terest-EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 Emvtl. L.55(1987)（强调说协商性法规制定模式只能会使行政机关沦为帮助利益相关人达成合意的促进者，且会引起行政机关超越法定权限行为的危险。）；但也有相反的观点，如Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking. 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.32(2002)（简述了行政协商的优点）。
[33] 见Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis. 29 J. Legal Stud. 1037, 1054(2000)；但也有相反的观点，见Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000)（旨在言明成本效益分析法的不足）。
[34] 见Margret Catde, Can Bambi Ride Herd over Godzilla? The Role of Esecutive Oversight in EPA’s Rulemaking for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 36 Nat. Resources J. 643, 675-76 & n.248(1996)（鉴于国会的核废物政策，作者认为OMB对EPA的监管不仅没能澄清反而模糊了其在政治上所负的说明责任。）；又见Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Envi-Resources L.1, 28-35, 55-57(1984)（认为OMB对EPA法规的审查既没能增进行政机关的说明义务，也没能促进强有力的分析。）。.
[35] 通常可参考：Ian Ayres & John Brathwaite. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992);以及Stewart, 同前注[30] at 27-38。
[36] Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification; Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 483-84(1997)（由于不必要的分析障碍，行政法上旨在扩大公众参与的新发展已不经意地阻碍了法规的制定。）。
[37] 见Stewart, 同前注[30]， at 27-38。
[38] 见 Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and American Adversary Legalism 404-05(Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000); Richard B. Stewart, Recon-stitutive Law, 46 Md. L. Rev. 86, 103-04(1986)。
[39] Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev.1, 5, 18-19(1997) (提出对抗性的代表程序会导致法规制定的延缓、僵化和缺乏创新性。)。
[40] 见 Seidenfeld, 同前注[36]， at 483 ( “僵化”是指行政机关在采用新法规之前由于须首先清除分析上的障碍，从而使得管理方案缺乏效率)；又见Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1387-1436(1992)（概述了“僵化”的原因和后果）；Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60-66(1995) (同样简述了“僵化”的原因和后果)。
[41] 有关风险评估和效果分析在多大程度上才是不合算的，以及如何才能有效推迟行政决定的作出的讨论。可参见：Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 93, 126-27(1999); 以及Thomas O. McGarity, The Espanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1523(1996)。
[42] 见Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J.1311, 1332-55 (1992)（提供了一些行政机关运用非立法性政策文件来约束公众的例子）；又见Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Espert peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 Emory L.J. 1033, 1068-69 & n.161(2000)（为防止改革的僵化，行政机关可能会选择不太正式的机制。）。
[43] 一般可参见Freeman，同前注[39]（认为行政法的联合管理模式可以代替利益代表模式）；又见Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stake-holder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 Va. Envtl. L.J. 37(1995)（作者运用利益相关人理论的规范原则来提出所有相关选民的要求，并在允许经济增长的同时促进平等）；还可见Seidenfeld ,同前注[39] at414-26（为促进协作性管理方式而完善了利益相关人理论）；以及Stewart, 同前注[30]， at 60-94（简述了合同和准合同性质的行政管理方案的使用）。
[44] 见 Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabonsky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environ-mental Policy 123-29 (1998)。
[45] 有关这一方式之优点的论述，可比较Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255 (1997)（讨论了因协商性法规制定方法而致的审查和裁决中的缺陷）；与Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1(1982)（支持协商性法规制定方式的使用）。
[46] 通常可以参见 Notice, Medicare and Medicaid Programs Health Care Financing Research and Demonstration Cooperative Agreements and Grants for Fiscal Year 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 26, 120 (June 6, 1991)。
[47] Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)). See generally Notice, Medicare and Medicaid Programs Health Care Financing Research and Demonstration Cooperative Agreements and Grants for Fiscal Year 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,120 (June 6, 1991)。
[48] 一般可以参见Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 189 (2002)（介绍了正在出现的“协作生态系统管理”模式，该模式强调要通过广泛的公——私合作、协作和信息共享来为本土生态问题设计一个解决之道）；又见Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 Ecology L.Q. 369, 379 & n.49 (1996)（简述了在《濒临灭绝物种法》中的协商程序）。
[49] 一般可见Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 283 (1998)（针对现代生活的情况提出了民主实验主义（democratic experimentalism）的管理模式）。
[50] Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments 691, 694-95 (Jonathan Zeitlin与David Trubeck主编，2003年即将出版) [hereinafter Governing Work], 可浏览 http: //web. mit. edu/ polisci/ research/ cohen/ s

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