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   WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(4)      ★★★ 【字体: 】  
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(4)
收集整理:佚名    来源:本站整理  时间:2009-02-04 14:06:04   点击数:[]    

giouserrorsconstituteafailuretomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsasrequiredbyArticle11oftheDSU.”17
  
  VExerciseofJudicialEconomy
  Inthisregard,whatwewillnextdiscussistheissueofwhetherArt.11oftheDSUentitlesacomplainingpartytoafindingoneachofthelegalclaimsitmakestoapanel.Asisthecoreofso-calledjudicialeconomyprinciplederivedfromArt.11oftheDSU.TheprincipleofjudicialeconomyisnotexplicitlyprovidedinanyarticlesoftheDSUoranyothercoveredagreementsundertheWTO.However,itisafundamentalprincipleundertheWTOjurisprudence,whichismorethanonetimeexercisedbypanelsandthenupheldbytheAppellateBodyduringthedisputessettlement.
  InUS-ShirtsandBlouses(DS33),thePanelstatesinparagraph6.6oftheitsReport:“ConcerningIndia’sargumentthatArticle11oftheDSUentitlesIndiatoafindingoneachoftheissuesitraised,wedisagreeandrefertotheconsistentGATTpanelpracticeofjudicialeconomy.Indiaisentitledtohavethedisputeoverthecontested‘measure’resolvedbythePanel,andifwejudgethatthespecificmatterindisputecanberesolvedbyaddressingonlysomeoftheargumentsraisedbythecomplainingparty,wecandoso.We,therefore,decidetoaddressonlythelegalissueswethinkareneededinordertomakesuchfindingsaswillassisttheDSBinmakingrecommendationsoringivingrulingsinrespectofthisdispute.”18Asisappealed.AndtheAppellateBodymakeandetailedanalysisontheprincipleofjudicialeconomyfromtheprovisionsoftheDSUaswellaspracticeundertheGATT1947andtheWTOAgreement:19
  AsprovidedinArt.11oftheDSU,thefunctionofpanelsistoassisttheDSBindischargingitsresponsibilitiesundertheDSUandthecoveredagreements.NothinginthisprovisionorinpreviousGATTpracticerequiresapaneltoexaminealllegalclaimsmadebythecomplainingparty.
  Firstly,previousGATT1947andWTOpanelshavefrequentlyaddressedonlythoseissuesthatsuchpanelsconsidersnecessaryfortheresolutionofthematterbetweentheparties,andhavedeclinedtodecideotherissues.Thus,ifapanelhasfoundthatameasureisinconsistentwithaparticularprovision,itgenerallydoesnotgoontoexaminewhetherthemeasureisalsoinconsistentwithotherprovisionsthatacomplainingpartymayhavearguedareviolated.InrecentWTOpractice,panelslikewisehaverefrainedfromexaminingeachandeveryclaimmadebythecomplainingpartyandhavemadefindingsonlyonthoseclaimsthatsuchpanelsconcludearenecessarytoresolvetheparticularmatter.AlthoughafewGATT1947andWTOpanelshavemadebroaderrulings,byconsideringanddecidingissuesthatarenotabsolutelynecessarytodisposeoftheparticulardispute,thereisnothinganywhereintheDSUthatrequirespanelstodoso.
  Secondly,sucharequirementforapanelastoaddressonallclaimsthecomplainantmadeisnotconsistentwiththeaimoftheWTOdisputesettlementsystem.Art.3.7oftheDSUexplicitlystates:“Theaimofthedisputesettlementmechanismistosecureapositivesolutiontoadispute.Asolutionmutuallyacceptabletothepartiestoadisputeandconsistentwiththecoveredagreementsisclearlytobepreferred.”Thus,thebasicaimofdisputesettlementintheWTOistosettledisputes.ThisbasicaimisaffirmedelsewhereintheDSU.Art.3.4,forexample,stipulates:“RecommendationsorrulingsmadebytheDSBshallbeaimedatachievingasatisfactorysettlementofthematterinaccordancewiththerightsandobligationsunderthisUnderstandingandunderthecoveredagreements.”
