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ChapterVIII
　　StrengtheningoftheMultilateralSystem
　　
　　Art.23oftheDSUdeals,asindicatedbyitstitle,withthe“StrengtheningoftheMultilateralSystem”.ItsoveralldesignistopreventWTOMembersfromunilaterallyresolvingtheirdisputesinrespectofWTOrightsandobligations.ItdoessobyobligatingMemberstofollowthemultilateralrulesandproceduresoftheDSU.Art.23oftheDSUreads:
　　
　　“StrengtheningoftheMultilateralSystem
　　1.WhenMembersseektheredressofaviolationofobligationsorothernullificationorimpairmentofbenefitsunderthecoveredagreementsoranimpedimenttotheattainmentofanyobjectiveofthecoveredagreements,theyshallhaverecourseto,andabideby,therulesandproceduresofthisUnderstanding.
　　2.Insuchcases,Membersshall:
　　(a)notmakeadeterminationtotheeffectthataviolationhasoccurred,thatbenefitshavebeennullifiedorimpairedorthattheattainmentofanyobjectiveofthecoveredagreementshasbeenimpeded,exceptthroughrecoursetodisputesettlementinaccordancewiththerulesandproceduresofthisUnderstanding,andshallmakeanysuchdeterminationconsistentwiththefindingscontainedinthepanelorAppellateBodyreportadoptedbytheDSBoranarbitrationawardrenderedunderthisUnderstanding;
　　(b)followtheproceduressetforthinArticle21todeterminethereasonableperiodoftimefortheMemberconcernedtoimplementtherecommendationsandrulings;and
　　(c)followtheproceduressetforthinArticle22todeterminethelevelofsuspensionofconcessionsorotherobligationsandobtainDSBauthorizationinaccordancewiththoseproceduresbeforesuspendingconcessionsorotherobligationsunderthecoveredagreementsinresponsetothefailureoftheMemberconcernedtoimplementtherecommendationsandrulingswithinthatreasonableperiodoftime.”
　　
　　Inthissection,toendthisbook,theauthormeanstotakeapreciseoverlookonthenatureofobligationsunderArt.23oftheDSUasawholebyreferringtotwopanels’reportsinpart.Inthisrespect,thePanelinUS-Sections301-310(DS152)rules:1
　　“Onthisbasis[provisionofArticle23],weconcludeasfollows:
　　(a)ItisfortheWTOthroughtheDSUprocess-notforanindividualWTOMember-todeterminethataWTOinconsistencyhasoccurred(Article23.2(a)).
　　(b)ItisfortheWTOorbothofthedisputingparties,throughtheproceduressetforthinArticle21-notforanindividualWTOMember-todeterminethereasonableperiodoftimefortheMemberconcernedtoimplementDSBrecommendationsandrulings(Article23.2(b)).
　　(c)ItisfortheWTOthroughtheproceduressetforthinArticle22-notforanindividualWTOMember-todetermine,intheeventofdisagreement,thelevelofsuspensionofconcessionsorotherobligationsthatcanbeimposedasaresultofaWTOinconsistency,aswellastograntauthorizationfortheactualimplementationofthesesuspensions.
　　Article23.2clearly,thus,prohibitsspecificinstancesofunilateralconductbyWTOMemberswhentheyseekredressforWTOinconsistenciesinanygivendispute.Thisis,inourview,thefirsttypeofobligationscoveredunderArticle23.
　　Article23.1isnotconcernedonlywithspecificinstancesofviolation.Itprescribesageneraldutyofadualnature.First,itimposesonallMembersto‘haverecourseto’themultilateralprocesssetoutintheDSUwhentheyseektheredressofaWTOinconsistency.Inthesecircumstances,MembershavetohaverecoursetotheDSUdisputesettlementsystemtotheexclusionofanyothersystem,inparticularasystemofunilateralenforcementofWTOrightsandobligations.This,whatonecouldcall‘exclusivedisputeresolutionclause’,isanimportantnewelementofMembers’rightsandobligationsundertheDSU.Second,Article23.1alsoprescribesthatMembers,whentheyhaverecoursetothedisputesettlementsystemintheDSU,haveto‘abideby’therulesandproceduressetoutintheDSU.ThissecondobligationunderArticle23.1isofaconfirmatorynature:whenhavingrecoursetotheDSUMembersmustabidebyallDSUrulesandprocedures.
