sreasonablewiththeiremphasisonstrictobservanceoftherequirementsofArt.17.5(ii).
　　Furthermore,thePanelnotesthattotheextentthereareanylimitstotheevidencethatmaybeconsideredinconnectionwiththoseclaimsunderthecoveredagreementsotherthantheADAgreement,thesewouldderivefromtheprovisionsoftheDSUitself,andnottheADAgreement.Also,theyrulethat,asageneralrule,panelshavewidelatitudeinadmittingevidenceinWTOdisputesettlement.TheDSU(asopposedtotheADAgreement)containsnorulethatmightbeunderstoodtorestricttheevidencethatpanelsmayconsider.Therefore,theymakeanotherconclusionthat,“particularlyinconsideringallegationsunderArt.XofGATT1994,weshouldexerciseourdiscretiontoallowthepresentationofevidenceconcerningtheadministrationofthedefendingMembers’anti-dumpinglaws,whichmightinanyeventgobeyondthespecificfactsmadeavailabletotheadministeringauthorityinaccordancewithappropriatedomesticproceduresduringthecourseofasingleanti-dumpinginvestigation”.
　　Theauthor,however,cannothidehisconcernastosuchimplicationasnottoacceptnewevidence,derivedfromArt.17.5(ii)byanypartiesorpanelsthat,especiallywithregardtotherulingthat:“Itseemscleartousthat,underthisprovision,apanelmaynot,whenexaminingaclaimofviolationoftheADAgreementinaparticulardetermination,considerfactsorevidencepresentedtoitbyapartyinanattempttodemonstrateerrorinthedeterminationconcerningquestionsthatwereinvestigatedanddecidedbytheauthorities,unlesstheyhadbeenmadeavailableinconformitywiththeappropriatedomesticprocedurestotheauthoritiesoftheinvestigatingcountryduringtheinvestigation”.Inanyevent,asapracticalmatter,itisunlikelythataMemberwouldimproperlywithholdargumentsfromcompetentauthoritieswithaviewtoraisingthoseargumentslaterbeforeapanel.Moredangerous,itwouldforceexportingmemberstoappearbeforenationalinvestigatingauthoritiesinordertokeepthepossibilitytoraiseissuesinpanelproceedings.Clearly,itisatleastnotreasonable.Thepartiesinvolvedinanunderlyinganti-dumpinginvestigationaregenerallyexporters,importersandothercommercialentities,whilethoseinvolvedinWTOdisputesettlementaretheMembersoftheWTO.Therefore,itjustifiesacceptingnewevidenceevenincasesundertheADAgreement,solongaspanelsthinkitappropriatetoexercisetheirdiscretionso.
　　However,inanyevent,thenewArt.17.5(ii)isnotwithoutanymeritbutcausinguncertainty.Astobeshownbelow,thereisaclearconnectionbetweenArts.17.6(i)and17.5(ii).ThefactsofthematterreferredtoinArt.17.6(i)are“thefactsmadeavailableinconformitywithappropriatedomesticprocedurestotheauthoritiesoftheimportingMember”underArt.17.5(ii).Art.17.6(i)placesalimitationonthepanelinthecircumstancesdefinedbytheArticle.TheaimofArt.17.6(i)istopreventapanelfrom“second-guessing”adeterminationofanationalauthoritywhentheestablishmentofthefactsisproperandtheevaluationofthosefactsisunbiasedandobjective.ItbearsmoresignificancethatthepanelnotetheimportanceofArt.17.5(ii)inguidingtheirdecisionsinthisregard.Itisaspecificprovisiondirectingapanel’sdecisionastowhatevidenceitwillconsiderinexaminingaclaimundertheADAgreement.Moreover,iteffectuatesthegeneralprinciplethatpanelsreviewingthedeterminationsofinvestigatingauthoritiesinanti-dumpingcasesarenottoengageindenovoreview.
　　Mostimportantly,Art.17.5(ii)canneverbedeemedtorequirethatapanelconsiderthosefactsexclusivelyintheformatinwhichtheywereoriginallyavailabletotheinvestigatingauthority.Inanyevent,thestatementofArt.17.5(ii)thattheDSBshallestablishapaneltoexaminethematterbasedupon:“thefactsmadeavailableinconformitywithappropriatedomesticprocedurestotheauthoritiesoftheimportingMember”,doesnotmeanthatapanelisfrozenintoinactivity.Itdoesnotofferanybasisforrefusingtoconsideraclaimbyapartyinadisputesettlementmerelybecausethesubjectmatteroftheclaimwerenotraisedbeforetheinvestigatingauthoritiesundernationallaw.ThisistobeconfirmedbysomerulingsfromtheAppellateBodybelow.
　　WhatevermeritsArt.17.6oftheADAgreementbears,itoffersnoclearguidanceratherthancausingsomeissuesofinterpretation.Therefore,theauthorthinksitmuchusefulandunavoidabletoexaminehowandtowhatextenttheAppellateBodyhaveappliedandinterpretedthisarticle.
　　Inthisregard,theAppellateBodyinThailand-H-beams(DS122)considertheextentofapanel’sobligationsunderArt.17.6toreviewtheinvestigatingauthority’sfinaldetermination,andtheyruleas:16
　　“Articles17.5and17.6clarifythepowersofreviewofapanelestablishedundertheAnti-DumpingAgreement.Theseprovisionsplacelimitingobligationsonapanel,withrespecttothereviewoftheestablishmentandevaluationoffactsbytheinvestigatingauthority.…
　　Article17.5specifiesthatapanel’sexaminationmustbebaseduponthe‘factsmadeavailable’tothedomesticauthorities.Anti-dumpinginvestigationsfrequentlyinvolvebothconfidentialandnon-confidentialinformation.ThewordingofArticle17.5doesnotspecificallyexcludefrompanelexaminationfactsmadeavailabletodomesticauthorities,butnotdisclosedordiscernibletointerestedpartiesbythetimeofthefinaldetermination.BasedonthewordingofArticle17.5,wecanconcludethatapanelmustexaminethefactsbeforeit,whetherinconfidentialdocumentsornon-confidentialdocuments.
　　Article17.6(i)requiresapanel,initsassessmentofthefactsofthematter,todeterminewhethertheauthorities’‘establishmentofthefacts’was‘proper’.Theordinarymeaningof‘establishment’suggestsanactionto‘placebeyonddispute;ascertain,demonstrate,prove’;theordinarymeaningof‘proper’suggests‘accurate’or‘correct’.Basedontheordinarymeaningofthesewords,theproperestablishmentofthefactsappearstohavenologicallinktowhetherthosefactsaredisclosedto,ordiscernibleby,thepartiestoananti-dumpinginvestigationpriortothefinaldetermination.Article17.6(i)requiresapanelalsotoexaminewhethertheevaluationofthosefactswas‘unbiasedandobjective’.Theordinarymeaningofthewords‘unbiased’and‘objective’alsoappearstohavenologicallinktowhetherthosefactsaredisclosedto,ordiscernibleby,thepartiestoananti-dumpinginvestigationatthetimeofthefinaldetermination.
　　ThereisaclearconnectionbetweenArticles17.6(i)and17.5(ii).ThefactsofthematterreferredtoinArticle17.6(i)are‘thefactsmadeavailableinconformitywithappropriatedomesticprocedurestotheautho

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