renegotiated“atthesametime,bythesameMembersandinthesameforum”,theprincipleofeffectiveinterpretationisrecalled.Whataprincipleisit?
　　AsruledbythePanelinJapan-AlcoholicBeverage(DS8/DS10/DS11),effectiveinterpretationisaprinciple“wherebyallprovisionsofatreatymustbe,totheextentpossible,giventheirfullmeaningsothatpartiestosuchatreatycanenforcetheirrightsandobligationseffectively….thisprincipleofinterpretationprevents[thepanel]fromreachingaconclusionontheclaims…orthedefense…,orontherelatedprovisionsinvokedbytheparties,thatwouldleadtoadenialofeitherparty’srightsorobligations.”6ThisrulingisupheldbytheAppellateBodywhenrulingthat,“[a]fundamentaltenetoftreatyinterpretationflowingfromthegeneralruleofinterpretationsetoutinArticle31istheprincipleofeffectiveness(utresmagisvaleatquampereat).InUnitedStates-StandardsforReformulatedandConventionalGasoline,wenotedthat‘[o]neofthecorollariesofthe‘generalruleofinterpretation’intheViennaConventionisthatinterpretationmustgivemeaningandeffecttoallthetermsofthetreaty.Aninterpreterisnotfreetoadoptareadingthatwouldresultinreducingwholeclausesorparagraphsofatreatytoredundancyorinutility’.”7
　　ItisclearthattheapplicationoftheprincipleofeffectiveinterpretationisconsistentwithArt.3.2oftheDSU,whichstatesthat‘theDSBcannotaddtoordiminishtherightsandobligationsprovidedinthecoveredagreements’.Asamatteroffact,itmaybethecasethatinnearlyallinstances,theordinarymeaningofthetermsoftheactualdescriptioninacoveredagreementaccuratelyreflectsandexhauststhecontentoftheexpectationsonimprovedcompetitiverelationship.Itisclearlythecasethatmostdescriptionsaretobetreatedwiththeutmostcaretomaintaintheirintegritypreciselybecause,ontheirface,theynormallyconstitutethemostconcrete,tangibleandreliableevidenceofcommitmentsmade.
　　
　　IVTheStatusofLegitimateExpectationsinInterpretation
　　Theprincipleofgoodfaithprohibitsanyconductofpartiestoanagreementthataimsatnullificationorimpairmentofthepropermeaningandpurposeoftheagreement.However,doesgoodfaithinterpretationunderArt.31oftheViennaConventionrequire,asruledbyapanel,theprotectionofso-calledlegitimateexpectations?Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyinIndia-PatentProtection(DS50)rules:8
　　“AlthoughthePanelstatesthatitismerelyapplyinga‘well-establishedGATTprinciple’,thePanel’sreasoningdoesnotaccuratelyreflectGATT/WTOpractice.Indevelopingitsinterpretativeprinciple,thePanelmerges,andtherebyconfuses,twodifferentconceptsfrompreviousGATTpractice.Oneistheconceptofprotectingtheexpectationsofcontractingpartiesastothecompetitiverelationshipbetweentheirproductsandtheproductsofothercontractingparties.ThisisaconceptthatwasdevelopedinthecontextofviolationcomplaintsinvolvingArticlesIIIandXI,broughtunderArticleXXIII:1(a),oftheGATT1947.Theotheristheconceptoftheprotectionofthereasonableexpectationsofcontractingpartiesrelatingtomarketaccessconcessions.Thisisaconceptthatwasdevelopedinthecontextofnon-violationcomplaintsbroughtunderArticleXXIII:1(b)oftheGATT.
　　InthecontextofviolationcomplaintsmadeunderArticleXXIII:1(a),itistruethatpanelsexaminingclaimsunderArticlesIIIandXIoftheGATThavefrequentlystatedthatthepurposeofthesearticlesistoprotecttheexpectationsofMembersconcerningthecompetitiverelationshipbetweenimportedanddomesticproducts,asopposedtoexpectationsconcerningtradevolumes.However,thisstatementisoftenmadeafterapanelhasfoundaviolationof,forexample,ArticleIIIorArticleXIthatestablishesaprimafaciecaseofnullificationorimpairment.Atthatpointinitsreasoning,thepanelisexaminingwhetherthedefendingpartyhasbeenabletorebutthechargeofnullificationorimpairment.ItisinthiscontextthatpanelshavereferredtotheexpectationsofMembersconcerningtheconditionsofcompetition.
　　Thedoctrineofprotectingthe‘reasonableexpectations’ofcontractingpartiesdevelopedinthecontextof‘non-violation’complaintsbroughtunderArticleXXIII:1(b)oftheGATT1947.Someoftherulesandproceduresconcerning‘non-violation’caseshavebeencodifiedinArticle26.1oftheDSU.‘Non-violation’complaintsarerootedintheGATT’soriginsasanagreementintendedtoprotectthereciprocaltariffconcessionsnegotiatedamongthecontractingpartiesunderArticleII.Intheabsenceofsubstantivelegalrulesinmanyareasrelatingtointernationaltrade,the‘non-violation’provisionofArticleXXIII:1(b)wasaimedatpreventingcontractingpartiesfromusingnon-tariffbarriersorotherpolicymeasurestonegatethebenefitsofnegotiatedtariffconcessions.UnderArticleXXIII:1(b)oftheGATT1994,aMembercanbringa‘non-violation’complaintwhenthenegotiatedbalanceofconcessionsbetweenMembersisupsetbytheapplicationofameasure,whetherornotthismeasureisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthecoveredagreement.Theultimategoalisnotthewithdrawalofthemeasureconcerned,butratherachievingamutuallysatisfactoryadjustment,usuallybymeansofcompensation.
　　[…]
　　Withthiscustomaryruleofinterpretation[Article31oftheViennaConvention]inmind,thePanelstatedthat:‘Inourview,goodfaithinterpretationrequirestheprotectionoflegitimateexpectationsderivedfromtheprotectionofintellectualpropertyrightsprovidedforintheAgreement.’
　　ThePanelmisappliesArticle31oftheViennaConvention.ThePanelmisunderstandstheconceptoflegitimateexpectationsinthecontextofthecustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw.Thelegitimateexpectationsofthepartiestoatreatyarereflectedinthelanguageofthetreatyitself.Thedutyofatreatyinterpreteristoexaminethewordsofthetreatytodeterminetheintentionsoftheparties.ThisshouldbedoneinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutinArticle31oftheViennaConvention.Buttheseprinciplesofinterpretationneitherrequirenorcondonetheimputationintoatreatyofwordsthatarenotthereortheimportationintoatreatyofconceptsthatwerenotintended.
　　InUnitedStates-StandardsforReformulatedandConventionalGasoline,wesetouttheproperapproachtobeappliedininterpretingtheWTOAgreementinaccordancewiththerulesinArticle31oftheViennaConvention.TheserulesmustberespectedandappliedininterpretingtheTRIPSAgreementoranyothercoveredagreement.ThePanelinthiscasehascreateditsowninterpretativeprinciple,whichisconsistentwithneitherthecustomaryrulesof

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