hlyandtheintroductionofHouseholdResponsibilitySystemhasgotagreatsuccess,althoughitcouldnotaddresseverythingasonlyaninstitutionalinnovation.Afterseveralyearsofpractice,ithasbeenalreadyprovedthatthereareanumberofweaknessesandlimitationsremainedfromtheincompletelyde-collectivization.Onehastoconfirm,thatthecollectiveownershipandcontractsystemledtotheinequityinbotheconomicandpoliticalfeatures.
　　Ineconomicview,duringthede-collectivization,farmlandwasdistributedtoindividualhouseholdsinformoffragmentedfarmingunits.Theprincipleoflanddistributionwasderiveddirectlyfromcollectiveownership.Farmlandinavillagewasownedbyallofitsmemberscollectively.Asaresult,everymemberhadequalrighttoclaimondistributionofthelandaccordingtocertainnorm,whichwasbasedprimarilyonthesizeofthepeasantfamily.InrealityofChinawithabundantpopulationandlimitedland,theamountcanbedistributedtoeachhouseholdwasverysmall.Moreover,landdifferedfromeachotherintermsofsoilfertility,irrigationconditions,locationandsoon.Inmanycases,ahouseholdhadtoobtainpiecesoflandfromeachofthegrades.asaresult,thesumwasnotonlyinsufficientbutalsodisjointedandscatteredaroundvillages.Largeareasofcultivatedlandwerewastedintheformofpathsandboundariesseparatinghouseholds’contractfield.AsurveyconductedbytheChineseMinistryofAgricultureindicatedthatin1986,among7983samplevillagesfrom29provinces,averagecultivatedareaperhouseholdwas0.466ha(7mu)fragmentedinto5.85plots,eachplotonaverage0.08ha(1.2mu)(MinistryofAgricultureofChina,1993).Thisfragmentedstructureoffamilyfarminghasremainedlargelyuntouchedafterimplementofcontractsystemandhasdetainedthepossibilitiesofusingrelativelyadvancedmechanicalagriculturalequipmentandinfrastructures.
　　Undersuchsystem,farmersturnedtobeshort-terminaction.Accordingtothedistributeruleoflandinhouseholdresponsibilitysystem,landistodistributedependedonlyonvillagerstatus,babiesandvillagers’new-comersuchasnewlymarriedbridefromothervillageswerealleligibleclaimants,whichhavingequalrightstoshareequalamountsoflandinthisvillage;onthecontrary,whenavillagerleftordied,therightoflandclaimwouldautomaticallywithdraw.Aspopulationincreased,villageshadtoreadjustthedistributionstructure,whichfurthersubdividedthefarmland.Theendlessredistributionoffarmlandresultedinmanyproblems,including:1)thesituationofasmallandfragmentedfarmingstructurefurtherdeteriorated;2)worryingabouttheriskoflosingtheirlandaswellasinvestment,farmershadlittleincentivestoimprovelandconservationandagriculturalinfrastructure-irrigatedland,oneofthemostsignificantcomponentsofagriculturalinfrastructureinChina,remainedalmostunchangedduringthe1980s;3)farmersover-exploitedthesoiltopursueshort-termprofits;4)thecourseoflandredistributionwasalsocostly,itrequiredlaborandtimeinorganizationandexecution.(Chen,1999)
　　Anotherproblemisthatfarmlandwasgenerallybadlyendowedwiththeappropriatehumancapital.Sinceegalitarianismwasthegeneralleadingprinciplerule,whichgavelittleconsiderationtointerfamilydifferencessuchaslaborcapability,educationandindividualpreference.Asaresult,somelargehouseholdswithaincompletelaborforcecouldhavecomparablymuchmorelandtocultivate,meanwhileothersmallerhouseholds,aboveallthosespecializedinagriculture,couldhaveonlyinadequatelandforfullemployment.Suchkindofproblemwasmuchworseinruralareasexperiencingrapidtownshiporvillageindustryandurbanization.Inthoseregiontherewasoftendeteriorationintheagriculturallaborforcesincemostofcapablelaborstendednottoworkathomeasafarmer.Thereweremanywhodidnotgiveprioritytocultivationandattimesevenletthelandlieunused.Consequently,thefarmlandwasunderutilized.
　　Uponprecedinganalyzing,wecanseethat,inordertopursueegalitarianismonsurfaceindistributionofland,intheprocessofthede-collectivizationsacrificedeconomicefficiency.Thus,ifthelandwasprivate,thenthosedifferencearousefromdistributionwilldeceaseafterenoughtime,becausethefreemarketwillleadtoequalefficiencythroughthechooseofmarket.However,suchpoliticalbackgroundlackedfrombeginningon,sothattheshortcomingofanon-privatizationde-collectivizationcan’tbecorrectedorevenbeenlargedbecauseofproblemofpoliticalsystem.
　　Oneofthemainreasonispoliticalstructureoverthecollectiveownership.Firstatgrass-rootlevel,itwasusuallythevillagehead,whotakesthepowertodecidedistributionsincedecentralization.Sothatthecadrefamilyortheirrelationswillsurelybenefitfromthedistribution.Havingacadreinthefamilyseemstobeacertainprerogativeinusingtheirpoliticalstatustoaccumulatewealth.Atonehand,Villagecadresmayallocatemorefertilepartsofthevillagelandtothemselvesanddeterminedmorefavorablegrainsalesquotasforthemselves.Andalso,cadreshavemoreopportunitytobuildpersonalrelationshipwithhigherlevelandotherimportantdepartments,ruralcreditbanksortransportationcompaniesforexample,sothattheyhavemorechancetoobtainmaterialbenefitthannormalpeasants.Aswesee,mostofcollectiveenterprisesandprivateeconomiesinruralareashavetightrelationshipwithlocalgovernments,atthebasiclevel,withvillagercadres,mostruralenterprisersarevillagerleaderthemselves.Furthermore,cadresandtheirrelationsgenerallytendtobreakthepolicyofbirthcontrol,becausetheyarecapabletosupportmorefamilymembers,andtheirkinwillstrengthentheireconomicandpoliticalpowerinreturn.
　　Atanotherhand,thoughaccordingtotheelectionregulationofruralcadreinchina,thesevillagecadreshouldbeelecteddirectlybyvillagers,whohavecommoninterestinthecommunity,thisrulehasbeenalmostneverputintopractice.UnderonePartysystemandpublicownershipsystem,allimportantresourcesaregatheredintheParty’shand,asaresult,insteadofelection,theopinionfromhigherlevelplaysasignificantrole,inordertocarryortthepolicyofPartyefficiently.Infact,twofactorsdeterminethecandidatesinappointmentofvillagehead,oneistherelationshipwithofficialofhigherlevel,andtheotheriskinship.Consequently,cadrefamilytakesalladvantagestomaintaintheirpowerandstatusthroughsuchappointment.So,cadresinruralChinadon’trepresentthebenefitoftheirvillagemembers,butthepowerofthePartyaswellasthefamily,thereisnopossibilityforpeasantstoclaimequalityorsavetheirfromsufferingasapeasant.
　　Inaword,afterashortflouris

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