domesticprocedurestotheauthoritiesoftheinvestigatingcountryduringtheinvestigation.…JapanacknowledgesthatArticle17.5(ii)mustguidethePanelinthisrespect,butarguesthatit‘complements’theprovisionsoftheDSUwhichestablishthatitistheresponsibilityofthepaneltodeterminetheadmissibilityandrelevanceofevidenceofferedbypartiestoadispute.Weagree,totheextentthatitisourresponsibilitytodecidewhatevidencemaybeconsidered.However,thatArticle17.5(ii)andtheDSUprovisionsarecomplementarydoesnotdiminishtheimportanceofArticle17.5(ii)inguidingourdecisionsinthisregard.Itisaspecificprovisiondirectingapanel’sdecisionastowhatevidenceitwillconsiderinexaminingaclaimundertheADAgreement.Moreover,iteffectuatesthegeneralprinciplethatpanelsreviewingthedeterminationsofinvestigatingauthoritiesinanti-dumpingcasesarenottoengageindenovoreview.
　　TheconclusionthatwewillnotconsidernewevidencewithrespecttoclaimsundertheADAgreementflowsnotonlyfromArticle17.5(ii),butalsofromthefactthatapanelisnottoperformadenovoreviewoftheissuesconsideredanddecidedbytheinvestigatingauthorities.WenotethatseveralpanelshaveappliedsimilarprinciplesinreviewingdeterminationsofnationalauthoritiesinthecontextofsafeguardsundertheAgreementonSafeguardsandspecialsafeguardsunderArticle6oftheAgreementonTextilesandClothing.ThereisnocorollarytoArticle17.5(ii)inthoseagreements.Nonetheless,thesepanelshaveconcludedthatadenovoreviewofthedeterminationswouldbeinappropriate,andhaveundertakenanassessmentof,interalia,whetherallrelevantfactswereconsideredbytheauthorities.Inthatcontext,thePanelinUnitedStates-DefinitiveSafeguardMeasuresonImportsofWheatGlutenfromtheEuropeanCommunities(UnitedStates-WheatGluten)recentlyobservedthatitwasnotthepanel’sroletocollectnewdataortoconsiderevidencewhichcouldhavebeenpresentedtothedecisionmakerbutwasnot.”
　　Clearly,thePaneldeterminesnottoconsidernewevidencewithrespecttoclaimsundertheADAgreement.Nonetheless,itisimportanttonotethat,thesamePanelmakesanotherrulingnottoexcludethepresentationofevidencewhichmightinanyeventgobeyondthespecificfactsmadeavailabletotheadministeringauthorityinaccordancewithappropriatedomesticproceduresduringthecourseofasingleanti-dumpinginvestigation.Inthisrespect,thePanelrules:14
　　“Itisimportanttonotethat,inthiscase,Japan’sclaimsarenotlimitedtochallengesundertheADAgreementtothefinalanti-dumpingmeasureimposedbytheUnitedStates.…Japandoes,however,arguethatthechallengedevidenceisrelevanttotheclaimsunderArticleXofGATT1994.Inourview,theevidencetobeconsideredinconnectionwithJapan’sArticleXclaimisnotlimitedbytheprovisionsofArticle17.5(ii)oftheADAgreementTotheextentthereareanylimitstotheevidencethatmaybeconsideredinconnectionwithJapan’sclaimunderArticleXofGATT1994,thesewouldderivefromtheprovisionsoftheDSUitself,andnottheADAgreement.
　　UnderArticle13.2oftheDSU,Panelshaveageneralrighttoseekinformation‘fromanyrelevantsource’.Wenotethat,asageneralrule,panelshavewidelatitudeinadmittingevidenceinWTOdisputesettlement.TheDSU(asopposedtotheADAgreement)containsnorulethatmightbeunderstoodtorestricttheevidencethatpanelsmayconsider.Moreover,internationaltribunalsaregenerallyfreetoadmitandevaluateevidenceofeverykind,andtoascribetoittheweightthattheyseefit.Asonelegalscholarhasnoted:‘Theinherentflexibilityoftheinternationalprocedure,anditstendencytobefreefromtechnicalrulesofevidenceappliedinmunicipallaw,providetheevidencewithawiderscopeininternationalproceedings…Generallyspeaking,internationaltribunalshavenotcommittedthemselvestotherestrictiverulesofevidenceinmunicipallaw.Theyhavefounditjustifiedtoreceiveeverykindandformofevidence,andhaveattachedtothemtheprobativevaluetheydeserveunderthecircumstancesofagivencase.’
　　Itseemstousthat,particularlyinconsideringallegationsunderArticleXofGATT1994,weshouldexerciseourdiscretiontoallowthepresentationofevidenceconcerningtheadministrationofthedefendingMembers’anti-dumpinglaws,whichmightinanyeventgobeyondthespecificfactsmadeavailabletotheadministeringauthorityinaccordancewithappropriatedomesticproceduresduringthecourseofasingleanti-dumpinginvestigation.
　　[…]
　　Thereis,however,asignificantdistinctionbetweenquestionsconcerningtheadmissibilityofevidence,andtheweighttobeaccordedtotheevidenceinmakingourdecisions.ThatwehaveconcludedthatitisnotappropriatetoexcludefromthisproceedingattheoutsetevidenceputforwardbyJapanhasnonecessaryimplicationsconcerningtherelevanceorweightofthatevidenceinourultimatedeterminationsonthesubstantiveclaimsbeforeus.Moreover,wewishtoemphasizethatwehaveconductedourexaminationofthechallengedfinalanti-dumpingmeasureandtheunderlyingdeterminationsoftheUSDOCandUSITCinstrictobservanceoftherequirementsofArticle17.5(ii).”
　　(iii)TentativeRemarks:GuidancefromtheAppellateBody
　　ThenewArt.17.5(ii)oftheADAgreementbroughtintheUruguayRoundcausesadhocbutvagueapproachestodomesticinvestigation.Contradictoryreportshavebeenissued,astowhetherthisarticleallowstheadmissibilitybeforethepanelproceedingsofnewevidenceundertheADAgreementwheresuchevidenceorclaimshadnotbeenraisedbeforethenationalinvestigatingauthorities.However,overall,therecordappearstobesatisfactory.Thisparticularlyso,bearinginmindthatthenegotiatorsoftheDSUandofthespecificdisputesettlementprovisionsofthenewAnti-dumpingAgreementfailedtocomeupwithmuchmorepreciseguidelinesthanthosethatpanelshadsomehowsetforthemselves.Asfarasfindingsoffactsareconcerned,thenewADAgreementcontainsoneguidelinethatpurportstobemorespecifici.e.restrictingthepossibilityforpanelstooverturntheevaluationoffactsasmadebynationaladministeringauthorities.Apartfromthequestionwhetherthismeansthatpanelsmusthenceforthignorecompellingnewevidence,thereportsexaminedshowthatpanelshaveavoideddenovoreviewsandhaveatmostengagedin“marginal”reviewofthefindingsoffact.15
　　AsfarasthereportissuedbythePanelinUS-Hot-rolledSteel(DS184)nottoconsidernewevidence,itappearsatleasttobesatisfactoryowingtoitsunderstandingofArt.17.5(ii)andbearinginmindthatapanelisnottoperformadenovoreviewoftheissuesconsideredanddecidedbytheinvestigatingauthorities.Itsconclusionnottoacceptnewevidencei

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