enfortheotherpartytosubmitevidencetothecontraryifitchallengestheexistenceofthatfact”.6
　　Insum,withrespecttothegeneralrulesofburdenofproofinthecontextofviolationcomplaints,asruledbythePanelinJapan-Film(DS44):“[w]enotethatasinallcasesundertheWTO/GATTdisputesettlementsystem-and,indeed,astheAppellateBodyrecentlystated,undermostsystemsofjurisprudence-itisforthepartyassertingafact,claimordefencetobeartheburdenofprovidingproofthereof.Oncethatpartyhasputforwardsufficientevidencetoraiseapresumptionthatwhatisclaimedistrue,theburdenofproducingevidencethenshiftstotheotherpartytorebutthepresumption.…”.7Certainly,asnotedbytheAppellateBodyinUS-ShirtsandBlouses(DS33),“nthecontextoftheGATT1994andtheWTOAgreementpreciselyhowmuchandpreciselywhatkindofevidencewillberequiredtoestablishsuchapresumptionwillnecessarilyvaryfrommeasuretomeasure,provisiontoprovisionandcasetocase”.8
　　(ii)BurdenofProofincaseofInvokinganException
　　Asdiscussedabove,generally,theburdenofproofrestsupontheparty,whethercomplainingordefending,whoassertsafactortheaffirmativeofaparticularclaimordefence.Astobeshown,thisruleappliesequallyevenincaseofinvokinganexception.
　　Inthiscontext,itisageneralprincipleoflaw,well-establishedbypanelsinpriorGATT/WTOpractice,thattheparty(thedefendant)whichinvokesanexceptioninordertojustifyitsactioncarriestheburdenofproofthatithasfulfilledtheconditionsforinvokingtheexception.However,intheauthor’sview,tounderstandtheissueconcerningburdenofproofincaseofinvokinganexception,whichisdifferentfromtherelativelyclearburdenofestablishingaprimafaciecaseofviolationonthecomplainingparty,it’shelpfultostresssomepointshere,amongwhichthekeypointistobecautiouswhiledeterminewhichdefenceis“affirmative”andthereforeburdensthedefendanttoprovidesufficientevidencetorebutthechallengedviolation.
　　InUnitedStates-ShirtsandBlouses(DS33),Indiaarguesthatitwas“customaryGATTpractice”thatthepartyinvokingaprovisionwhichhadbeenidentifiedasanexceptionmustofferproofthattheconditionssetoutinthatprovisionweremet.TheAppellateBodyacknowledgesthatseveralGATT1947andWTOpanelshaverequiredsuchproofofapartyinvokingadefence,suchasthosefoundinArt.XXorArt.XI:2(c)(i),toaclaimofviolationofaGATTobligation,suchasthosefoundinArts.I:1,II:1,IIIorXI:1.Arts.XXandXI:(2)(c)(i)arelimitedexceptionsfromobligationsundercertainotherprovisionsoftheGATT1994,notpositiverulesestablishingobligationsinthemselves.Theyareinthenatureofaffirmativedefences.Itisonlyreasonablethattheburdenofestablishingsuchadefence,i.e.invokinganexceptioninthenatureofaffirmativedefences,shouldrestonthepartyassertingit.9
　　However,asruledbytheAppellateBodyinEC-Hormones(DS26/DS48),“[t]hegeneralruleinadisputesettlementproceedingrequiringacomplainingpartytoestablishaprimafaciecaseofinconsistencywithaprovisionof…[thecoveredagreements]beforetheburdenofshowingconsistencywiththatprovisionistakenonbythedefendingparty,isnotavoidedbysimplydescribingthatsameprovisionasan‘exception’.Inmuchthesameway,merelycharacterizingatreatyprovisionasan‘exception’doesnotbyitselfjustifya‘stricter’or‘narrower’interpretationofthatprovisionthanwouldbewarrantedbyexaminationoftheordinarymeaningoftheactualtreatywords,viewedincontextandinthelightofthetreaty’sobjectandpurpose,or,inotherwords,byapplyingthenormalrulesoftreatyinterpretation.Itisalsowelltorememberthataprimafaciecaseisonewhich,intheabsenceofeffectiverefutationbythedefendingparty,requiresapanel,asamatteroflaw,toruleinfavourofthecomplainingpartypresentingtheprimafaciecase.”10
　　Inshort,duringtheprocessoftheestablishmentofaviolation,it’sgenerallyuptothecomplainanttoprovideevidenceconcerninginconsistency,andonlyincaseoflimitedexceptionstheburdenofproofrestsuponthedefendingpartyinvokingadefenceinthenatureofaffirmativedefences,suchasthosefoundinArt.XXorArt.XI:2(c)(i)oftheGATT1994.