　　TurningtothesecondparagraphunderArticle23,Article23.2-which,onitsface,addressesconductinspecificdisputes-startswiththewords‘nsuchcases’.Itis,thus,explicitlylinkedto,andhastobereadtogetherwithandsubjectto,Article23.1.
　　Indeed,twoofthethreeprohibitionsmentionedinArticle23.2-Article23.2(b)and(c)-arebutegregiousexamplesofconductthatcontradictstherulesandproceduresoftheDSUwhich,undertheobligationinArticle23.1to‘abidebytherulesandprocedures’oftheDSU,Membersareobligatedtofollow.TheserulesandproceduresclearlycovermuchmorethantheonesspecificallymentionedinArticle23.2.ThereisagreatdealmoreStateconductwhichcanviolatethegeneralobligationinArticle23.1tohaverecourseto,andabideby,therulesandproceduresoftheDSUthantheinstancesespeciallysingledoutinArticle23.2.
　　Article23interdicts,thus,morethanactioninspecificdisputes,italsoprovidesdisciplineforthegeneralprocessWTOMembersmustfollowwhenseekingredressofWTOinconsistencies.AviolationoftheexplicitprovisionsofArticle23can,therefore,beoftwodifferentkinds.Itcanbecaused
　　(a)byanadhoc,specificactioninagivendispute,or
　　(b)bymeasuresofgeneralapplicability,e.g.legislationorregulations,providingforacertainprocesstobefollowedwhichdoesnot,say,includerecoursetotheDSUdisputesettlementsystemorabidebytherulesandproceduresoftheDSU.”
　　Furthermore,astoArt.23oftheDSU,thePanelinUS-ImportMeasures(DS165)confirmstherulingdevelopedinUS-Sections301-310,andstates:2
　　“ThePanelbelievesthattheadoptedPanelReportonUnitedStates-Sections301-310oftheTradeActof1974(‘US-Section301’)hasconfirmedthecrucialimportancethatWTOMembersplaceonthedisputesettlementsystemoftheWTO,astheexclusivemeanstoredressanyviolationsofanyprovisionsoftheWTOAgreement.ThisfundamentalprincipleisembeddedinArticle23oftheDSU:…
　　AnimportantreasonwhyArticle23oftheDSUmustbeinterpretedwithaviewtoprohibitinganyformofunilateralactionisbecausesuchunilateralactionsthreatenthestabilityandpredictabilityofthemultilateraltradesystem,anecessarycomponentformarketconditionsconducivetoindividualeconomicactivityinnationalandglobalmarketswhich,inthemselves,constituteafundamentalgoaloftheWTO.Unilateralactionsare,therefore,contrarytotheessenceofthemultilateraltradesystemoftheWTO.AsstatedinthePanelReportonUS-Section301:
　　‘7.75ProvidingsecurityandpredictabilitytothemultilateraltradingsystemisanothercentralobjectandpurposeofthesystemwhichcouldbeinstrumentaltoachievingthebroadobjectivesofthePreamble.OfallWTOdisciplines,theDSUisoneofthemostimportantinstrumentstoprotectthesecurityandpredictabilityofthemultilateraltradingsystemandthroughitthatofthemarket-placeanditsdifferentoperators.DSUprovisionsmust,thus,beinterpretedinthelightofthisobjectandpurposeandinamannerwhichwouldmosteffectivelyenhanceit.’
　　ThestructureofArticle23isthatthefirstparagraphstatesthegeneralprohibitionorgeneralobligation,i.e.whenMembersseektheredressofaWTOviolation,theyshalldosoonlythroughtheDSU.Thisisageneralobligation.Anyattempttoseek‘redress’cantakeplaceonlyintheinstitutionalframeworkoftheWTOandpursuanttotherulesandproceduresoftheDSU.
　　TheprohibitionagainstunilateralredressintheWTOsectorsismoredirectlyprovidedforinthesecondparagraphofArticle23.FromtheordinarymeaningofthetermsusedinthechapeauofArticle23.2(‘insuchcases,Membersshall’),itisalsoclearthatthesecondparagraphofArticle23is‘explicitlylinkedto,andhastobereadtogetherwithandsubjectto,Article23.1’.Thatistosay,thespecificprohibitionsofparagraph2ofArticle23havetobeunderstoodinthecontextofthefirstparagraph,i.e.whensuchactionisperformedbyaWTOMemberwithaviewtoredressingaWTOviolation.