  Furthermore,Art.3.2oftheDSUstatesthattheMembersoftheWTO“recognize”thatthedisputesettlementsystem“servestopreservetherightsandobligationsofMembersunderthecoveredagreements,andtoclarifytheexistingprovisionsofthoseagreementsinaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw”.GiventheexplicitaimofdisputesettlementthatpermeatestheDSU,theAppellateBodydoesnotconsiderthatArt.3.2oftheDSUismeanttoencourageeitherpanelsortheAppellateBodyto“makelaw”byclarifyingexistingprovisionsoftheWTOAgreementoutsidethecontextofresolvingaparticulardispute.
  Insum,asruledbytheAppellateBodyinIndia-PatentProtection(DS50),“nUnitedStates-ShirtsandBlouses,wesaidthat‘[a]panelneedonlyaddressthoseclaimswhichmustbeaddressedinordertoresolvethematterinissueinthedispute’.Thismeansthatapanelhasthediscretiontodeterminetheclaimsitmustaddressinordertoresolvethedisputebetweentheparties--providedthatthoseclaimsarewithinthatpanel’stermsofreference”.20
  However,isthereanylimitstosuchadiscretionexercisedasjudicialeconomy?Withregardtothisissue,theAppellateBodyinAustralia-Salmon(DS18)findsthat,theprincipleofjudicialeconomyhastobeappliedbypanelskeepingintheirmindtheaimofthedisputesettlementsystem,i.e,“tosecureapositivesolutiontoadispute”asprovidedforinArt.3.7oftheDSUandaffirmedinArt.3.4oftheDSU,whichstipulates:“RecommendationsorrulingsmadebytheDSBshallbeaimedatachievingasatisfactorysettlementofthematterinaccordancewiththerightsandobligationsunderthisUnderstandingandunderthecoveredagreements.”Therefore,toprovideonlyapartialresolutionofthematteratissuewouldbefalsejudicialeconomy.ApanelhastoaddressthoseclaimsonwhichafindingisnecessaryinordertoenabletheDSBtomakesufficientlypreciserecommendationsandrulingssoastoallowforpromptcompliancebyaMemberwiththoserecommendationsandrulings“inordertoensureeffectiveresolutionofdisputestothebenefitofallMembers”.21
  Tosumup,asruledbytheAppellateBodyinUS-LampMeat(DS177/DS178),“ontheissueofpanels’exerciseofjudicialeconomy,wehavepreviouslyexplainedthatpanels‘needonlyaddressthoseclaimswhichmustbeaddressedinordertoresolvethematterinissueinthedispute’.Atthesametime,the‘discretion’apanelenjoystodeterminewhichclaimsitshouldaddressisnotwithoutlimits,asapanelisobliged‘toaddressthoseclaimsonwhichafindingisnecessaryinordertoenabletheDSBtomakesufficientlypreciserecommendationsandrulingssoastoallowforpromptcompliancebyaMemberwiththoserecommendationsandrulings’”.22
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  【NOTE】:
  1.    See,StevenP.CroleyandJohnH.Jackson,‘WTODisputePanelDeferencetoNationalGovernmentDecisions.TheMisplacedAnalogytotheU.S.ChevronStandard-Of-ReviewDoctrine’,InternationalTradeLawandtheGATT/WTODisputeSettlementSystem(PetersmannEd.),KluwerLawInternational,London,1997,pp.187-188.
  2.    Supra.note1,p.208.
  3.    Supra.note1,p.192.
  4.    See,WT/DS33/R/7.16.
  5.    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/114;116.
  6.    Seealso,WT/DS121/AB/R/118-120.
  7.    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/111.
  8.    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/117.
  9.    See,WT/DS24/R/7.10-7.11.
  10.    See,WT/DS121/R/8.118-8.121.
  11.    See,indetail,WT/DS177/AB/R;WT/DS178/AB/R/106-107.
  12.    See,WT/DS192/AB/R/76.
  13.    See,MaryE.Footer,‘SomeAspectsofThirdPartyInterventioninGATT/WTODisputeSettlementProceedings’,InternationalTradeLawandtheGATT/WTODisputeSettlementSystem(PetersmannEd.),KluwerLawInternational,London,1997,pp.209-210.
  14.    Supra.note13,p.210.
  15.    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/133.
  16.    See,WT/DS69/AB/R/133.
  17.    See,WT/DS76/AB/R/141.
  18.    See,WT/DS33/R/6.6.
  19.    See,indetail,WT/DS33/AB/R/VI.
  20.    See,WT/DS50/AB/R/87.
  21.    See,indetail,WT/DS18/AB/R/223.
  22.    See,WT/DS177/AB/R;WT/DS178/AB/R/191.
  


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