　　(iii)SpecialRulesConcerningNon-ViolationClaims
　　Assuggestedbythecorrespondingprovisions,themostsignificantdifferencebetweenviolationcomplaintsunderArt.XXIII:1(a)oftheGATT1994andnon-violationonesunderArt.XXIII:1(b)is,while,whenviolationcomplaintsarebroughtunderArt.XXIII:1(a),theinfringementofanobligationoftheagreementsisconsideredprimafacietoconstituteacaseofnullificationorimpairment,fromthefactofviolationalone,byestablishingaformalpresumption,suchapresumptiondoesnotexistinnon-violationcases.
　　Withthelackofsuchapresumption,andgiventhenatureofthefactuallycomplexdisputesandparticularclaimsofnon-violationnullificationorimpairment,theresolutionofissuesrelatingtotheproperallocationoftheburdenofproofisofparticularimportance.Incaseofnon-violationnullificationorimpairment,i.e.,wheretheapplicationofArt.XXIII:1(b)isconcerned,Art.26.1(a)oftheDSUandpanelpracticeinthecontextoftheWTOAgreementandGATTjurisprudenceconfirmthatthisisanexceptionalcourseofactionforwhichthecomplainingpartybearstheburdenofprovidingadetailedjustificationtobackupitsallegations.
　　ThisrequirementhasbeenrecognizedandappliedbyanumberofGATTpanels.Forexample,thepanelonUruguayanRecoursetoArt.XXIIInotedthatincases“wherethereisnoinfringementofGATTprovisions,itwouldbe...incumbentonthecountryinvokingArticleXXIIItodemonstratethegroundsandreasonsforitsinvocation.DetailedsubmissionsonthepartofthatcontractingpartyonthesepointswerethereforeessentialforajudgementtobemadeunderthisArticle”.AndthepanelonUS-AgriculturalWaivernoted,inapplyingthe1979codificationofthisrule:“Thepartybringingacomplaintunder[ArticleXXIII:1(b)]wouldnormallybeexpectedtoexplainindetailthatbenefitsaccruingtoitunderatariffconcessionhavebeennullifiedorimpaired”.
　　Art.26.1(a)oftheDSUcodifiesthepriorGATTpractice,whichprovidesinrelevantpart:“thecomplainingpartyshallpresentadetailedjustificationinsupportofanycomplaintrelatingtoameasurewhichdoesnotconflictwiththerelevantcoveredagreement...”.
　　AndinJapan–Film(DS44),thePanelconfirmstheruleonburdenofproofinthecontextofnon-violationcomplaintsunderArt.XXIII:1(b):“ConsistentwiththeexplicittermsoftheDSUandestablishedWTO/GATTjurisprudence,andrecallingtheAppellateBodyrulingthat‘preciselyhowmuchandpreciselywhatkindofevidencewillberequiredtoestablish...apresumptionwillnecessarilyvaryfrom...provisiontoprovision’,wethusconsiderthattheUnitedStates[thecomplainingparty],withrespecttoitsclaimofnon-violationnullificationorimpairmentunderArticleXXIII:1(b),bearstheburdenofprovidingadetailedjustificationforitsclaiminordertoestablishapresumptionthatwhatisclaimedistrue.ItwillbeforJapan[thedefendant]torebutanysuchpresumption.”11
　　(iv)SummaryandConclusions
　　Tosumup,inthecontextofviolationcomplaintsunderArt.XXIII:1(a)oftheGATT1994,asruledbythePanelinTurkey-TextileandClothingProducts(DS34):“TherulesonburdenofproofarenowwellestablishedintheWTOandcanbesummedupasfollows:(a)itisforthecomplainingpartytoestablishtheviolationitalleges;(b)itisforthepartyinvokinganexceptionoranaffirmativedefensetoprovethattheconditionscontainedthereinaremet;and(c)itisforthepartyassertingafacttoproveit.”12
　　Andinthecontextofnon-violationcomplaintsunderArt.XXIII:1(b)oftheGATT1994,“[thecomplainant],withrespecttoitsclaimofnon-violationnullificationorimpairmentunderArticleXXIII:1(b),bearstheburdenofprovidingadetailedjustificationforitsclaiminordertoestablishapresumptionthatwhatisclaimedistrue.Itwillbefor[thedefendant]torebutanysuchpresumption”.
　　
　　IIAdmissibilityofCertainEvidences
　　Generally,asamatterofprocessbeforethepanel,thecomplainantwillsubmititsargumentsandevidenceandtherespondentwillrespondtorebutthecomplainant’sclaims.However,asnotedabove,theallocationofburdenofproofisonlyapplicabletodeterminepreciselyhowmuchandpreciselywhatkindofevidencewillberequiredtoestablishapresumptionthatwhatisclaimedistrue.Next,oncethepartyassertingafactortheaffirmativeofaparticularclaimordefencehassucceededinraisingapresumptionthatitsclaimistrue,itisincumbentonpanels,beforewhomsuchapresumptionissuccessfullyraised,toassessthemeritsofalltheargumentsmadeandtheadmissibility,relevanceandweightofallthefactualevidencesubmittedwithaviewtoestablishingwhetherthepartycontestingthepresumptionraisedhassuccessfullyrebuttedit.Andattheendofthisprocess,itisforthepaneltoweighandassesstheevidencesubmittedandargumentsassertedbybothpartiesinordertoreachconclusionsastowhethertheclaimsraisedbythecomplainantareultimatelywell-foundedorsuccessfullyrebutted.
