oncludesthatthecompetentauthorities,inaparticularcase,havenotprovidedareasonedoradequateexplanationfortheirdetermination,thatpanelhasnot,thereby,engagedinadenovoreview.Norhasthatpanelsubstituteditsownconclusionsforthoseofthecompetentauthorities.Rather,thepanelhas,consistentwithitsobligationsundertheDSU,simplyreachedaconclusionthatthedeterminationmadebythecompetentauthoritiesisinconsistentwiththespecificrequirementsofthecoveredAgreement.11
　　Specifically,astodefinitionofthedutiesofpanelsinreviewingtheinvestigationsanddeterminationscarriedoutbycompetentauthorities,theAppellateBodyinUS-CombedCottonYarn(DS192)summarizesthat,“[o]urReportsinthesedisputes[Argentina-Footwear;US-LambMeat;US-WheatGluten]undertheAgreementonSafeguardsspelloutkeyelementsofapanel’sstandardofreviewunderArticle11oftheDSUinassessingwhetherthecompetentauthoritiescompliedwiththeirobligationsinmakingtheirdeterminations.Thisstandardmaybesummarizedasfollows:panelsmustexaminewhetherthecompetentauthorityhasevaluatedallrelevantfactors;theymustassesswhetherthecompetentauthorityhasexaminedallthepertinentfactsandassessedwhetheranadequateexplanationhasbeenprovidedastohowthosefactssupportthedetermination;andtheymustalsoconsiderwhetherthecompetentauthority’sexplanationaddressesfullythenatureandcomplexitiesofthedataandrespondstootherplausibleinterpretationsofthedata.However,panelsmustnotconductadenovoreviewoftheevidencenorsubstitutetheirjudgementforthatofthecompetentauthority.”19“Nevertheless,theaboveprinciplesconcerningthestandardofreviewunderArticle11oftheDSUwithrespecttotheAgreementonSafeguardsapplyequally,inourview,toapanel’sreviewofaMember’sdeterminationunderArticle6oftheATC”.12
　　Andtheauthorthinksitappropriate,withspecialcautiousnessandspecificexaminationtothefactualorlegalissuesinparticularcases,toextendtheaboveprinciplestopanels’reviewunderothercoveredagreements(otherthantheAnti-dumpingAgreement).
　　Insum,panelsshouldbecautiousaboutthe“activist”posturesintheGATT/WTOcontext.Manypanelshaveinthepastrefusedtoundertakedenovoreview,wisely,sinceundercurrentpracticeandsystems,theyareinanycasepoorlysuitedtoengageinsuchareview.
　　Afterall,theinternationalsystemanditsdisputesettlementprocedures,instarkcontrasttomostnationalsystems,dependsheavilyonvoluntarycomplianceamongparticipatingmembers.Inappropriatepanel“activism”couldwellalienatemembers,thusthreateningthestabilityoftheGATT/WTOdisputesettlementprocedureitself.Moreover,panelsarewelladvisedtobeawarealsoofthepotentialshortcomingsoftheinternationalprocedures,shortcomingsthatsometimesrelatetoashortageofresources,especially(butnotonly)resourcesforfactfinding,aswelltotheproblemsoftheneedforaverybroadmultilateralconsensus.Furthermore,panelsshouldalsorecognizethatnationalgovernmentsoftenhavelegitimatereasonsfordecisionstheytake.Andmoregenerally,panelsshouldkeepinmindthatabroad-based,multilateralinternationalinstitutionmustcontendwithawidevarietyoflegal,political,andculturalvalues,whichcounselinfavorofcautiontowardinterpretingtreatyobligationsthatmaybeappropriatetoonesocietybutnottootherparticipants.13
　　However,panelsmustunderstandthecentralroleofGATT/WTOadjudicatorysystemplaysinenhancingtheimplementation,effectiveness,andcredibilityoftheelaboratesetsofrulesforwhichtheWTOhasbeencreated.SuccessfulcooperationamongnationalauthoritiestoalargeextentrestswiththeinstitutionsgiventheresponsibilitytohelpcarryouttheWTOdisputesettlementprocedures.Thus,whenaparticularnationalauthority’sactivityordecisionwouldunderminetheeffectivenessofWTOrules,orwouldestablishapracticethatcouldtriggerdamagingactivitiesbyothermembercountries,panelswillundoubtedlyshowlessdeference.14
　　Tosumup,withthisarticulationofthestandardofreviewbasedonArt.11oftheDSU,adenovoreviewwouldbeinappropriate.However,toadoptapolicyoftotaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthoritiescouldnotensurean“objectiveassessment”asforeseenbyArt.11oftheDSU.Theapplicablestandardisneitherdenovoreviewassuch,nor“totaldeference”,butratherthe“objectiveassessment”.However,whenmayapanelberegardedashavingfailedtodischargeitsdutyunderArt.11oftheDSUtomakeanobjectiveassessment?Asiswhattobediscussedinmoredetailbelow.
　　
　　IVAllegationagainstPanels’StandardofReview
　　InEC-Hormones(DS26/DS48),theEuropeanCommunitiesclaimsthatthePanelfailedtomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsasrequiredbyArt.11oftheDSU,andaskstheAppellateBodytoreversethefindingssoarrivedatbythePanel.TheAppellateBodyfindsconcerningthisappealthat:15
　　“[…]Clearly,noteveryerrorintheappreciationoftheevidence(althoughitmaygiverisetoaquestionoflaw)maybecharacterizedasafailuretomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefacts.Inthepresentappeal,theEuropeanCommunitiesrepeatedlyclaimsthatthePaneldisregardedordistortedormisrepresentedtheevidencesubmittedbytheEuropeanCommunitiesandeventheopinionsexpressedbythePanel’sownexpertadvisors.Thedutytomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsis,amongotherthings,anobligationtoconsidertheevidencepresentedtoapanelandtomakefactualfindingsonthebasisofthatevidence.Thedeliberatedisregardof,orrefusaltoconsider,theevidencesubmittedtoapanelisincompatiblewithapanel’sdutytomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefacts.Thewilfuldistortionormisrepresentationoftheevidenceputbeforeapanelissimilarlyinconsistentwithanobjectiveassessmentofthefacts.‘Disregard’and‘distortion’and‘misrepresentation’oftheevidence,intheirordinarysignificationinjudicialandquasi-judicialprocesses,implynotsimplyanerrorofjudgmentintheappreciationofevidencebutratheranegregiouserrorthatcallsintoquestionthegoodfaithofapanel.Aclaimthatapaneldisregardedordistortedtheevidencesubmittedtoitis,ineffect,aclaimthatthepanel,toagreaterorlesserdegree,deniedthepartysubmittingtheevidencefundamentalfairness,orwhatinmanyjurisdictionsisknownasdueprocessoflawornaturaljustice”.
　　Inshort,“[a]nallegationthatapanelhasfailedtoconductthe‘objectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit’requiredbyArticle11oftheDSUisaveryseriousallegation.SuchanallegationgoestotheverycoreoftheintegrityoftheWTOdisputesettlementprocessitself”.16“Onlyegre

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