ppellateBodyreports.Art.2oftheDSUprovidesthattheDSBhasthe“authoritytoestablishpanels,adoptpanelandAppellateBodyReports,maintainsurveillanceandimplementationofrulingsandrecommendations,andauthorizesuspensionofconcessionsandotherobligationsunderthecoveredagreements”.Moreimportantly,theDSUprovidesanintegrateddisputesettlementmechanismapplicabletodisputesarisingunderanyofthe“coveredagreements”(includingtheWTOAgreement,theAgreementsinAnnexes1and2,aswellasanyPlurilateralTradeAgreementinAnnex4whereitsCommitteeofsignatorieshastakenadecisiontoapplytheDSU).
　　Furthermore,therule-orientedfunctionandlegalprimacyoftheWTOdisputesettlementsystemareemphasizedinArt.3oftheDSU:
　　
　　“2.ThedisputesettlementsystemoftheWTOisacentralelementinprovidingsecurityandpredictabilitytothemultilateraltradingsystem.TheMembersrecognizethatitservestopreservetherightsandobligationsofMembersunderthecoveredagreements,andtoclarifytheexistingprovisionsofthoseagreementsinaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw.RecommendationsandrulingsoftheDSBcannotaddtoordiminishtherightsandobligationsprovidedinthecoveredagreements.
　　…
　　5.Allsolutionstomattersformallyraisedundertheconsultationanddisputesettlementprovisionsofthecoveredagreements,includingarbitrationawards,shallbeconsistentwiththoseagreementsandshallnotnullifyorimpairbenefitsaccruingtoanyMemberunderthoseagreements,norimpedetheattainmentofanyobjectiveofthoseagreements.
　　6.MutuallyagreedsolutionstomattersformallyraisedundertheconsultationanddisputesettlementprovisionsofthecoveredagreementsshallbenotifiedtotheDSBandtherelevantCouncilsandCommittees,whereanyMembermayraiseanypointrelatingthereto.
　　…”
　　Hence,evendisputesettlementsthroughbilateralarbitrationandmutuallyagreedarrangementsmustbetransparentandconsistentwithWTOlaw.TheDSUprovisionsonmutuallyagreedarbitration“asanalternativemeansofdisputesettlement”(Art.25),andoncompulsoryarbitrationonthe“reasonableperiodoftime”fortheimplementationofdisputesettlementrulings(Art.21.3)andondisputesoverthesuspensionofconcessions(Arts.22.6-7),reflectafurthershifttowardsjudicialmethodsofdisputesettlementintheWTO.
　　Significantly,thequasi-automaticadoptionofdisputesettlementreportsisanewcrucialfeatureoftheWTOdisputesettlementmechanism,anothercontributiontothe“judicialization”ofthismechanism.UndertheWTOjurisprudence,reportsissuedbyvariouspanelsandtheAppellateBodyshallbeadoptedbytheDSBand“unconditionallyaccepted”bythepartiestoadisputeunless“theDSBdecidesbyconsensusnottoadoptthereport”(Art.16.4;Art.17.14).BothpanelreportsandAppellateBodyreportsarethusdeemedtobeadoptedunlessthereisa“negativeconsensus”nottoadoptthesereportsorthepanelreportisappealed.
　　Contributingtoafurther“judicialization”ofWTOdisputesettlementprocedures,amostsignificantimprovementupontheGATTdisputesettlementmechanism,theappellatereviewintroducedintheDSUisanewfeatureinthesettlementofinternationaltradedisputes.AppellatereviewisanintegralpartofthenewcomprehensivedisputesettlementsannexedtotheWTOAgreementasanoutcomeoftheUruguayRound.Therightofapartytoadisputetoappealisclearlyspelledoutandcanberesortedtobeforethesubmissionofthepanel’sreporttoaDSBmeeting.Art.16.4oftheDSUgrants“righttoappeal”withoutsubjecting,asdoinsomedomesticjurisdictionsandinternationalcourtprocedures,thisrighttoanyfilteringdevice.
　　AppellatereviewundertheWTOjurisprudenceisconductedbyastandingAppellateBody,establishedasabalancingoffactorinrespectofthequasi-automaticadoptionofpanelreports.Asnotedabove,thenewWTOdisputesettlementsystemprovidesforquasi-automaticadoptionofpanelreportsbytheDSB,withoutpreviouslyexistingpossibilityofblockingconsensusundertheGATT.Theproceduresfortheenforcementofadoptedpanelreportshavealsobeenstrengthened.Thislegalizationwasacceptablebecausetheprovisionson“interimreview”bythepanel(Art.15),andonappellatereviewbyastandingAppellateBodycomposedofsevenindependentexpertsappointedforafour-yearterm(Art.17),offeradditionalsafeguardsagainstwrongpanelreports.ThestrictlylegalfunctionandexpertiseoftheAppellateBodywereperceivedasarule-orientedsubstituteforthepoliticalconsensuspracticeregardingpanelreportsintheGATTCouncil,whichhadbeenincreasinglyabusedduringthelastyearsoftheUruguayRoundnegotiations.Theappellatereviewisexpectedtoestoplosingpartiesfromclaiming,asgroundsofnon-compliance,thatthedisputesettlementrulingwasunfair,erroneousorincompletebecausecertainargumentshadnotbeenaddressed.
　　However,theprimarypurposeforintroducingappealhasbeenthatofavoidingmistakesinthelegalfindingbypanels,althoughtheimprovementinthepanels’compositionandindependenceandthepossibilityofseekingexperts’advicebythemontechnicalissuesshouldreducethisrisk.Appealsfrompanelcases,heardbythestandingAppellateBody,are“limitedtoissuesoflawcoveredinthepanelreportandlegalinterpretationdevelopedbythepanel”(Art.17.6).AndtheAppellateBody“mayuphold,modifyorreversethelegalfindingsandconclusionsofthepanel”(Art.17.13).TheAppellateBodyconsequentlypassesuponthelegalmeritsofthecasewithfulljurisdictionandmayeitherconfirmorreplaceinwholeorinpartthepanel’sreportwithitsdecision.Itmayalsoconfineitselftocorrectingthelegalinterpretationofthepanelmodifyingitslegalfindingsbutleavingitsoverallconclusionsandrecommendationsunaffected.Therefore,apreliminaryquestionastothescopeofappellatereviewiscentraltotheAppellateBody’sdispositionofthespecificissuesraisedintheappeal.Inaddressingthisissue,wethinkithelpfultorecalltheAppellateBody’srulinginEC–Hormones(DS26/DS48)that:1
　　“UnderArt.17.6oftheDSU,appellatereviewislimitedtoappealsonquestionsoflawcoveredinapanelreportandlegalinterpretationsdevelopedbythepanel.Findingsoffact,asdistinguishedfromlegalinterpretationsorlegalconclusions,byapanelare,inprinciple,notsubjecttoreviewbytheAppellateBody.Thedeterminationofwhetherornotacertaineventdidoccurintimeandspaceistypicallyaquestionoffact;forexample,thequestionofwhetherornotCodexhasadoptedaninternationalstandard,guidelineorrecommendationonMGAisafactualquestion.Determinationofthecredibilityandweightprop

上一页  [1] [2] [3] [4]  下一页