　　However,thefollowingparagraphswillnotdealwitheverythinginvolvedintheprocessofpanels’assessmentofargumentsorevidence,whichariseslogicallyaftertheallocationofburdenofproof,butfocusontheadmissibilityissue,i.e.,amatteroftowhatextentandhowtheevidenceavailabletopanelsshouldbebasedontodeterminewhether,onbalance,allegedimpairmentornullificationexists.Inthisrespect,astobedemonstratedinthefollowingparagraphs,panelsenjoytheirbroaddiscretioninadmittingvariousevidences.
　　(i)EvidenceObtainedfromPriorConsultations
　　AccordingtotheWTOjurisprudence,theDSBisnotinvolvedinconsultationsprocessalthoughtheyareacrucialandintegralpartoftheDSU.NothinginthetextoftheDSUorothercoveredagreementsprovidesthatthescopeofapanel’sworkisgovernedbythescopeofpriorconsultations.13However,astobenotedbelow,panelswon’tprecludethoseevidencesmerelybecausetheyareobtainedduringthecourseofconsultations.Indeed,informationobtainedduringthecourseofconsultationsmayenablethecomplainanttofocusthescopeofthematterwithrespecttowhichitseeksestablishmentofapanel,thus,tosomeextentwillassistpanel’sexaminationofmeasuresatissuetomakeobjectiveassessmentwiththeaccessofsuchinformationofferedtothepanel.
　　（a）ProceduralConcern:ConfidentialityofConsultations
　　InAustralia-AutomotiveLeather(DS126),AustraliaappearstobeaskingthePaneltorulethat,theUnitedStatesislimitedtorelyingonthefactsandargumentsexplicitlysetoutinitsrequestforconsultationsinpresentingitscasetothePanel.Astothisobjection,thePanelrulesasfollows:14
　　“AsAustraliarightlynotes,Article4.6oftheDSUprovidesthat‘[c]onsultationsshallbeconfidential,andwithoutprejudicetotherightsofanyMemberinanyfurtherproceedings’.However,inourview,thisdoesnotmeanthatfactsandinformationdevelopedinthecourseofconsultationsheldpursuanttoonerequestcannotbeusedinapanelproceedingconcerning,asitdoesinthiscase,thesamedispute,betweenthesameparties,conductedpursuanttoanother,differentrequest.
　　WerecallthatArticle11oftheDSUobligesapaneltoconduct‘anobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit’.Asdiscussedearlier,anyevidentiaryrulingswemakemustbeconsistentwiththisobligation.ThepanelinKorea-TaxesonAlcoholicBeveragesrecentlyconfirmedtherightofapartytoaWTOdisputetouseinformationlearnedinconsultationsinpanelproceedings.AfternotingtherequirementofconfidentialityinArticle4.6oftheDSU,whichthepanelviewedas‘essentialifthepartiesaretobefreetoengageinmeaningfulconsultations’,thepanelcontinued:‘However,itisourviewthatthisconfidentialityextendsonlyasfarasrequiringthepartiestotheconsultationsnottodiscloseanyinformationobtainedintheconsultationstoanypartiesthatwerenotinvolvedinthoseconsultations.Wearemindfulofthefactthatthepanelproceedingsbetweenthepartiesremainconfidential,andpartiesdonottherebybreachanyconfidentialitybydisclosinginthoseproceedingsinformationacquiredduringtheconsultations.Indeed,inourview,theveryessenceofconsultationsistoenabletheparties[to]gathercorrectandrelevantinformation,forpurposesofassistingtheminarrivingatamutuallyagreedsolution,orfailingwhich,toassisttheminpresentingaccurateinformationtothepanel.Itwouldseriouslyhamperthedisputesettlementprocessiftheinformationacquiredduringconsultationscouldnotbesubsequentlyusedbyanypartyintheensuingproceedings’15.”
