greement.Article17.1doesnotdistinguishbetweendisputesrelatingtoanti-dumpinglegislationassuchanddisputesrelatingtoanti-dumpingmeasurestakenintheimplementationofsuchlegislation.Article17.1thereforeimpliesthatMemberscanchallengetheconsistencyoflegislationassuchwiththeAnti-DumpingAgreementunlessthisactionisexcludedbyArticle17.
　　Similarly,Article17.2oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementdoesnotdistinguishbetweendisputesrelatingtoanti-dumpinglegislationassuchanddisputesrelatingtoanti-dumpingmeasurestakenintheimplementationofsuchlegislation.Onthecontrary,itreferstoconsultationswithrespectto‘anymatteraffectingtheoperationofthisAgreement’.
　　Article17.3oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementstates,inwordingthatmirrorsArticleXXIIIoftheGATT1994:‘IfanyMemberconsidersthatanybenefitaccruingtoit,directlyorindirectly,underthisAgreementisbeingnullifiedorimpaired,orthattheachievementofanyobjectiveisbeingimpeded,byanotherMemberorMembers,itmay,withaviewtoreachingamutuallysatisfactoryresolutionofthematter,requestinwritingconsultationswiththeMemberorMembersinquestion….’
　　InourReportinGuatemala-Cement,wedescribedArticle17.3as:‘…theequivalentprovisionintheAnti-DumpingAgreementtoArticlesXXIIandXXIIIoftheGATT1994,whichserveasthebasisforconsultationsanddisputesettlementundertheGATT1994…’
　　Article17.3doesnotexplicitlyaddresschallengestolegislationassuch.Aswehaveseenabove,ArticlesXXIIandXXIIIallowchallengestobebroughtundertheGATT1994againstlegislationassuch.SinceArticle17.3isthe‘equivalentprovision’toArticlesXXIIandXXIIIoftheGATT1994,Article17.3providesfurthersupportforourviewthatchallengesmaybebroughtundertheAnti-DumpingAgreementagainstlegislationassuch,unlesssuchchallengesareotherwiseexcluded.”
　　(iii)UnderstandingofArt.17.4oftheADAgreement
　　Asindicatedabove,theUnitedStatesbasesitsobjectiontothePanel’sjurisdictiononArt.17.4oftheADAgreementandtheAppellateBody’sReportinGuatemala-Cement.Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyinpresentcaserules:12
　　“[…]Wenotethat,unlikeArticles17.1to17.3,Article17.4isaspecialoradditionaldisputesettlementrulelistedinAppendix2totheDSU.
　　InGuatemala-Cement,MexicohadchallengedGuatemala’sinitiationofanti-dumpingproceedings,anditsconductoftheinvestigation,withoutidentifyinganyofthemeasureslistedinArticle17.4.Westatedthat:
　　‘…Threetypesofanti-dumpingmeasurearespecifiedinArticle17.4:definitiveanti-dumpingduties,theacceptanceofpriceundertakings,andprovisionalmeasures.AccordingtoArticle17.4,amattermaybereferredtotheDSBonlyifoneoftherelevantthreeanti-dumpingmeasuresisinplace.Thisprovision,whenreadtogetherwithArticle6.2oftheDSU,requiresapanelrequestinadisputebroughtundertheAnti-DumpingAgreementtoidentify,asthespecificmeasureatissue,eitheradefinitiveanti-dumpingduty,theacceptanceofapriceundertaking,oraprovisionalmeasure…
　　[…]WefindthatindisputesundertheAnti-DumpingAgreementrelatingtotheinitiationandconductofanti-dumpinginvestigations,adefinitiveanti-dumpingduty,theacceptanceofapriceundertakingoraprovisionalmeasuremustbeidentifiedaspartofthematterreferredtotheDSBpursuanttotheprovisionsofArticle17.4oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementandArticle6.2oftheDSU.’
　　NothinginourReportinGuatemala-CementsuggeststhatArticle17.4precludesreviewofanti-dumpinglegislationassuch.Rather,inthatcase,wesimplyfoundthat,forMexicotochallengeGuatemala’sinitiationandconductoftheanti-dumpinginvestigation,Mexicowasrequiredtoidentifyoneofthethreeanti-dumpingmeasureslistedinArticle17.4initsrequestforestablishmentofapanel.Sinceitdidnotdoso,thepanelinthatcasedidnothavejurisdiction.
　　ImportantconsiderationsunderlietherestrictioncontainedinArticle17.4.Inthecontextofdisputesettlementproceedingsregardingananti-dumpinginvestigation,thereistensionbetween,ontheonehand,acomplainingMember’srighttoseekredresswhenillegalactionaffectsitseconomicoperatorsand,ontheotherhand,theriskthatarespondingMembermaybeharassedoritsresourcessquanderedifdisputesettlementproceedingscouldbeinitiatedagainstitinrespectofeachstep,howeversmall,takeninthecourseofananti-dumpinginvestigation,evenbeforeanyconcretemeasurehadbeenadopted.Inourview,bylimitingtheavailabilityofdisputesettlementproceedingsrelatedtoananti-dumpinginvestigationtocasesinwhichaMember’srequestforestablishmentofapanelidentifiesadefinitiveanti-dumpingduty,apriceundertakingoraprovisionalmeasure,Article17.4strikesabalancebetweenthesecompetingconsiderations.
　　Therefore,Article17.4setsoutcertainconditionsthatmustexistbeforeaMembercanchallengeactiontakenbyanationalinvestigatingauthorityinthecontextofananti-dumpinginvestigation.However,Article17.4doesnotaddressoraffectaMember’srighttobringaclaimofinconsistencywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreementagainstanti-dumpinglegislationassuch.”
　　(iv)ExtensiveBasisinContext
　　Moreover,asnotedabove,theGATTandWTOcaselawfirmlyestablishesthatdisputesettlementproceedingsmaybebroughtbasedontheallegedinconsistencyofaMember’slegislationassuchwiththatMember’sobligations.Ithasbeenfoundthat,nothinginherentinthenatureofanti-dumpinglegislationthatwouldrationallydistinguishsuchlegislationfromothertypesoflegislationforpurposesofdisputesettlement,orthatwouldremoveanti-dumpinglegislationfromtheambitofthegenerally-acceptedpracticethatapanelmayexaminelegislationassuch.Togofurther,theAppellateBodyrulesthat:13
　　“OurreadingofArticle17asallowingMemberstobringclaimsagainstanti-dumpinglegislationassuchissupportedbyArticle18.4oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　Article18.4oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementstates:‘EachMembershalltakeallnecessarysteps,ofageneralorparticularcharacter,toensure,notlaterthanthedateofentryintoforceoftheWTOAgreementforit,theconformityofitslaws,regulationsandadministrativeprocedureswiththeprovisionsofthisAgreementastheymayapplyfortheMemberinquestion.’
　　Article18.4imposesanaffirmativeobligationoneachMembertobringitslegislationintoconformitywiththeprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementnotlaterthanthedateofentryintoforceoftheWTOAgreementforthatMember.NothinginArticle18.4orelsewhereintheAnti-DumpingAgreementexcludestheobligationsetoutinArticle18.4fromthescopeofmattersthatmaybe

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