制度在欧洲大陆国家并不流行，美国、英国等国家则有独立董事一说。这是因为以德国为代表的公司法实行的是董事会集体表决制度。在德国，执行业务的董事（内幕董事）受到了监事会的有效约束。反之，由于美国公司内部基本上不设立监事会，因此建立独立董事制度也就顺理成章。

[77] 即英文Model Business Corporate Act，简称MBCA。

[78] 中国证监会也颁布了“公司治理准则”与“独立董事准则”，见证监会网站，www.csrc.gov.com.

[79]参见羊城晚报25/4/2001；新快报25/4/2001、上海证券报以及国内网站的报道。

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Systematic Defects of Chinese Company Law under a Reform Approach
WU Yue
(Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing, 400031)

Abstract： According to the research of this paper, there exist some systematic defects in the current Chinese Company Law, namely no organizational difference between private und public companies, the improper institutional design of wholly state owned corporations, inadequate supervision of executive board by supervising board, and finally the insufficient regulation of corporate groups and affiliated corporations. Hence, it is necessary to reform the organizational design of private companies and rebuild the legal relationships between executive boards and supervising boards of public companies. It is also suggested to add regulations for corporate groups.
Key Words: private company; publicly held company; supervisary board; excutive board; corporate democracy; affiliated corporations; corporate groups

（原载《现代法学》2003年2期）