nvestigatingauthoritymadeonthebasisoftheinformationbeforeitinordertodeterminewhethertheestablishmentofthefactswasproperandtheevaluationofthefactswasunbiasedandobjective.Withrespecttothelatteraspectofourreview,weconsiderthatthetaskbeforeusistoexaminewhether,onthebasisoftheinformationbeforeit,anunbiasedandobjectiveinvestigatingauthorityevaluatingthatevidencecouldhavereachedtheconclusionsitdid.”
　　ItisruledinmoredetailbythePanelinUS-Hot-rolledSteelProducts(DS184)as:3
　　“…Thequestionofwhethertheestablishmentoffactswasproperdoesnot,inourview,involvethequestionwhetherallrelevantfactswereconsideredincludingthosethatmightdetractfromanaffirmativedetermination.Whetherthefactswereproperlyestablishedinvolvesdeterminingwhethertheinvestigatingauthoritiescollectedrelevantandreliableinformationconcerningtheissuetobedecided-itessentiallygoestotheinvestigativeprocess.Then,assumingthattheestablishmentofthefactswithregardtoaparticularclaimwasproper,weconsiderwhether,basedontheevidencebeforetheinvestigatingauthorities[oftheimportingMember]atthetimeofthedetermination,anunbiasedandobjectiveinvestigatingauthorityevaluatingthatevidencecouldhavereachedtheconclusionsthattheinvestigatingauthorities[oftheimportingMember]reachedonthematterinquestion.Inthiscontext,weconsiderwhetheralltheevidencewasconsidered,includingfactswhichmightdetractfromthedecisionactuallyreachedbytheinvestigatingauthorities.”
　　WithrespecttotheinterpretationoftheADAgreement,itisArt.17.6(ii)thatrunsonthelegalinterpretationissue.Inthisrespect,itsapplicationofcustomaryrulesofinterpretation,aswellasunusualprovisioninArt.17.6(ii)hasalsobeennotedonmanyoccasions,e.g.,thePanelinArgentina-FloorTiles(DS189)rules:4
　　“WeconsiderthefirstpartofthissubparagraphtobeaclearreferencetothecustomaryrulesofinterpretationaslaiddowninArticles31-32oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties.Article31oftheViennaConventionprovidesthatatreatyshallbeinterpretedinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheircontextandinlightofitsobjectandpurpose.Article17.6(ii)oftheADAgreementprovidesthatinthecasewherethismethodleadsthepaneltotheconclusionthattheprovisioninquestionadmitsofmorethanonepermissibleinterpretation,thepanelshallfindthemeasureinconformityifitisbasedononesuchpermissibleinterpretation.”
　　Furthermore,thePanelinUS-Hot-rolledSteelProducts(DS184)rules:5
　　“…Thus,inconsideringthoseaspectsofthedetermination[oftheimportingMember]whichstandorfalldependingontheinterpretationoftheADAgreementitselfratherthanorinadditiontotheanalysisoffacts,wefirstinterprettheprovisionsoftheADAgreement.AstheAppellateBodyhasrepeatedlystated,panelsaretoconsidertheinterpretationoftheWTOAgreements,includingtheADAgreement,inaccordancewiththeprinciplessetoutintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(theViennaConvention).Thus,welooktotheordinarymeaningoftheprovisioninquestion,initscontext,andinlightofitsobjectandpurpose.Finally,wemayconsiderthepreparatorywork(thenegotiatinghistory)oftheprovision,shouldthisbenecessaryorappropriateinlightoftheconclusionswereachbasedonthetextoftheprovision.Wethenevaluatewhethertheinterpretation[oftheimportingMember]isonethatis‘permissible’inlightofthecustomaryrulesofinterpretationofinternationallaw.Ifso,weallowthatinterpretationtostand,andunlessthereiserrorinthesubsequentanalysisofthefactsunderthatlegalinterpretationunderthestandardofreviewunderArticle17.6(i),thechallengedactionisupheld.”
　　Withrespecttolegalanalysis,asnotedabove,Art.17.6(ii)providesfirstthattherelevantprovisionsshallbeinaccordancethecustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpubliclaw,anddiffersnothingfromthegeneralguidelineforinterpretationofthecoveredagreementsundertheWTO;andthereforewewillnotgiveunnecessarydetailsastothisgenerallyappliedguidanceinthissection.However,whatattractsourobservationhereisthecontroversyanddoubtcausedbyArt.17.6(ii)whichthenprovidesthatifthepanelfindsthattherelevantprovisionsadmitsofmorethanonepermissibleinterpretation,theauthority’sactionsmustrestupononeofthe“permissibleinterpretations”tobeinconformity.
　　Interestingly,however,itisnotclearinlightoftheViennaConventionwhetherorhowapanelcouldeverreachtheconclusionthatprovisionsofanagreementadmitofmorethanoneinterpretation.ThisistruebecausetheViennaConventionprovidesasetofrulesforinterpretationoftreaties,aimedatresolvingambiguitiesinthetext.Arts.31and32oftheViennaConventionareparticularlyrelevanthere.Art.31,“Generalruleofinterpretation”,providesasetofrulesguidingtheinterpretationofthetextoftreaty.Art.32,“Supplementarymeansofinterpretation”,providesadditionalguidelinesforanycasenwhichapplicationoftherulesinArt.31stillleavesthemeaningofaprovision“ambiguousorobscure”,orwhentheyrenderaprovision“manifestlyabsurdorunreasonable”.Art.32suggests,inotherwords,thattheapplicationofArt.31shouldinmanycasesresolveambiguities,andthatwheretheapplicationofArt.31doesnotresolveambiguities,Art.32’sownrule“recourse…tosupplementarymeansofinterpretation,includingthepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion”willresolveanylingeringambiguities.
　　Tounderstandthesourceofthatcontroversy,onemustreadArt.17.6(ii)inthelightofitsnegotiationcontextandhistory.6Art.17.6(ii)wasthecompromiselanguageoftheUruguayRoundnegotiators.Whatdoesitmean?Abetterunderstandingofitsmeaningmustawaitfuturepaneldecisions.Butatleastonthefaceofit,subsection(ii)seemstoestablishatwo-stepprocessforpanelreviewofinterpretivequestions.7First,thepanelmustconsiderwhethertheprovisionoftheagreementinquestionadmitsofmorethanoneinterpretation.Ifnot,thepanelmustvindicatetheprovision’sonlypermissibleinterpretation.If,ontheotherhand,thepaneldeterminesthattheprovisiondoesindeedadmitofmorethanoneinterpretation,thepanelshallproceedtothesecondstepoftheanalysisandconsiderwhetherthenationalinterpretationiswithinthesetof“permissible”interpretations.Ifso,thepanelmustdefertotheinterpretationgiventotheprovisionbyanationalgovernment.
　　(ii)RelationshipbetweenArt.11oftheDSUandArt.17.6oftheADAgreement
　　InUS-Hot-rolledSteelProducts(DS184),theAppellate

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