　　Furthermore,sofarastheconfidentialityofconsultationsisconcerned,theadmissibilityofinformationobtainedfromconsultationsdoesn’talterasaresultofthirdpartyparticipationinthepanelproceedings.AsruledbythePanelinMexico-HFCS(DS132):“itwouldseriouslyhamperthedisputesettlementprocessifapartycouldnotuseinformationobtainedintheconsultationsinsubsequentpanelproceedingsmerelybecauseathirdpartywhichdidnotparticipateintheconsultationschoosestoparticipateinthepanelproceedings.As…thirdpartyparticipationinthepanelproceedingscannotbevetoedbythepartiestotheproceeding.Inourview,itwouldbeanomalousifthedecisionofaMembertoparticipateinapanelproceedingasathirdpartywhenitdidnot,orcouldnot,participateasathirdpartyintheunderlyingconsultationshadtheeffectoflimitingtheevidencethatcouldberelieduponinthepanelproceedingbyprecludingtheintroductionofinformationobtainedduringtheconsultations.Thirdpartiesaresubjecttothesamerequirementtomaintaintheconfidentialityofpanelproceedingsasareparties.Wethereforeconcludethattherequirementtomaintaintheconfidentialityofconsultationsisnotviolatedbytheinclusionofinformationobtainedduringconsultationsinthewrittensubmissionofapartyprovidedtoathirdpartyinthesubsequentpanelproceedingevenifthatthirdpartydidnotparticipateintheconsultations.”16
　　(b)SubstantialConcern:NecessityorRelevanceofEvidence
　　InEC-BedLinen(DS141),thePanelnotesthatitseemsthattheevidenceconcerningtheconsultationsisatbestunnecessary,andmaybeirrelevant.However,thePanelrulesthat,thatsaid,“merelybecausetheevidenceisunnecessaryorirrelevantdoesnotrequireustoexcludeit”.Andtheycometothisrulingbystating:17
　　“ApanelisobligatedbyArticle11oftheDSUtoconduct‘anobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit’.ThePanelinAustralia-AutomotiveLeatherobservedthat:
　　‘Anyevidentiaryrulingswemakemust,therefore,beconsistentwiththisobligation.Inourview,adecisiontolimitthefactsandargumentsthattheUnitedStatesmaypresentduringthecourseofthisproceedingtothosesetforthintherequestforconsultationswouldmakeitdifficult,ifnotimpossible,forustofulfillourobligationtoconductanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeus.’
　　Similarlyinthiscase,weconsiderthatitisnotnecessarytolimitthefactsandargumentsIndiamaypresent,evenifwemightconsiderthosefactsorargumentstobeirrelevantornotprobativeontheissuesbeforeus.Inourview,thereisasignificantandsubstantivedifferencebetweenquestionsconcerningtheadmissibilityofevidence,andtheweighttobeaccordedevidenceinmakingourdecisions.Thatis,wemaychoosetoallowpartiestopresentevidence,butsubsequentlynotconsiderthatevidence,becauseitisnotrelevantornecessarytoourdeterminationsorisnotprobativeontheissuesbeforeit.Inourview,thereislittletobegainedbyexpendingourtimeandeffortinrulingonpointsof‘admissibility’ofevidencevelnon.”
　　Inaddition,underArt.13.2oftheDSU,panelshaveageneralrighttoseekinformation“fromanyrelevantsource”.“Inthiscontext,weconsiderthat,asageneralrule,panelshavewidelatitudeinadmittingevidenceinWTOdisputesettlement.TheDSUcontainsnorulethatmightrestricttheformsofevidencethatpanelsmayconsider.Moreover,internationaltribunalsaregenerallyfreetoadmitandevaluateevidenceofeverykind,andtoascribetoittheweightthattheyseefit.”18
　　Asonelegalscholarhasnoted:“Theinherentflexibilityoftheinternationalprocedure,anditstendencytobefreefromtechnicalrulesofevidenceappliedinmunicipallaw,providethe‘evidence’withawiderscopeininternationalproceedings...Generallyspeaking,internationaltribunalshavenotcommittedthemselvestotherestrictiverulesofevidenceinmunicipallaw.Theyhavefounditjustifiedtoreceiveeverykindandformofevidence,andhaveattachedtothemtheprobativevaluetheydeserveunderthecircumstancesofagivencase.”19
　　Insum,“thasclearlybeenheldintheWTOthatinformationobtainedinconsultationsmaybepresentedinsubsequentpanelproceedings”.20“Thisisunlikethesituationbeforemanyinternationaltribunals,whichoftenrefusetoadmitevidenceobtainedduringsettlementnegotiationsbetweenthepartiestoadispute.ThecircumstancesofsuchsettlementnegotiationsareclearlydifferentfromWTOdisputesettlementconsultations,whichare,astheAppellateBodyhasnoted,partofthemeansbywhichfactsareclarifiedbeforeapanelproceeding.”21Inallevents,asruledbythePanelinUS-LinePipe(DS202),“[o]urdecisionnottoexcludetheinformationdoesnotprejudgeinanywaytheissueofwhetherthePanelwillusetheinformation,norwhethertheinformationisrelevanttothematterathand.”22Thereisasignificantandsubstantivedifferencebetweenquestionsconcerningtheadmissibilityofevidence,andtheweighttobeaccordedevidenceinmakingdecisions.
