nsprovidedinthecoveredagreements”.Thislanguagecouldbeinterpretedasaconstraintonthestandardofreview,butpossiblynottotheextentofArt.17.6oftheAnti-dumpingAgreement.1
　　TheissueofscopeofreviewbecameacontroversyinthenegotiationsofthenewAnti-dumpingCodeduringtheUruguayRoundandcenteredonwhatstandardofreviewshouldbeappliedbypanelsinexaminingissuesoflaw,especiallywhentheagreementdoesnotspecificallyaddressanissueandwhetherthereshouldbeaprovisionlimitingtheextentofscrutinybyapaneloffactualissues,soastopreventpanelsfromengaginginadenovoreviewofsuchfactualissues.Astothesecondissue,obviouslystandardofreviewandscopeofreviewarecloselylinked.
　　Inthisrespect,themostprominentoftheseisfoundintheADAgreementatArt.17.6whichreadsasfollows:
　　
　　“Inexaminingthematterreferredtoinparagraph5:
　　(i)    initsassessmentofthefactsofthematter,thepanelshalldeterminewhethertheauthorities’establishmentofthefactswasproperandwhethertheirevaluationofthosefactswasunbiasedandobjective.Iftheestablishmentofthefactswasproperandtheevaluationwasunbiasedandobjective,eventhoughthepanelmighthavereachedadifferentconclusion,theevaluationshallnotbeoverturned;
　　(ii)    thepanelshallinterprettherelevantprovisionsoftheAgreementinaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw.WherethepanelfindsthatarelevantprovisionoftheAgreementadmitsofmorethanonepermissibleinterpretation,thepanelshallfindtheauthorities’measuretobeinconformitywiththeAgreementifitrestsupononeofthosepermissibleinterpretations.”
　　
　　AndArt.17.6isnottheonlyprovisionbearingonthestandard-of-reviewintheanti-dumpingfield.AlsorelevantaretwoMinisterialDecisionstakenatthefinalMinisterialConferenceoftheUruguayRoundatMarrakesh,MoroccoinApril1994,andmadepartoftheUruguayRoundFinalActtext.Thesestate,respectively:
　　
　　“DECISIONONREVIEWOFARTICLE17.6OFTHEAGREEMENTONIMPLEMENTATIONOFARTICLEVIOFTHEGENERALAGREEMENTONTARIFFSANDTRADE1994
　　Ministersdecideasfollows:
　　Thestandardofreviewinparagraph6ofArticle17oftheAgreementonImplementationofArticleVIofGATT1994shallbereviewedafteraperiodofthreeyearswithaviewtoconsideringthequestionofwhetheritiscapableofgeneralapplication.
　　DECLARATIONONDISPUTESETTLEMENTPURSUANTTOTHEAGREEMENTONIMPLEMENTATIONOFARTICLEVIOFTHEGENERALAGREEMENTONTARIFFSANDTRADE1994ORPARTVOFTHEAGREEMENTONSUBSIDIESANDCOUNTERVAILINGMEASURES
　　Ministersrecognize,withrespecttodisputesettlementpursuanttotheAgreementonImplementationofArticleVIofGATT1994orPartVoftheAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures,theneedfortheconsistentresolutionofdisputesarisingfromanti-dumpingandcountervailingdutymeasures.”
　　
　　Asbothofthesepassagessuggest,theanti-dumpingprovisionswerenotuncontroversial,fortheMinisterialDecisionseembothtolimittheapplicationofthoseanti-dumpingprovisions,andtoraisequestionshowtheyfitintotheoveralljurisprudenceoftheWTO.Nevertheless,wenotethatboththetwoMinisterialDecisionsareamere“Declaration”,ratherthana“Decision”oftheMinisters.Inourview,aDeclarationlacksthemandatoryauthorityofaDecision.IntheMinisterialDeclaration,Ministerssimply“recognize…theneed”fortheconsistentresolutionofdisputes.Inouropinion,thesimplerecognitionoftheneedforanactiondoesnotmandatethataction.InaMinisterialDecision,bycontrast,Ministers“decide”thatcertainactionshallbetaken.Forthesereasons,wedonotconsiderthattheMinisterialDeclarationimposesanyobligationsonpanels.
　　SincethestandardslaidoutintheADAgreement(andtheDSU)essentiallycodifyrecentpanelreviewstandardsundertheGATT,andremaintobeclarifiedanddevelopedbyfurtherpracticebytheDSBundertheWTO,theremainderofthissectionwillexaminethosestandardswithrespecttoanti-dumpingasimplementedbypanelsandinterpretedbytheAppellateBodyinparticularcases.
　　IISpecialStandardofReviewundertheADAgreement:inGeneral
　　Asnotedaboveandmorespecifiedpreviously,intheabsenceofprovisionsintheDSUoranyothercoveredagreementsexplicitlyconcerningthestandardofreviewquestion,astothegeneralapproachforpanels(outsideoftheanti-dumpingareas),Art.11oftheDSUwhichprovides“anobjectiveassessment”bearsdirectlyonstandardofreviewapplicabletothedeterminationandassessmentofthefactsinnationalinvestigativeproceedings.Also,panelshavestated,onmorethanoneoccasion,that,for“allbutone”ofthecoveredagreements,Art.11oftheDSUsetsforththeappropriatestandardofreviewforpanels.The“one”istheADAgreement.
　　(i)AdhocApproachestoDomesticDetermination:Art.17.6
　　Asnotedpreviously,ingeneral,onbalancepanelsdon’tactas“super-investigativeauthorities”anddonotengageinadenovoreviewoffactualissues,norinatotaldeference.However,astobenotedbelow,Art.17.6ADseemstosetoutanadhocspecificstandardofreviewfordisputesarisingundertheADAgreement.Art.17.6oftheADAgreementsetsoutaspecialstandardofreviewfordisputesarisingunderthatAgreement.However,astobeshowninmoredetailbelow,thisArt.17.6standardappliesonlytodisputesarisingundertheADAgreement,andnottodisputesarisingunderothercoveredagreements.Importantly,itseemsthatthenegotiatorscompromisedsothatthelimitinglanguageonstandardofreviewasprovidedforinArt.17.6oftheADAgreement,wouldapplyonlytotheanti-dumpingtext,andnotnecessarilytootherdisputesettlementcasesbeforetheWTOpanels.
　　Withregardtofactualissues,itisArt.17.6(i)thatisonpoint.Inthisrespect,thespecialstandardinArt.17.6(i)hasbeenappliedonmanyoccasions,e.g.,thePanelinArgentina-FloorTiles(DS189)rules:2
　　“WenotethatthePanelinthecaseUnitedStates-Anti-DumpingMeasuresonStainlessSteelPlateinCoilsandStainlessSteelSheetandStripfromKoreaconsideredthatArticle17.6(i):‘speaksnotonlytotheestablishmentofthefacts,butalsototheirevaluation.Therefore,thePanelmustchecknotmerelywhetherthenationalauthoritieshaveproperlyestablishedtherelevantfactsbutalsothevalueorweightattachedtothosefactsandwhetherthiswasdoneinanunbiasedandobjectivemanner.Thisconcernstheaccordingofacertainweighttothefactsintheirrelationtoeachother;itisnotalegalevaluation.’
　　Accordingly,itisnotourroleasapaneltoperformadenovoreviewoftheevidencewhichwasbeforetheinvestigatingauthorityatthetimeitmadeitsdetermination.Rather,wemustreviewthedeterminationthei

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