ritiesoftheimportingMember’underArticle17.5(ii).SuchfactsdonotexcludeconfidentialfactsmadeavailabletotheauthoritiesoftheimportingMember.Rather,Article6.5explicitlyrecognizesthesubmissionofconfidentialinformationtoinvestigatingauthoritiesanditstreatmentandprotectionbythoseauthorities.Article12,inparagraphs2.1,2.2and2.3,alsorecognizestheuse,treatmentandprotectionofconfidentialinformationbyinvestigatingauthorities.The‘facts’referredtoinArticles17.5(ii)and17.6(i)thusembrace‘allfactsconfidentialandnon-confidential’,madeavailabletotheauthoritiesoftheimportingMemberinconformitywiththedomesticproceduresofthatMember.Article17.6(i)placesalimitationonthepanelinthecircumstancesdefinedbytheArticle.TheaimofArticle17.6(i)istopreventapanelfrom‘second-guessing’adeterminationofanationalauthoritywhentheestablishmentofthefactsisproperandtheevaluationofthosefactsisunbiasedandobjective.Whetherevidenceorreasoningisdisclosedormadediscernibletointerestedpartiesbythefinaldeterminationisamatterofprocedureanddueprocess.Thesemattersareveryimportant,buttheyarecomprehensivelydealtwithinotherprovisions,notablyArticles6and12oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
　　Articles17.5and17.6(i)requireapaneltoexaminethefactsmadeavailabletotheinvestigatingauthorityoftheimportingMember.Theseprovisionsdonotpreventapanelfromexaminingfactsthatwerenotdisclosedto,ordiscernibleby,theinterestedpartiesatthetimeofthefinaldetermination.
　　We,therefore,reversethePanel’sinterpretationthat,inreviewinganinjurydeterminationunderArticle3.1,apanelisrequiredunderArticle17.6(i),inassessingwhethertheestablishmentoffactsisproper,toascertainwhetherthe‘factualbasis’ofthedeterminationis‘discernible’fromthedocumentsthatwereavailabletotheinterestedpartiesand/ortheirlegalcounselinthecourseoftheinvestigationandatthetimeofthefinaldetermination;and,inassessingwhethertheevaluationofthefactsisunbiasedandobjective,toexaminethe‘analysisandreasoning’inonlythosedocuments‘toascertaintheconnectionbetweenthedisclosedfactualbasisandthefindings’.”
　　
　　
　　
　　
　　
　　【NOTE】:
　　1    See,StevenP.CroleyandJohnH.Jackson,‘WTODisputePanelDeferencetoNationalGovernmentDecisions.TheMisplacedAnalogytotheU.S.ChevronStandard-Of-ReviewDoctrine’,InternationalTradeLawandtheGATT/WTODisputeSettlementSystem(PetersmannEd.),KluwerLawInternational,London,1997,p.195.
　　2    See,WT/DS189/R/6.2-6.3.Alsoappliedin,e.g.,WT/DS141/R/6.45;WT/DS179/R/6.3.
　　3    See,WT/DS184/R/7.26.
　　4    See,WT/DS189/R/6.5.Alsoappliedin,e.g.,WT/DS141/R/6.46;WT/DS179/R/6.4.
　　5    See,WT/DS184/R/7.28.
　　6    See,indetail,note1above,pp.194-195.
　　7    See,e.g.,note1above,pp.195-197.
　　8    See,indetail,WT/DS184/AB/R/51-62.
　　9    See,WT/DS132/AB/RW/130.
　　10    See,indetail,JacquesH.J.Bourgeois,‘GATT/WTODisputeSettlementPracticeintheFieldofAnti-dumpingLaw’,InternationalTradeLawandtheGATT/WTODisputeSettlementSystem(PetersmannEd.),KluwerLawInternational,London,1997,pp.292-293.
　　11    See,indetail,note10above,p.294.
　　12    See,WT/DS141/R/6.43.
　　13    See,indetail,WT/DS184/R/7.6-7.7.
　　14    See,indetail,WT/DS184/R/7.9-7.10;7.12.
　　15    See,indetail,note10above,p.310.
　　16    See,indetail,WT/DS122/AB/R/114-119.
　　


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