BodythinksitusefultoaddresscertaingeneralaspectsofthestandardofreviewestablishedbyArt.17.6oftheADAgreement,asthisstandardbearsuponeachissuearisinginthisappeal.Withregardtothesegeneralaspects,theAppellateBodythinksthattwothresholdaspectsoftheArt.17.6needtobenoted.Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrules:8
　　“…ThefirstisthatArticle17.6isidentifiedinArticle1.2andAppendix2oftheDSUasoneofthe‘specialoradditionalrulesandprocedures’whichprevailovertheDSU‘[t]otheextentthatthereisadifference’betweenthoseprovisionsandtheprovisionsoftheDSU.InGuatemala-Anti-DumpingInvestigationRegardingPortlandCementfromMexico,adisputewhichinvolvedclaimsundertheAnti-DumpingAgreement,westated:‘Inourview,itisonlywheretheprovisionsoftheDSUandthespecialoradditionalrulesandproceduresofacoveredagreementcannotbereadascomplementingeachotherthatthespecialoradditionalprovisionsaretoprevail.AspecialoradditionalprovisionshouldonlybefoundtoprevailoveraprovisionoftheDSUinasituationwhereadherencetotheoneprovisionwillleadtoaviolationoftheotherprovision,thatis,inthecaseofaconflictbetweenthem.’
　　Thus,wemustconsidertheextenttowhichArticle17.6oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementcanproperlybereadas‘complementing’therulesandproceduresoftheDSUor,conversely,theextenttowhichArticle17.6‘conflicts’withtheDSU.
　　ThesecondthresholdaspectfollowsfromthefirstandconcernstherelationshipbetweenArticle17.6oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementandArticle11oftheDSU.Article17.6laysdownrulesrelatingtoapanel’sexaminationof‘matters’arisingunderone,andonlyone,coveredagreement,theAnti-DumpingAgreement.Incontrast,Article11oftheDSUprovidesruleswhichapplytoapanel’sexaminationof‘matters’arisingunderanyofthecoveredagreements.Article11reads,inpart:‘…apanelshouldmakeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements…’
　　Article11oftheDSUimposesuponpanelsacomprehensiveobligationtomakean‘objectiveassessmentofthematter’,anobligationwhichembracesallaspectsofapanel’sexaminationofthe‘matter’,bothfactualandlegal.Thus,panelsmakean‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’,ofthe‘applicability’ofthecoveredagreements,andofthe‘conformity’ofthemeasureatstakewiththosecoveredagreements.Article17.6isdividedintotwoseparatesub-paragraphs,eachapplyingtodifferentaspectsofthepanel’sexaminationofthematter.Thefirstsub-paragraphcoversthepanel’s‘assessmentofthefactsofthematter’,whereasthesecondcoversits‘interpret[ationof]therelevantprovisions’.ThestructureofArticle17.6,therefore,involvesacleardistinctionbetweenapanel’sassessmentofthefactsanditslegalinterpretationoftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　InconsideringArticle17.6(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement,itisimportanttobearinmindthedifferentrolesofpanelsandinvestigatingauthorities.Investigatingauthoritiesarecharged,undertheAnti-DumpingAgreement,withmakingfactualdeterminationsrelevanttotheiroveralldeterminationofdumpingandinjury.UnderArticle17.6(i),thetaskofpanelsissimplytoreviewtheinvestigatingauthorities’‘establishment’and‘evaluation’ofthefacts.Tothatend,Article17.6(i)requirespanelstomakean‘assessmentofthefacts’.ThelanguageofthisphrasereflectscloselytheobligationimposedonpanelsunderArticle11oftheDSUtomakean‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.Thusthetextofbothprovisionsrequirespanelsto‘assess’thefactsandthis,inourview,clearlynecessitatesanactiverevieworexaminationofthepertinentfacts.Article17.6(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementdoesnotexpresslystatethatpanelsareobligedtomakeanassessmentofthefactswhichis‘objective’.However,itisinconceivablethatArticle17.6(i)shouldrequireanythingotherthanthatpanelsmakeanobjective‘assessmentofthefactsofthematter’.Inthisrespect,weseeno‘conflict’betweenArticle17.6(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementandArticle11oftheDSU.
　　Article17.6(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementalsostatesthatthepanelistodetermine,first,whethertheinvestigatingauthorities’‘establishmentofthefactswasproper’and,second,whethertheauthorities’‘evaluationofthosefactswasunbiasedandobjective’.AlthoughthetextofArticle17.6(i)iscouchedintermsofanobligationonpanels-panels‘shall’makethesedeterminations-theprovision,atthesametime,ineffectdefineswheninvestigatingauthoritiescanbeconsideredtohaveactedinconsistentlywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreementinthecourseoftheir‘establishment’and‘evaluation’oftherelevantfacts.Inotherwords,Article17.6(i)setsforththeappropriatestandardtobeappliedbypanelsinexaminingtheWTO-consistencyoftheinvestigatingauthorities’establishmentandevaluationofthefactsunderotherprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.Thus,panelsmustassessiftheestablishmentofthefactsbytheinvestigatingauthoritieswasproperandiftheevaluationofthosefactsbythoseauthoritieswasunbiasedandobjective.Ifthesebroadstandardshavenotbeenmet,apanelmustholdtheinvestigatingauthorities’establishmentorevaluationofthefactstobeinconsistentwiththeAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　WeturnnowtoArticle17.6(ii)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.ThefirstsentenceofArticle17.6(ii),echoingcloselyArticle3.2oftheDSU,statesthatpanels‘shall’interprettheprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreement‘inaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw’.SuchcustomaryrulesareembodiedinArticles31and32oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(ViennaConvention).Clearly,thisaspectofArticle17.6(ii)involvesno‘conflict’withtheDSUbut,rather,confirmsthattheusualrulesoftreatyinterpretationundertheDSUalsoapplytotheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　ThesecondsentenceofArticle17.6(ii)bearsrepeatinginfull:‘WherethepanelfindsthatarelevantprovisionoftheAgreementadmitsofmorethanonepermissibleinterpretation,thepanelshallfindtheauthorities’measuretobeinconformitywiththeAgreementifitrestsupononeofthosepermissibleinterpretations.’
　　ThissecondsentenceofArticle17.6(ii)presupposesthatapplicationoftherulesoftreatyinterpretationinArticles31and32oftheViennaConventioncouldgiveriseto,atleast,twointerpretationsofsomeprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreement,which,underthatConvention,wouldbothbe‘permissibleinterpretations’.Inthatevent,ameas

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