　　(ii)ArgumentsbeforeDomesticInvestigativeAuthorities
　　Withrespecttopanels’examinationoffactualdeterminationsbydomesticinvestigativeauthoritiesinfieldsconcerningcountervailingmeasures,anti-dumpingdutiesandsafeguardsetc.,theAppellateBodyhasruledthat,“[s]ofarasfact-findingbypanelsisconcerned,theiractivitiesarealwaysconstrainedbythemandateofArticle11oftheDSU:theapplicablestandardisneitherdenovoreviewassuch,nor‘totaldeference’,butratherthe‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.Manypanelshaveinthepastrefusedtoundertakedenovoreview,wisely,sinceundercurrentpracticeandsystems,theyareinanycasepoorlysuitedtoengageinsuchareview.Ontheotherhand,‘totaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthorities’,ithasbeenwellsaid,‘couldnotensurean“objectiveassessment”asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU’”.23Andthe“nor‘totaldeference’”standardsuggeststhatpanelswillnotsimplyaccepttheconclusionsofthecompetentauthorities.Thenthefollowingparagraphswillgetdowntotheissueoftheadmissibilityofargumentsorevidenceraisedbeforedomesticinvestigativeauthorities.Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesinUS-LambMeat(DS177/DS178)that:24
　　“InourreportinThailand-Anti-DumpingDutiesonAngles,ShapesandSectionsofIronorNon-AlloySteelH-BeamsfromPoland,inthecourseofourexaminationofthespecificityofPoland’srequestfortheestablishmentofapanelunderArticle6.2oftheDSU,wesaid:‘ThePanel’sreasoningseemstoassumethatthereisalwayscontinuitybetweenclaimsraisedinanunderlyinganti-dumpinginvestigationandclaimsraisedbyacomplainingpartyinarelateddisputebroughtbeforetheWTO.Thisisnotnecessarilythecase.Thepartiesinvolvedinanunderlyinganti-dumpinginvestigationaregenerallyexporters,importersandothercommercialentities,whilethoseinvolvedinWTOdisputesettlementaretheMembersoftheWTO.Therefore,itcannotbeassumedthattherangeofissuesraisedinananti-dumpinginvestigationwillbethesameastheclaimsthataMemberchoosestobringbeforetheWTOinadispute.’
　　Althoughtheclaimunderexaminationinthatappealwasdifferent,thesamereasoningappliesinrespectoftherelationshipbetweendomesticinvestigationsculminatingintheimpositionofasafeguardmeasure,anddisputesettlementproceedingsundertheDSUregardingthatsafeguardmeasure.Inarguingclaimsindisputesettlement,aWTOMemberisnotconfinedmerelytorehearsingargumentsthatweremadetothecompetentauthoritiesbytheinterestedpartiesduringthedomesticinvestigation,eveniftheWTOMemberwasitselfaninterestedpartyinthatinvestigation.Likewise,panelsarenotobligedtodetermine,andconfirmthemselvesthenatureandcharacteroftheargumentsmadebytheinterestedpartiestothecompetentauthorities.Argumentsbeforenationalcompetentauthoritiesmaybeinfluencedby,andfocusedon,therequirementsofthenationallaws,regulationsandprocedures.Ontheotherhand,disputesettlementproceedingsbroughtundertheDSUconcerningsafeguardmeasuresimposedundertheAgreementonSafeguardsmayinvolveargumentsthatwerenotsubmittedtothecompetentauthoritiesbytheinterestedparties.
　　Furthermore,werecallthat,inUnitedStates-WheatGlutenSafeguard,wereversedafindingbythepanelthatcompetentauthoritiesareobligedtoevaluateonlythoseotherrelevantfactors,underArticle4.2(a),whichwereactuallyraisedbytheinterestedpartiesduringtheinvestigationbeforeit.Wesaidtherethatcompetentauthoritieshaveanindependentdutyofinvestigationandthattheycannotremainpassiveinthefaceofpossibleshort-comingsintheevidencesubmitted,andviewsexpressed,bytheinterestedparties.Inshort,competentauthoritiesareobliged,insomecircumstances,togobeyondtheargumentsthatwereadvancedbytheinterestedpartiesduringtheinvestigation.Ascompetentauthoritiesthemselvesareobliged,insomecircumstances,togobeyondtheargumentsoftheinterestedpartiesinreachingtheirowndeterminations,sotoo,webelieve,panelsarenotlimitedtotheargumentssubmittedbytheinterestedpartiestothecompetentauthoritiesinreviewingthosedeterminationsinWTOdisputesettlement.
　　WewishtoemphasizethatthediscretionthatWTOMembersenjoytoarguedisputesettlementclaimsinthemannertheydeemappropriatedoesnot,ofcourse,detractfromtheirobligation,underArticle3.10oftheDSU,‘toengageindisputesettlementprocedures’ingoodfaithinanefforttoresolvethedispute’.ItfollowsthatWTOMemberscannotimproperlywithholdargumentsfromcompetentauthoritieswithaviewtoraisingthoseargumentslaterbeforeapanel.Inanyevent,asapracticalmatter,wethinkitunlikelythataMemberwoulddoso.”
