interpretationofpublicinternationallawnorestablishedGATT/WTOpractice.BothpanelsandtheAppellateBodymustbeguidedbytherulesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutintheViennaConvention,andmustnotaddtoordiminishrightsandobligationsprovidedintheWTOAgreement.
　　ThisconclusionisdictatedbytwoseparateandveryspecificprovisionsoftheDSU.Article3.2oftheDSUprovidesthatthedisputesettlementsystemoftheWTO:‘...servestopreservetherightsandobligationsoftheMembersunderthecoveredagreements,andtoclarifytheexistingprovisionsofthoseagreementsinaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw.RecommendationsandrulingsoftheDSBcannotaddtoordiminishtherightsandobligationsprovidedinthecoveredagreements.’Furthermore,Article19.2oftheDSUprovides:‘Inaccordancewithparagraph2ofArticle3,intheirfindingsandrecommendations,thepanelandAppellateBodycannotaddtoordiminishtherightsandobligationsprovidedinthecoveredagreements.’
　　Theseprovisionsspeakforthemselves.Unquestionably,bothpanelsandtheAppellateBodyareboundbythem.”
　　TherulingdevelopedinIndia-PatentisrepeatedlyappliedbytheAppellateBody,e.g.inEC-ComputerEquipment(DS62/DS67/DS68),wheretheEuropeanCommunitiessubmitsthatthePanelerredinconsideringthatthe“legitimateexpectations”ofanexportingMember.Withregardtothisappeal,theAppellateBodyrulesinpertinentpart:9
　　“WedisagreewiththePanel’sconclusionthatthemeaningofatariffconcessioninaMember’sSchedulemaybedeterminedinthelightofthe‘legitimateexpectations’ofanexportingMember.First,wefailtoseetherelevanceoftheEEC-OilseedspanelreportwithrespecttotheinterpretationofaMember’sScheduleinthecontextofaviolationcomplaintmadeunderArticleXXIII:1(a)oftheGATT1994.TheEEC-Oilseedspanelreportdealtwithanon-violationcomplaintunderArticleXXIII:1(b)oftheGATT1994,andisnotlegallyrelevanttothecasebeforeus.ArticleXXIII:1oftheGATT1994providesforthreelegally-distinctcausesofactiononwhichaMembermaybaseacomplaint;itdistinguishesbetweenso-calledviolationcomplaints,non-violationcomplaintsandsituationcomplaintsunderparagraphs(a),(b)and(c).Theconceptof‘reasonableexpectations’,whichthePanelreferstoas‘legitimateexpectations’,isaconceptthatwasdevelopedinthecontextofnon-violationcomplaints.AswestatedinIndia-Patents,forthePaneltousethisconceptinthecontextofaviolationcomplaint‘meldsthelegally-distinctbasesfor“violation”and“non-violation”complaintsunderArticleXXIIIoftheGATT1994intooneuniformcauseofaction’,andisnotinaccordancewithestablishedGATTpractice.
　　[…]
　　Third,weagreewiththePanelthatthesecurityandpredictabilityof‘thereciprocalandmutuallyadvantageousarrangementsdirectedtothesubstantialreductionoftariffsandotherbarrierstotrade’isanobjectandpurposeoftheWTOAgreement,generally,aswellasoftheGATT1994.However,wedisagreewiththePanelthatthemaintenanceofthesecurityandpredictabilityoftariffconcessionsallowstheinterpretationofaconcessioninthelightofthe‘legitimateexpectations’ofexportingMembers,i.e.,theirsubjectiveviewsastowhattheagreementreachedduringtariffnegotiationswas.ThesecurityandpredictabilityoftariffconcessionswouldbeseriouslyunderminediftheconcessionsinMembers’SchedulesweretobeinterpretedonthebasisofthesubjectiveviewsofcertainexportingMembersalone.ArticleII:1oftheGATT1994ensuresthemaintenanceofthesecurityandpredictabilityoftariffconcessionsbyrequiringthatMembersnotaccordtreatmentlessfavourabletothecommerceofotherMembersthanthatprovidedforintheirSchedules.
　　Furthermore,wedonotagreewiththePanelthatinterpretingthemeaningofaconcessioninaMember’sScheduleinthelightofthe‘legitimateexpectations’ofexportingMembersisconsistentwiththeprincipleofgoodfaithinterpretationunderArticle31oftheViennaConvention.Recently,inIndia-Patents,thepanelstatedthatgoodfaithinterpretationunderArticle31required‘theprotectionoflegitimateexpectations’.WefoundthatthepanelhadmisappliedArticle31oftheViennaConventionandstatedthat:‘Thedutyofatreatyinterpreteristoexaminethewordsofthetreatytodeterminetheintentionsoftheparties.ThisshouldbedoneinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutinArticle31oftheViennaConvention.Buttheseprinciplesofinterpretationneitherrequirenorcondonetheimputationintoatreatyofwordsthatarenotthereortheimportationintoatreatyofconceptsthatwerenotintended.’
　　ThepurposeoftreatyinterpretationunderArticle31oftheViennaConventionistoascertainthecommonintentionsoftheparties.Thesecommonintentionscannotbeascertainedonthebasisofthesubjectiveandunilaterallydetermined‘expectations’ofoneofthepartiestoatreaty.TariffconcessionsprovidedforinaMember’sSchedule--theinterpretationofwhichisatissuehere--arereciprocalandresultfromamutually-advantageousnegotiationbetweenimportingandexportingMembers.AScheduleismadeanintegralpartoftheGATT1994byArticleII:7oftheGATT1994.Therefore,theconcessionsprovidedforinthatSchedulearepartofthetermsofthetreaty.Assuch,theonlyruleswhichmaybeappliedininterpretingthemeaningofaconcessionarethegeneralrulesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutintheViennaConvention.
　　TheapplicationoftheserulesinArticle31oftheViennaConventionwillusuallyallowatreatyinterpretertoestablishthemeaningofaterm.However,ifafterapplyingArticle31themeaningofthetermremainsambiguousorobscure,orleadstoaresultwhichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable,Article32allowsatreatyinterpretertohaverecourseto:‘...supplementarymeansofinterpretation,includingthepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion.’Withregardto‘thecircumstancesof[the]conclusion’ofatreaty,thispermits,inappropriatecases,theexaminationofthehistoricalbackgroundagainstwhichthetreatywasnegotiated.”
　　Insum,thelegitimateexpectationsofthepartiestoatreatyarereflectedinthelanguageofthetreatyitself.Thedutyofatreatyinterpreteristoexaminethewordsofthetreatytodeterminetheintentionsoftheparties.ThisshouldbedoneinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutinArt.31oftheViennaConvention.Buttheseprinciplesofinterpretationneitherrequirenorcondonetheimputationintoatreatyofwordsthatarenotthereortheimportationintoatreatyofconceptsthatwerenotintended.Asgeneralprinciplesofinterpretation,thewordso

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