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WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(4)
收集整理:佚名    来源:本站整理  时间:2009-02-04 14:06:04   点击数:[]    

review’.ThisstandardofreviewwouldallowapanelcompletefreedomtocometoadifferentviewthanthecompetentauthorityoftheMemberwhoseactordeterminationisbeingreviewed.Apanelwouldhaveto‘verifywhetherthedeterminationbythenationalauthoritywas…correct(bothfactuallyandprocedurally)’.Thesecondisdescribedas‘deference’.Undera‘deference’standard,apanel,inthesubmissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,shouldnotseektoredotheinvestigationconductedbythenationalauthoritybutinsteadexaminewhetherthe‘procedure’requiredbytherelevantWTOruleshadbeenfollowed”.7Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesthat:8
  “Sofarasfact-findingbypanelsisconcerned,theiractivitiesarealwaysconstrainedbythemandateofArticle11oftheDSU:theapplicablestandardisneitherdenovoreviewassuch,nor‘totaldeference’,butratherthe‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.Manypanelshaveinthepastrefusedtoundertakedenovoreview,wisely,sinceundercurrentpracticeandsystems,theyareinanycasepoorlysuitedtoengageinsuchareview.Ontheotherhand,‘totaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthorities’,ithasbeenwellsaid,‘couldnotensurean’objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU’.”
  Therulingisconfirmedonmanyotheroccasions.Forexample,thePanelonUS-Underwear(DS24)findsthat:9
  “Inouropinion,apolicyoftotaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthoritiescouldnotensurean‘objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU.Thisconclusionissupported,inourview,bypreviouspanelreportsthathavedealtwiththisissue,andmostnotablyinthepanelreportonthe‘Transformers’case.
  Thepanelinthe‘Transformers’casewasconfrontedwiththeargumentofNewZealandthatthedeterminationof‘materialinjury’bythecompetentNewZealandinvestigatingauthoritycouldnotbescrutinizedbythepanel.The‘Transformers’panelrespondedtothisargumentasfollows:
  ‘ThePanelagreedthattheresponsibilitytomakeadeterminationofmaterialinjurycausedbydumpedimportsrestedinthefirstplacewiththeauthoritiesoftheimportingcontractingpartyconcerned.However,thePanelcouldnotsharetheviewthatsuchadeterminationcouldnotbescrutinizedifitwerechallengedbyanothercontractingparty.Onthecontrary,thePanelbelievedthatifacontractingpartyaffectedbythedeterminationcouldmakeacasethattheimportationcouldnotinitselfhavetheeffectofcausingmaterialinjurytotheindustryinquestion,thatcontractingpartywasentitled,undertherelevantGATTprovisionsandinparticularArticleXXIII,thatitsrepresentationsbegivensympatheticconsiderationandthateventually,ifnosatisfactoryadjustmentwaseffected,itmightreferthemattertotheCONTRACTINGPARTIES,ashadbeendonebyFinlandinthepresentcase.Toconcludeotherwisewouldgivegovernmentscompletefreedomandunrestricteddiscretionindecidinganti-dumpingcaseswithoutanypossibilitytoreviewtheactiontakenintheGATT.ThiswouldleadtoanunacceptablesituationundertheaspectoflawandorderininternationaltraderelationsasgovernedbytheGATT’.”
  Inshort,forthepaneltoadoptapolicyoftotaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthoritiescouldnotensurean“objectiveassessment”asforeseenbyArt.11oftheDSU.Thisconclusionissupported,inourview,bypreviouspanelreportsthathavedealtwiththisissue.However,panelsdonotseetheirreviewasasubstitutefortheproceedingsconductedbynationalinvestigatingauthorities,either.Forexample,inArgentina-Footwear(DS121),thePaneldoesn’tconsiderthattheyhavethemandatetoconductadenovoreview:10
  “Thisapproachisconsistentwiththereportsofpanelsreviewingnationalinvestigations…ThepanelonUnitedStates-Anti-dumpingDutiesonImportofSalmonfromNorwayconcludedthatitshouldnotengageinadenovoreviewoftheevidenceexaminedbythenationalinvestigatingauthority.
  ThepanelonUnitedStates-Underwearfollowedthisapproachbynoting,however,thatitdidnotseeits‘reviewasasubstitutefortheproceedingsconductedbynationalinvestigatingauthoritiesorbytheTextilesMonitoringBody(TMB).Rather…thePanel’sfunctionshouldbetoassessobjectivelythereviewconductedbythenationalinvestigatingauthority,inthiscasetheCITA.Wedrawparticularattentiontothefactthataseriesofpanelreportsintheanti-dumpingandsubsidies/countervailingdutiescontexthavemadeitclearthatitisnottheroleofpanelstoengageinadenovoreview.Inourview,thesameistrueforpanelsoperatinginthecontextoftheATC,sincetheywouldbecalledupon,asinthecasesdealingwithanti-dumpingand/orsubsidies/countervailingduties,toreviewtheconsistencyofadeterminationbyanationalinvestigatingauthorityimposingarestrictionundertherelevantprovisionsoftherelevantWTOlegalinstruments,inthiscasetheATC.…’
  Accordingly,thepanelonUnitedStates-Underweardecided,‘inaccordancewithArticle11oftheDSU,tomakeanobjectiveassessmentoftheStatementissuedbytheUSauthorities…which,asthepartiestothedisputeagreed,constitutesthescopeofthematterproperlybeforethePanelwithout,however,engaginginadenovoreview.…anobjectiveassessmentwouldentailanexaminationofwhethertheCITAhadexaminedallrelevantfactsbeforeit,whetheradequateexplanationhadbeenprovidedofhowthefactsasawholesupportedthedeterminationmade,and,consequently,whetherthedeterminationmadewasconsistentwiththeinternationalobligationsoftheUnitedStates’.
  ThepanelonUnitedStates-ShirtsandBlousesalsostatedthat‘[t]hisisnottosaythatthePanelinterpretstheATCasimposingontheimportingMemberanyspecificmethodeitherforcollectingdataorforconsideringandweighingalltherelevanteconomicfactorsuponwhichtheimportingMemberwilldecidewhetherthereisneedforasafeguardrestraint.TherelativeimportanceofparticularfactorsincludingthoselistedinArticle6.3oftheATCisforeachMembertoassessinthelightofthecircumstancesofeachcase’.
  ThesepastGATTandWTOpanelreportsmakeitclearthatpanelsexaminingnationalinvestigationsinthecontextoftheapplicationofanti-dumpingandcountervailingduties,aswellassafeguardsundertheATC,haverefrainedfromengaginginadenovoreviewoftheevidenceexaminedbythenationalauthority.”
  However,asemphasizedbytheAppellateBody,althoughpanelsarenotentitledtoconductadenovoreviewoftheevidence,nortosubstitutetheirownconclusionsforthoseofthecompetentauthorities,thisdoesnotmeanthatpanelsmustsimplyaccepttheconclusionsofthecompetentauthorities.Inthisrespect,thephrase“denovoreview”shouldnotbeusedloosely.Ifapanelc

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