　　(iii)ArgumentsSubmittedaftertheFirstSubstantiveMeeting
　　TheAppellateBodyhaveobservedthat:“Itisalsotrue,however,thattheWorkingProceduresinAppendix3docontemplatetwodistinguishablestagesinaproceedingbeforeapanel.Paragraphs4and5oftheWorkingProceduresaddressthefirststage…Thesecondstageofapanelproceedingisdealtwithinparagraph7…UndertheWorkingProceduresinAppendix3,thecomplainingpartyshouldsetoutitscaseinchief,includingafullpresentationofthefactsonthebasisofsubmissionofsupportingevidence,duringthefirststage.Thesecondstageisgenerallydesignedtopermit‘rebuttals’byeachpartyoftheargumentsandevidencesubmittedbytheotherparties.”25
　　Inaddition,theAppellateBodyrulesthat,“[apanelrequest]oftenformsthebasisforthetermsofreferenceofthepanelpursuanttoArticle7oftheDSU”26.Andthepanelrequestisnormallysubmittedbeforethefirstsubstantivemeeting.Subsequently,thedefendantpartyhasoccasionallycontestedthatpanelsshouldrejectsubmissionsofnewevidenceorargumentsmadeafterthefirstsubstantivemeeting.Inthisrespect,theauthorthinksitnecessarytoclarifyseveralpointsasfollows:
　　(a)Thereisasignificantdifferencebetweentheclaimsandtheargumentssupportingthoseclaims.
　　AsruledbytheAppellateBodyinEC-Bananas(DS27),Art.6.2oftheDSUrequiresthat“theclaims,butnotthearguments”,mustallbespecifiedsufficientlyintherequestfortheestablishmentofapanel.Withthisregard,theAppellateBodyrulethat,“…nourview,thereisasignificantdifferencebetweentheclaimsidentifiedintherequestfortheestablishmentofapanel,whichestablishthepanel’stermsofreferenceunderArticle7oftheDSU,andtheargumentssupportingthoseclaims,whicharesetoutandprogressivelyclarifiedinthefirstwrittensubmissions,therebuttalsubmissionsandthefirstandsecondpanelmeetingswiththeparties”.27
　　AndasclarifiedbythePanelinThailand-IronandH-Beams(DS122),“…Article6.2DSUdoesnotrelatedirectlytothesufficiencyofthesubsequentwrittenandoralsubmissionsofthepartiesinthecourseoftheproceedings,whichmaydeveloptheargumentsinsupportoftheclaimssetoutinthepanelrequest.…”.28Also,theArbitratorsintheEC-Hormones(DS26)caseobservethat,“…[p]anelsareinhibitedfromaddressinglegalclaimsfallingoutsidetheirtermsofreference.However,nothingintheDSUlimitsthefacultyofapanelfreelytouseargumentssubmittedbyanyoftheparties--ortodevelopitsownlegalreasoning--tosupportitsownfindingsandconclusionsonthematterunderitsconsideration”.29
　　(b)Thereisnoprovisionestablishingprecisedeadlinesforthepresentationofevidence.
　　Inthisrespect,forexample,theAppellateBodyinAustralia-Salmon(DS18)rulesthat:“Moregenerally,…wenotethattheWorkingProceduresinAppendix3oftheDSUdonotestablishprecisedeadlinesforthesubmissionofevidence.UndertheprovisionsofArticle12.1oftheDSU,panelsarepermittedtoestablishtheirownworkingprocedures,inadditiontothosesetoutinAppendix3.…WenotethatArticle12.2oftheDSUprovidesthat‘[p]anelproceduresshouldprovidesufficientflexibilitysoastoensurehigh-qualitypanelreports,whilenotundulydelayingthepanelprocess.’However,apanelmustalsobecarefultoobservedueprocess,whichentailsprovidingthepartiesadequateopportunitytorespondtotheevidencesubmitted.WhetherthePanelaffordedAustraliaadequateopportunitytorespondisthequestionaddressedinthenextsection.”30
　　Also,theAppellateBodyinArgentina-Footwear(DS56)rulesthat,“Article11oftheDSUdoesnotestablishtimelimitsforthesubmissionofevidencetoapanel.Article12.1oftheDSUdirectsapaneltofollowtheWorkingProceduressetoutinAppendix3oftheDSU,butatthesametimeauthorizesapaneltodootherwiseafterconsultingthepartiestothedispute.TheWorkingProceduresinAppendix3alsodonotestablishprecisedeadlinesforthepresentationofevidencebyapartytothedispute.ItistruethattheWorkingProcedures‘donotprohibit’submissionofadditionalevidenceafterthefirstsubstantivemeetingofapanelwiththeparties…”.31
　　ThePanelinCanada-CivilianAircraft(DS70)referstothisrulingandstatesindetailas:32
　　“WerecallthattheAppellateBodyfoundinArgentineFootwearthatneitherArticle11oftheDSU,northeWorkingProceduresinAppendix3oftheDSU,establishprecisedeadlinesforthepresentationofevidencebypartiestoadispute.…
　　Inouropinion,anabsoluteruleexcludingthesubmissionofevidencebyacomplainingpartyafterthefirstsubstantivemeetingwouldbeinappropriate,sincetheremaybecircumstancesinwhichacomplainingpartyisrequiredtoadducenewevidenceinordertoaddressrebuttalargumentsmadebytherespondent.Furthermore,theremaybeinstances,asinthepresentcase,whereapartyisrequiredtosubmitnewevidenceattherequestofthepanel.Forthesereasons,werejectedCanada’srequestforapreliminaryrulingthatthePanelshouldnotacceptnewevidencesubmittedbyBrazilafterthefirstsubstantivemeeting.
