ncebegiventoitsviewsonthemeaningofitsownlaw.5
　　“WhileitisclearfromthetermsofArticle3.2oftheDSUthatitfallswithinthecompetenceofthePanelto‘clarifytheexistingprovisionsof[thecoveredagreements]inaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw’,theDSUdoesnotexpresslyprovidehowpanelsshouldaddressdomesticlegislation.Article11oftheDSUonlyspecifiesthatpanels‘shouldmake[…]anobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecase’.However,bothArticle3.2oftheDSUandthepracticeoftheAppellateBodymakeitclearthatwehave,wheneverappropriate,todevelopourapproachonthebasisofthatofinternationalcourtsinsimilarcircumstances.Wewillconsequentlytakeintoconsiderationthepracticeofinternationaltribunalsinthisrespect.”6
　　Furthermore,theunderstandingofalawtheWTO-compatibilityofwhichhastobeassessedbeginswithananalysisofthetermsofthatlaw.However,panelshaveneverconsideredthattheyshouldlimitthemselvestoananalysisofthetextofmunicipallawinisolationfromitsinterpretationbydomesticcourtsorotherauthorities,eveniftheyweretofindthattexttobeclearonitsface.Panelsthinkiftheyweretodoso,theymightdevelopanunderstandingofthatlawdifferentfromthewayitisactuallyunderstoodandappliedbythedomesticauthorities.Thiswouldbecontrarytopanels’obligationtomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecase,pursuanttoArticle11oftheDSU.Therefore,panelsrulethattheymustlookatalltheaspectsofthedomesticlegislationthatarerelevantfortheirunderstandingofthedisputedmunicipallaw.However,lookingatalltherelevantaspectsofthedomesticlawofaMembermayraisesomemethodologicaldifficulties,suchashowmuchdeferencemustbepaidtothatMember’scharacterizationofitslegislation.Inthatcontext,panelsthinktheywilldeterminefirsthowtodealwiththataspectoftheexaminationofadomesticlawandhowtheyshouldconsiderthecase-lawrelatedtoit,wherecourtsare,interalia,responsibleforinterpretingthelaw.7
　　Thus,asruledinUS-1916Act(DS136/DS162),“[panels’]understandingoftheterm‘examination’asusedbytheAppellateBodyisthatpanelsneednotacceptatfacevaluethecharacterisationthattherespondentattachestoitslaw.Apanelmayanalysetheoperationofthedomesticlegislationanddeterminewhetherthedescriptionofthefunctioningofthelaw,asmadebytherespondent,isconsistentwiththelegalstructureofthatMember.Thisway,itwillbeabletodeterminewhetherornotthelawasappliedisinconformitywiththeobligationsoftheMemberconcernedundertheWTOAgreement.”8
　　Tosumup,legislationassuch,independentlyfromitsapplicationinspecificcases,maybreachGATT/WTOobligations.PanelsundertheGATT/WTOconsistentlyconsiderthat,underArticleXXIIIoftheGATT,theyhavethejurisdictiontodealwithclaimsagainstlegislationassuch.SuchrulingisalsoconfirmedbytheWTOpractice.
　　However,panelscanneversubstitutedomesticauthoritiesoftheirroleininterpretingnationallaw.Panelshavetofindtheirappropriateapproachestodomesticlaw.Inthisrespect,ingeneral,assummarizedbytheAppellateBodyinUS-1998Act(DS176),“themunicipallawofWTOMembersmayservenotonlyasevidenceoffacts,butalsoasevidenceofcomplianceornon-compliancewithinternationalobligations.UndertheDSU,apanelmayexaminethemunicipallawofaWTOMemberforthepurposeofdeterminingwhetherthatMemberhascompliedwithitsobligationsundertheWTOAgreement.Suchanassessmentisalegalcharacterizationbyapanel”.9
　　IVSpecialRulesforClaimsagainstAnti-dumpingLegislationasSuch
　　（i）Introduction
　　InUS-1916Act(DS136/DS162),theUnitedStatesappealsthePanel’sfindingthatithadjurisdictiontoconsidertheclaimsthatthe1916ActassuchisinconsistentwithArticleVIoftheGATT1994andtheADAgreement.AccordingtotheUnitedStates,MemberscannotbringaclaimofinconsistencywiththeADAgreementagainstlegislationassuchindependentlyfromaclaimofinconsistencyofoneofthethreeanti-dumpingmeasuresspecifiedinArt.17.4,i.e.,adefinitiveanti-dumpingduty,apriceundertakingor,insomecircumstances,aprovisionalmeasure.
　　InexaminingthelegalbasisforthePanel’sjurisdictiontoconsidertheclaimsofinconsistencymadeinrespectofthe1916Actassuch,theAppellateBodybeginswithArt.1.1oftheDSU,whichstates,inrelevantpart:“TherulesandproceduresofthisUnderstandingshallapplytodisputesbroughtpursuanttotheconsultationanddisputesettlementprovisionsoftheagreementslistedinAppendix1tothisUnderstanding(referredtointhisUnderstandingasthe‘coveredagreements’).”TheAppellateBodyrulesthat,“[f]ortheDSUtoapplytoclaimsthatthe1916ActassuchisinconsistentwithArticleVIoftheGATT1994andtheAnti-DumpingAgreement,alegalbasistobringtheclaimsmustbefoundintheGATT1994andtheAnti-DumpingAgreement,respectively”.Theyalsonotethatinthepresentcase,“theEuropeanCommunitiesandJapanbothbroughttheirclaimsofinconsistencywithArticleVIoftheGATT1994andtheAnti-DumpingAgreementpursuanttoArticleXXIIIoftheGATT1994andArticle17oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement”.10
　　SincelegalbasisforclaimsagainstlegislationassuchundertheGATT1994hasgenerallybeendiscussedabove,theauthorwillnotgiveunnecessarydetailinthisrespectandmeanstofocushereontheissueofthelegalbasisforclaimsbroughtundertheADAgreement,Art.17.4oftheADAgreementbearsgreatrelevancehere.ThentheauthorwillexaminesomerelevantaspectsoftheAppellateBodyReportonUS-1916Act(DS136/DS162).
　　(ii)GeneralLegalBasisunderArt.17oftheADAgreement
　　Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrules:11
　　“[…]JustasArticlesXXIIandXXIIIoftheGATT1994createalegalbasisforclaimsindisputesrelatingtoprovisionsoftheGATT1994,soalsoArticle17establishesthebasisfordisputesettlementclaimsrelatingtoprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.InthesamewaythatArticleXXIIIoftheGATT1994allowsaWTOMembertochallengelegislationassuch,Article17oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementisproperlytoberegardedasallowingachallengetolegislationassuch,unlessthispossibilityisexcluded.NosuchexpressexclusionisfoundinArticle17orelsewhereintheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　InconsideringwhetherArticle17containsanimplicitrestrictiononchallengestoanti-dumpinglegislationassuch,wefirstnotethatArticle17.1states:‘Exceptasotherwiseprovidedherein,theDisputeSettlementUnderstandingisapplicabletoconsultationsandthesettlementofdisputesunderthisAgreement.’
　　Article17.1refers,withoutqualification,to‘thesettlementofdisputes’undertheAnti-DumpingA

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