　　WealsoagreewiththeUS-Section301PanelReportthatArticle23.2contains‘egregiousexamplesofconductthatcontradicttherulesoftheDSU’andwhichconstitutemorespecificformsofunilateralactions,otherwisegenerallyprohibitedbyArticle23.1oftheDSU.
　　‘[t]heserulesandprocedures[Article23.1]clearlycovermuchmorethantheonesspecificallymentionedinArticle23.2.ThereisagreatdealmoreStateconductwhichcanviolatethegeneralobligationinArticle23.1tohaverecourseto,andabideby,therulesandproceduresoftheDSUthantheinstancesespeciallysingledoutinArticle23.2.’
　　ThesamePanelidentifiedafewexamplesofsuchinstanceswheretheDSUcouldbeviolatedcontrarytotheprovisionsofArticle23.EachtimeaMemberseekingtheredressofaWTOviolationisnotabidingbyaruleoftheDSU,itthusviolatesArticle23.1oftheDSU.
　　InordertoverifywhetherindividualprovisionsofArticle23.2havebeeninfringed(keepinginmindthattheobligationtoalsoobserveotherDSUprovisionscanbebroughtundertheumbrellaofArticle23.1),wemustfirstdeterminewhetherthemeasureatissuecomesunderthecoverageofArticle23.1.Inotherwords,weneedtodeterminewhetherArticle23isapplicabletothedisputebeforeaddressingthespecificviolationsenvisagedinthesecondparagraphofArticle23oftheDSUorelsewhereintheDSU.
　　Article23.1oftheDSUprovidesthatthecriterionfordeterminingwhetherArticle23isapplicableiswhethertheMemberthatimposedthemeasurewas‘seekingtheredressof’aWTOviolation.…
　　Theterm‘seeking’or‘toseek’isdefinedintheWebsterNewEncyclopedicDictionaryas:‘toresortto,…tomakeanattempt,try’.ThistermwouldthereforecoversituationswhereaneffortismadetoredressWTOviolations(whetherperceivedorWTOdeterminedviolations).Theterm‘toredress’isdefinedintheNewShorterOxfordEnglishDictionaryas‘repair(anaction);atonefor(amisdeed);remedyorremove;tosetrightorrectify(injury,awrong,agrievanceetc.);obtainingreparationorcompensation’.Theterm‘redress’isdefinedintheNewShorterOxfordEnglishDictionaryas:‘reparationoforcompensationforawrongorconsequentloss;remedyfororrelieffromsometrouble;correctionorreformationofsomethingwrong’.Theterm’redress’implies,therefore,areactionbyaMemberagainstanotherMember,becauseofaperceived(orWTOdetermined)WTOviolation,withaviewtoremedyingthesituation.
　　Article23.1oftheDSUprescribesthatwhenaWTOMemberwantstotakeanyremedialactioninresponsetowhatitviewsasaWTOviolation,itisobligatedtohaverecoursetoandabidebytheDSUrulesandprocedures.IncaseofagrievanceonaWTOmatter,theWTOdisputesettlementmechanismistheonlymeansavailabletoWTOMemberstoobtainrelief,andonlytheremedialactionsenvisagedintheWTOsystemcanbeusedbyWTOMembers.TheremedialactionsrelatetorestoringthebalanceofrightsandobligationswhichformthebasisoftheWTOAgreement,andincludetheremovaloftheinconsistentmeasure,thepossibilityof(temporary)compensationand,inlastresort,the(temporary)suspensionofconcessionsorotherobligationsauthorisedbytheDSB(Articles3.7and22.1oftheDSU).Thelatterremedyisessentiallyretaliatoryinnature.”
　　
　　
　　【NOTE】:
　　1.    See,indetail,WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
　　2.    See,indetail,WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
　　
　　
　　ListofReferences
　　
　　1    SourcesofLegalTexts:http://www.wto.org;WTOSecretariat:TheWTODisputeSettlementProcedures(SecondEdition),CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS,2001.
　　2    SourceofCases:http://www.wto.org.
　　3    ERNST-ULRICHPETERSMANN,InternationalTradeLawandtheGATT/WTODisputeSettlementSystem,KluwerLawInternation
　　
　　
　　作者：
　　中国人民大学9-01硕士1班100872
　　


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