　　Wealsoconsiderthatwearenotboundtoexcludethesubmissionofnewallegationsafterthefirstsubstantivemeeting.WecanseenothingintheDSU,orintheAppendix3WorkingProcedures,thatwouldrequirethesubmissionofnewallegationstobetreatedanydifferentlythanthesubmissionofnewevidence.Indeed,onecouldenvisagesituationsinwhichtherespondentmightpresentinformationtoapanelduringthefirstsubstantivemeetingthatcouldreasonablybeusedasabasisforanewallegationbythecomplainingparty.Providedthenewallegationfallswithinthepanel’stermsofreference,andprovidedtherespondentparty’sdueprocessrightsofdefencearerespected,wecanseenoreasonwhyanysuchnewallegationshouldnecessarilyberejectedbythepanelasamatterofcourse,simplybecauseitissubmittedafterthefirstsubstantivemeetingwiththeparties.WeconsiderthatthisapproachisconsistentwiththeAppellateBody’srulinginEuropeanCommunities-Bananasthat‘thereisnorequirementintheDSUorinGATTpracticeforargumentsonallclaimsrelatingtothematterreferredtotheDSBtobesetoutinacomplainingparty’sfirstwrittensubmissiontothepanel.Itisthepanel’stermsofreference,governedbyArticle7oftheDSU,whichsetouttheclaimsofthecomplainingpartiesrelatingtothematterreferredtotheDSB’.
　　[…]
　　Asnotedabove,thereisnothingintheDSU,orintheAppendix3WorkingProcedures,topreventapartysubmittingnewevidenceorallegationsafterthefirstsubstantivemeeting.WecanseenobasisintheDSUtotreatthesubmissionofaffirmativedefencesafterthefirstsubstantivemeetinganydifferently.Thus,althoughitisdesirablethataffirmativedefences,aswithanyclaim,shouldbesubmittedasearlyaspossible,thereisnorequirementthataffirmativedefencesshouldbesubmittedbeforetheendofthefirstsubstantivemeetingwiththeparties.Providedthatdueprocessisrespected,weseenothingtoprohibitthesubmissionofaffirmativedefencesafterthefirstsubstantivemeetingwiththeparties.”
　　Insum,asprovidedforinArt.12.2oftheDSU,“[p]anelproceduresshouldprovidesufficientflexibilitysoastoensurehigh-qualitypanelreports,whilenotundulydelayingthepanelprocess.”TheWorkingProceduresinAppendix3oftheDSUdonotestablishprecisedeadlinesforthesubmissionofevidence;thereisnothingintheDSU,orintheAppendix3WorkingProcedures,topreventapartyprovidingnewsubmissionsafterthefirstsubstantivemeeting.Andasnotedabove,“theWorkingProceduresintheirpresentformdonotconstrainpanelswithhardandfastrulesondeadlinesforsubmittingevidence.”33
　　However,apanelmustalsobecarefultoobservedueprocess,whichentailsprovidingthepartiesadequateopportunitytorespondtotheevidencesubmitted.Justasnotedbyapanelinthisrespect,“ntiltheWTOMembersagreeondifferentandmorespecificrulesonthisregard,ourmainconcernistoensurethat‘dueprocess’isrespectedandthatallpartiestoadisputearegivenalltheopportunitiestodefendtheirpositiontothefullestextentpossible.”34
　　
　　IIIPanel’sRighttoSeekInformation
　　ApanelisobligatedbyArt.11oftheDSUtoconduct“anobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit”,anyevidentiaryrulingsmadebypanelsmustbeconsistentwiththisobligation.Therefore,tofulfiltheirfunctionsasprovidedinArt.11oftheDSUto“makeanobjective”,panelsarenotlimitedtotheargumentssubmittedbytheparticipantsinWTOdisputesettlement.Panelscannotremainpassiveinthefaceofpossibleshortcomingsintheevidencesubmitted,andviewsexpressed,bytheinterestedparties.Andtheyareobliged,insomecircumstances,togobeyondtheargumentsthatwereadvancedbythepartiesduringtheprocessinreachingtheirownconclusions.
　　Infact,theDSUgivespanelsdifferentmeansorinstrumentsforcomplyingwithArt.11;amongtheseistherightto“seekinformationandtechnicaladvice”asexpresslyspelledoutinArt.13oftheDSU.Art.13.1oftheDSUstatesthatapanelhas“therighttoseekinformationandtechnicaladvicefromanyindividualorbodywhichitdeemsappropriate”.Art.13.2furtherprovidesthatpanelsmay“seekinformationfromanyrelevantsourceandmayconsultexpertstoobtaintheiropiniononcertainaspectsofthematter”.35
　　(i)AGrantofDiscretionaryAuthority
　　PursuanttoArt.13oftheDSU,panelshaveasignificantinvestigativeauthority;apanelisentitledtoseekinformationandadvicefromanyrelevantsourceitchooses.Astobedemonstratedinthefollowingparagraphs,therighttoseekinformationvestedinpanelsbyArt.13oftheDSUis“agrantofdiscretionaryauthority”.
