uction
　　IIGenericThirdPartyRights:InterpretationofArt.10.3
　　IIIExtendedThirdPartyRights:ExerciseofPanels’Discretion
　　IVSummaryandConclusions
　　ChapterIVFunctionofPanels:Art.11oftheDSU
　　IIntroduction
　　IIApplicationofArt.11asaGeneralStandardofReview
　　IIIReviewin“neitherdenovonortotaldefence”
　　IVAllegationagainstPanels’StandardofReview
　　VExerciseofJudicialEconomy
　　ChapterVGuidelinesforInterpretationoftheWTOCoveredAgreements
　　IIntroduction
　　IIApplicationofArts.31,32oftheViennaConvention
　　IIIWTORulesonConflicts:EffectiveInterpretation
　　IVTheStatusofLegitimateExpectationsinInterpretation
　　ChapterVIGeneralRulesofEvidenceundertheWTOJurisprudence
　　IBurdenofProofundertheWTOJurisprudence
　　(i)GeneralRulesWellEstablishedinViolationComplaints
　　(ii)BurdenofProofincaseofInvokinganException
　　(iii)SpecialRulesConcerningNon-ViolationClaims
　　(iv)SummaryandConclusions
　　IIAdmissibilityofCertainEvidences
　　(i)EvidenceObtainedfromPriorConsultations
　　(a)ProceduralConcern:ConfidentialityofConsultations
　　(b)SubstantialConcern:NecessityorRelevanceofEvidence
　　(ii)ArgumentsbeforeDomesticInvestigativeAuthorities
　　(iii)ArgumentsSubmittedaftertheFirstSubstantiveMeeting
　　(a)Thereisasignificantdifferencebetweentheclaimsandtheargumentssupportingthoseclaims.
　　(b)Thereisnoprovisionestablishingprecisedeadlinesforthepresentationofevidence.
　　IIIPanel’sRighttoSeekInformation
　　(i)AGrantofDiscretionaryAuthority
　　(ii)TheAdmissibilityofNon-requestedInformation
　　(iii)SummaryandConclusions
　　IVAdverseInferencesfromParty’sRefusaltoProvideInformationRequested
　　(i)TheAuthorityofaPaneltoRequestInformationfromaPartytotheDispute
　　(ii)TheDutyofaMembertoComplywiththeRequestofaPaneltoProvideInformation
　　(iii)TheDrawingofAdverseInferencesfromtheRefusalofaPartytoProvideInformationRequestedbythePanel
　　VConcludingRemarks
　　ChapterVIISpecialRulesforAnti-dumpingDisputes
　　SectionOneRecourseofAnti-dumpingDisputestotheDSB
　　IIntroduction
　　IISufficiencyofPanelRequestundertheADAgreement
　　(i)Art.6.2oftheDSUandArticle17.4oftheADAgreement
　　(ii)Art.6.2oftheDSUandArticle17.5(i)oftheADAgreement
　　(iii)ASummaryGuiding
　　IIIGeneralLegalBasisforClaimsagainstLegislationasSuch
　　IVSpecialRulesforClaimsagainstAnti-dumpingLegislationasSuch
　　(i)Introduction
　　(ii)GeneralLegalBasisunderArt.17oftheADAgreement
　　(iii)UnderstandingofArt.17.4oftheADAgreement
　　(iv)ExtensiveBasisinContext
　　(v)ASummary
　　SectionTwoAdhocStandardofReviewforAnti-dumpingDisputes
　　IIntroduction
　　IISpecialStandardofReviewundertheADAgreement:inGeneral
　　(i)AdhocApproachestoDomesticDetermination:Art.17.6
　　(ii)RelationshipbetweenArt.11oftheDSUandArt.17.6oftheADAgreement
　　(iii)ASummaryGuiding
　　IIIScopeofReviewofFact-findings:Art.17.5(ii)oftheADAgreement
　　(i)OverviewoftheGATTPractice
　　(ii)ConcernedRulingsinReportsIssuedbyWTOPanels
　　(iii)TentativeRemarks:GuidancefromtheAppellateBody
　　ChapterVIIIStrengtheningoftheMultilateralSystem
　　
　　
　　
　　ChapterI
　　Trendtowards“Judicialization”:
　　ARule-orientedDisputeSettlementSystem
　　
　　Overdecadesofyearspast,manycountrieshavecometorecognizethecrucialrolethatdisputesettlementmechanismplaysforanytreatysystem.Thisisparticularlythecaseforatreatysystemdesignedtoaddressthemyriadofcomplexeconomicquestionsofinternationalrelationstodayandtofacilitatethecooperationamongnationsthatisessentialtothepeacefulandwelfare-enhancingroleofthoserelations.Disputesettlementprocedureassistsinmakingruleseffective,therebyaddinganessentialmeasureofpredictabilityandeffectivenessfortheoperationofarule-orientedsystemintheotherwiserelativelyweakrealmofinternationalnorms.
　　TheUruguayRoundresult,includingtheAgreementestablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization(‘theWTOAgreement’),isoneimportantefforttofaceuptosomeoftheproblemsassociatedwithinterdependentinternationaleconomicactivity.CentralandvitaltotheWTOinstitutionalstructureisthedisputesettlementprocedurederivedfromdecadesofexperimentandpracticeintheGATT,butnowelaboratelysetforth,aspartoftheWTOAgreement,inthenewtreatytextoftheDisputeSettlementUnderstanding(‘theDSU’).
　　TheentryintoforceoftheWTOAgreementon1January1995,includingthenewDSU,createsanimprovedsystemofrulesandproceduresforsettlinginternationaltradedisputes.AccordingtoArt.II:2oftheWTOAgreement,theDSUinAnnex2toitisan“integralpartofthisAgreement,bindingonallMembers”.Art.23oftheDSUundertheheading“StrengtheningoftheMultilateralSystem”emphasizesthelegalprimacyandexclusivecharacteroftheWTOdisputesettlementsystemvis-à-visalternativedisputesettlementsystemsoutsidetheWTO.Art.23.1requires,inpart:“WhenMembersseektheredressofaviolationofobligationsorothernullificationorimpairmentofbenefitsunderthecoveredagreementsoranimpedimenttotheattainmentofanyobjectiveofthecoveredagreements,theyshallhaverecourseto,andabideby,therulesandproceduresofthisUnderstanding.”
　　ThenewWTOdisputesettlementsystemisanintegratedsystemwithmuchbroaderjurisdictionandlessscopefor“ruleshopping”orso-calledforumshopping.WhilethetraditionalpanelsystemofsettlingdisputeswithintheGATTremainsthecentralfeatureofthissystem,thenewmechanismindicatesadistinctivetrendtowards“judicialization”withinachangefrompower-orienteddiplomaticmethodsofdisputesettlementtorule-orientedlegalones.Henceforth,theemphasisoftheDSUisupon“rule-orientated”ratherthan“power-orientated”interpretationandapplicationoftheWTOdisputesettlementprocedures,withthemovetowardsamorejudicialformofprocessthatallowsforreviewofdecisionsthroughanAppellateBodyandtheenforcementofpanelandAppellateBodydecisions.TheDSUisinturnakeyelementofthelegalizationoftheworldtradesystemagreedintheUruguayRoundthroughtheestablishmentoftheWTOandthereinforcementofsubstantialrulesofconduct.
　　Besides“judicializing”orcodifyingformerGATTpractice,theDSUhasaninstitutionaldimension.TheAgreementestablishesaDisputeSettlementBody(‘DSB’)toadministertherulesandproceduresforpanelproceedings,forappealagainstpaneldecisionstothestandingAppellateBodyandforadoptingpanelandA

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