nsofthetreatyaretobegiventheirordinarymeaningintheircontext.Theobjectandpurposeofthetreatyarealsotobetakenintoaccountindeterminingthemeaningofitsprovisions’.”1
　　Insum,asnotedbythePanelinCanada-AutomotiveIndustry(DS139/DS142),“understandingoftheserulesofinterpretationisthat,eventhoughthetextofatermisthestarting-pointforanyinterpretation,themeaningofatermcannotbefoundexclusivelyinthattext;inseekingthemeaningofaterm,wealsohavetotakeaccountofitscontextandtoconsiderthetextoftheterminlightoftheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.Article31oftheViennaConventionexplicitlyreferstothe‘ordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheir[theterms’]contextandinthelightofits[thetreaty’s]objectandpurpose’.ThethreeelementsreferredtoinArticle31-text,contextandobjectandpurpose-aretobeviewedasoneintegratedruleofinterpretationratherthanasequenceofseparateteststobeappliedinahierarchicalorder.Ofcourse,contextandobjectandpurposemaysimplyconfirmthetextualmeaningofaterm.Inmanycases,however,itisimpossibletogivemeaning,even‘ordinarymeaning’,withoutlookingalsoatthecontextand/orobjectandpurpose”.2
　　WithregardtoArt.32oftheViennaConvention,itisrepeatedlyruledthat,“[t]heapplicationoftheserulesinArticle31oftheViennaConventionwillusuallyallowatreatyinterpretertoestablishthemeaningofaterm.However,ifafterapplyingArticle31themeaningofthetermremainsambiguousorobscure,orleadstoaresultwhichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable,Article32allowsatreatyinterpretertohaverecourseto‘...supplementarymeansofinterpretation,includingthepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion’.Withregardto’thecircumstancesof[the]conclusion’ofatreaty,thispermits,inappropriatecases,theexaminationofthehistoricalbackgroundagainstwhichthetreatywasnegotiated.”3
　　Asawhole,undertheWTOjurisprudence,withregardtothedisputeamongthepartiesovertheappropriatelegalanalysistobeapplied,asgeneralprinciplesorguidelinesofinterpretation,itisoftenbegunwithArt.3.2oftheDSU.Togofurther,asnotedbythePanelinJapan-AlcoholicBeverages,“the‘customaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw’arethoseincorporatedintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT).GATTpanelshavepreviouslyinterpretedtheGATTinaccordancewiththeVCLT.ThePanelnotedthatArticle3:2DSUinfactcodifiesthispreviously-establishedpractice”.Consequently,“thePanelconcludedthatthestartingpointofaninterpretationofaninternationaltreaty,suchastheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994,inaccordancewithArticle31VCLT,isthewordingofthetreaty.Thewordingshouldbeinterpretedinitscontextandinthelightoftheobjectandthepurposeofthetreatyasawholeandsubsequentpracticeandagreementsshouldbetakenintoaccount.RecoursetosupplementarymeansofinterpretationshouldbemadeexceptionallyonlyundertheconditionsspecifiedinArticle32VCLT”.4
　　Inshort,itismaybethecasethat,itisgenerallyconsideredthatthefundamentalrulesoftreatyinterpretationsetoutinArts.31and32oftheViennaConventionhaveattainedthestatusofrulesofcustomaryinternationallaw.Inrecentyears,thejurisprudenceoftheAppellateBodyandWTOpanelshasbecomeoneoftherichestsourcesfromwhichtoreceiveguidanceontheirapplication.
　　IIIWTORulesonConflicts:EffectiveInterpretation
　　ThePanelReportonTurkey-TextileandClothingProducts(DS34)statesconcerningtheconflictsissuethat:5
　　“Asageneralprinciple,WTOobligationsarecumulativeandMembersmustcomplywithallofthematalltimesunlessthereisaformal‘conflict’betweenthem.ThisflowsfromthefactthattheWTOAgreementisa‘SingleUndertaking’.Onthedefinitionofconflict,itshouldbenotedthat:‘…aconflictoflaw-makingtreatiesarisesonlywheresimultaneouscompliancewiththeobligationsofdifferentinstrumentsisimpossible....Thereisnoconflictiftheobligationsofoneinstrumentarestricterthan,butnotincompatiblewith,thoseofanother,orifitispossibletocomplywiththeobligationsofoneinstrumentbyrefrainingfromexercisingaprivilegeordiscretionaccordedbyanother’.
　　Thisprinciple,alsoreferredtobyJapaninitsthirdpartysubmission,isinconformitywiththepublicinternationallawpresumptionagainstconflictswhichwasappliedbytheAppellateBodyinCanada-PeriodicalsandinEC-BananasIII,whendealingwithpotentialoverlappingcoverageofGATT1994andGATS,andbythepanelinIndonesia-Autos,inrespectoftheprovisionsofArticleIIIofGATT,theTRIMsAgreementandtheSCMAgreement.InGuatemala-Cement,theAppellateBodywhendiscussingthepossibilityofconflictsbetweentheprovisionsoftheAnti-dumpingAgreementandtheDSU,stated:‘AspecialoradditionalprovisionshouldonlybefoundtoprevailoveraprovisionoftheDSUinasituationwhereadherencetotheoneprovisionwillleadtoaviolationoftheotherprovision,thatis,inthecaseofaconflictbetweenthem’.
　　WerecallthePanel’sfindinginIndonesia-Autos,adisputewhereIndonesiawasarguingthatthemeasuresunderexaminationweresubsidiesandthereforetheSCMAgreementbeinglexspecialis,wastheonly‘applicablelaw’(totheexclusionofotherWTOprovisions):‘14.28InconsideringIndonesia’sdefencethatthereisageneralconflictbetweentheprovisionsoftheSCMAgreementandthoseofArticleIIIofGATT,andconsequentlythattheSCMAgreementistheonlyapplicablelaw,werecallfirstthatinpublicinternationallawthereisapresumptionagainstconflict.ThispresumptionisespeciallyrelevantintheWTOcontextsinceallWTOagreements,includingGATT1994whichwasmodifiedbyUnderstandingswhenjudgednecessary,werenegotiatedatthesametime,bythesameMembersandinthesameforum.Inthiscontextwerecalltheprincipleofeffectiveinterpretationpursuanttowhichallprovisionsofatreaty(andintheWTOsystemallagreements)mustbegivenmeaning,usingtheordinarymeaningofwords.’
　　Inlightofthisgeneralprinciple,wewillconsiderwhetherArticleXXIVauthorizesmeasureswhichArticlesXIandXIIIofGATTandArticle2.4oftheATCotherwiseprohibit.Inviewofthepresumptionagainstconflicts,asrecognizedbypanelsandtheAppellateBody,webearinmindthattotheextentpossible,anyinterpretationoftheseprovisionsthatwouldleadtoaconflictbetweenthemshouldbeavoided.”
　　Itisclearlyimpliedbytherulingabovethat,intheWTOsystem,anyinterpretationofthecoveredagreementsthatwouldleadtoaconflictbetweenthemshouldbeavoided.Inthisrespect,astoWTOrulesofconflicts,inthecontextthatallWTOagreementswe

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