ureisdeemedtobeinconformitywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreement‘ifitrestsupononeofthosepermissibleinterpretations’.
　　Itfollowsthat,underArticle17.6(ii)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement,panelsareobligedtodeterminewhetherameasurerestsuponaninterpretationoftherelevantprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementwhichispermissibleundertherulesoftreatyinterpretationinArticles31and32oftheViennaConvention.Inotherwords,apermissibleinterpretationisonewhichisfoundtobeappropriateafterapplicationofthepertinentrulesoftheViennaConvention.WeobservethattherulesoftreatyinterpretationinArticles31and32oftheViennaConventionapplytoanytreaty,inanyfieldofpublicinternationallaw,andnotjusttotheWTOagreements.Theserulesoftreatyinterpretationimposecertaincommondisciplinesupontreatyinterpreters,irrespectiveofthecontentofthetreatyprovisionbeingexaminedandirrespectiveofthefieldofinternationallawconcerned.
　　Wecannot,ofcourse,examineherewhichprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementdoadmitofmorethanone‘permissibleinterpretation’.Thoseinterpretivequestionscanonlybeaddressedwithinthecontextofparticulardisputes,involvingparticularprovisionsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementinvokedinparticularclaims,andafterapplicationoftherulesoftreatyinterpretationinArticles31and32oftheViennaConvention.
　　Finally,althoughthesecondsentenceofArticle17.6(ii)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementimposesobligationsonpanelswhicharenotfoundintheDSU,weseeArticle17.6(ii)assupplementing,ratherthanreplacing,theDSU,andArticle11inparticular.Article11requirespanelstomakean‘objectiveassessmentofthematter’asawhole.Thus,undertheDSU,inexaminingclaims,panelsmustmakean‘objectiveassessment’ofthelegalprovisionsatissue,their‘applicability’tothedispute,andthe‘conformity’ofthemeasuresatissuewiththecoveredagreements.NothinginArticle17.6(ii)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementsuggeststhatpanelsexaminingclaimsunderthatAgreementshouldnotconductan‘objectiveassessment’ofthelegalprovisionsoftheAgreement,theirapplicabilitytothedispute,andtheconformityofthemeasuresatissuewiththeAgreement.Article17.6(ii)simplyaddsthatapanelshallfindthatameasureisinconformitywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreementifitrestsupononepermissibleinterpretationofthatAgreement.”
　　(iii)ASummaryGuiding
　　Ingeneral,Art.11oftheDSUwhichprovides“anobjectiveassessment”bearsdirectlyonstandardofreviewapplicabletothedeterminationandassessmentofthefactsinnationalinvestigativeproceedings.Also,Art.17.6oftheADAgreementsetsoutaspecialstandardofreviewfor,andonlyto,disputesarisingunderthatAgreement,whichappliesnottodisputesarisingunderothercoveredagreements.
　　ThenwegetdowntotherelationshipbetweenArt.11oftheDSUandArt.17.6oftheADAgreement.Firstly,Art.17.6isidentifiedasoneofthe“specialoradditionalrulesandprocedures”whichprevailovertheDSU“totheextentthatthereisadifference”betweenthoseprovisionsandtheprovisionsoftheDSU.Inthisrespect,itisonlyinasituationwheretheprovisionscannotbereadascomplementingeachother,i.e.,whereadherencetotheoneprovisionwillleadtoaviolationoftheotherprovision,i.e.inthecaseofaconflictbetweenthem,thatthespecialoradditionalprovisionsaretoprevail.
　　Specifically,Art.11oftheDSUgenerallyimposesuponpanelsacomprehensiveobligationtomakean“objectiveassessmentofthematter”,embracingbothfactualandlegal;Art.17.6isdividedintotwoseparatesub-paragraphs,involvingacleardistinctionbetweenapanel’sassessmentofthefactsanditslegalinterpretationoftheADAgreement.
　　UnderArt.17.6(i),thetaskofpanelsissimplytoreviewtheinvestigatingauthorities’“establishment”and“evaluation”ofthefacts.ThetextsofbothArt.11oftheDSUandArt.17.6(i)provisionsrequirepanelsto“assess”thefacts,anditisinconceivablethatArt.17.6(i)shouldrequireanythingotherthanthatpanelsmakeanobjective“assessmentofthefactsofthematter”.Inthisrespect,weseeno“conflict”.Art.17.6(i)oftheADAgreementalsosetsforththeappropriatestandardtobeappliedbypanelsinexaminingtheWTO-consistency,i.e.,thepanelistodetermine,first,whethertheinvestigatingauthorities’“establishmentofthefactswasproper”and,second,whethertheauthorities’“evaluationofthosefactswasunbiasedandobjective”.I.e.,toreviewwhethertheinvestigatingauthoritiescollectedrelevantandreliableinformationconcerningtheissuetobedecided,and,whether,basedontheevidencebeforetheinvestigatingauthoritiesoftheimportingMemberatthetimeofthedetermination,anunbiasedandobjectiveinvestigatingauthorityevaluatingthatevidencecouldhavereachedtheconclusionsthattheinvestigatingauthoritiesoftheimportingMemberreachedonthematterinquestion-itessentiallygoestotheinvestigativeprocess.”
　　WeturnnowtoArt.17.6(ii).ThefirstsentenceofArt.17.6(ii),involvesno“conflict”withtheDSUbut,rather,confirmstheapplicationtotheADAgreementoftheusualrulesoftreatyinterpretationundertheDSUechoingcloselyArt.3.2oftheDSU,i.e.,“inaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw”embodiedinArts.31and32oftheViennaConventionwhichapplytoanytreaty,inanyfieldofpublicinternationallaw,andnotjusttotheWTOagreements.ThesecondsentenceofArt.17.6(ii)presupposesthatapplicationofsuchrulesoftreatyinterpretationcouldgiveriseto,atleast,twointerpretationsofsomeprovisionsoftheADAgreement,which,underthatConvention,wouldbothbe“permissibleinterpretations”.Inthatevent,ameasureisdeemedtobeinconformitywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreement“ifitrestsupononeofthosepermissibleinterpretations”.AndthequestionofwhichprovisionsoftheADAgreementdoadmitofmorethanone“permissibleinterpretation”,ifexists,canonlybeaddressedwithinthecontextofparticulardisputesafterapplicationoftherulesoftreatyinterpretationinArts.31and32oftheViennaConvention.
　　Inshort,althoughthesecondsentenceofArt.17.6(ii)oftheADAgreementimposesobligationsonpanelswhicharenotfoundintheDSU,weseeArt.17.6(ii)assupplementing,ratherthanreplacing,theDSU,andArt.11inparticular,toconductan“objectiveassessment”ofthelegalprovisionsoftheAgreement,theirapplicabilitytothedispute,andtheconformityofthemeasuresatissuewiththeAgreement.Art.17.6(ii)simplyaddsthatapanelshallfindthatameasureisinconformitywiththeAnti-DumpingAgreementifitrestsupononepermissibleinterpretationofthatAgr

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