　　Forexample,theAppellateBodyrulesinJapan-AgricultureProducts(DS76)that:“…Article13.1oftheDSUgivesapanel‘...therighttoseekinformationandtechnicaladvicefromanyindividualorbodywhichitdeemsappropriate’.PursuanttoArticle13.2oftheDSU,apanelmayseekinformationfromanyrelevantsourceandmayconsultexpertstoobtaintheiropinionsoncertainaspectsofthematteratissue.Thisisagrantofdiscretionaryauthority:apanelisnotduty-boundtoseekinformationineachandeverycaseortoconsultparticularexpertsunderthisprovision.WerecallourstatementinECMeasuresConcerningMeatandMeatProducts(Hormones)thatArticle13oftheDSUenablesapaneltoseekinformationandtechnicaladviceasitdeemsappropriateinaparticularcase,andthattheDSUleaves‘tothesounddiscretionofapanelthedeterminationofwhethertheestablishmentofanexpertreviewgroupisnecessaryorappropriate’.Justasapanelhasthediscretiontodeterminehowtoseekexpertadvice,soalsodoesapanelhavethediscretiontodeterminewhethertoseekinformationorexpertadviceatall.”36
　　Inaddition,theexerciseofthe“discretionaryauthority”enjoyedbypanelstoseekinformationisnotconditionalasapreliminarymatterontheestablishmentofaprimafaciecase.InCanada-CivilianAircraft(DS70),thePanelrulesthat,“apanel’srighttoseekinformationisgovernedbyArticle13.1oftheDSU.ThereisnothinginArticle13.1tosuggestthatapanel’srighttoseekinformationisrestrictedtomattersinrespectofwhichthecomplainingpartyhasbeendeemed(asapreliminarymatter)tohaveestablishedaprimafaciecase.Theonlyexpressrestrictiononapanel’srighttoseekinformationistheArticle13.1obligationforapanelto‘informtheauthorities’ofaMemberbeforeseekinginformationoradvicefromanyindividualorbodywithinthejurisdictionofthatMember.Inouropinion,anyrequirementthatpanelsshouldprovidepreliminaryrulingsonwhetherthecomplainingpartyhasestablishedaprimafaciecasebeforeseekinginformationoradviceunderArticle13.1couldrenderthatprovisionineffective.Thisisbecauseincertaincircumstancesapanelmayconsideritappropriatetoseekinformationoradvicepreciselyinordertodeterminewhetherthecomplainingpartyhasestablishedaprimafaciecase….”.37AndtheAppellateBodyconfirmsthisruling.
　　TheAppellateBodyinCanada-CivilianAircraft(DS70)rulesthat:“Aprimafaciecase,itiswelltoremember,isacasewhich,intheabsenceofeffectiverefutationbythedefendingparty(thatis,inthepresentappeal,theMemberrequestedtoprovidetheinformation),requiresapanel,asamatteroflaw,toruleinfavourofthecomplainingpartypresentingtheprimafaciecase.Thereis,asnotedearlier,nothingineithertheDSUortheSCMAgreementtosupportCanada’sassumption.Tothecontrary,apanelisvestedwithampleandextensivediscretionaryauthoritytodeterminewhenitneedsinformationtoresolveadisputeandwhatinformationitneeds.ApanelmayneedsuchinformationbeforeorafteracomplainingorarespondingMemberhasestablisheditscomplaintordefenceonaprimafaciebasis.Apanelmay,infact,needtheinformationsoughtinordertoevaluateevidencealreadybeforeitinthecourseofdeterminingwhethertheclaimingortherespondingMember,asthecasemaybe,hasestablishedaprimafaciecaseordefence.Furthermore,arefusaltoprovideinformationrequestedonthebasisthataprimafaciecasehasnotbeenmadeimpliesthattheMemberconcernedbelievesthatitisabletojudgeforitselfwhethertheotherpartyhasmadeaprimafaciecase.However,noMemberisfreetodetermineforitselfwhetheraprimafaciecaseordefencehasbeenestablishedbytheotherparty.ThatcompetenceisnecessarilyvestedinthepanelundertheDSU,andnotintheMembersthatarepartiestothedispute.”38
　　(i)TheAdmissibilityofNon-requestedInformation
　　InUS-Shrimp(DS58),theAppellateBodyonceagainstressesthebroaddiscretionvestedinpanelsbytheDSU.Itstatesinpertinent:39
　　“Thecomprehensivenatureoftheauthorityofapanelto‘seek’informationandtechnicaladvicefrom‘anyindividualorbody’itmayconsiderappropriate,orfrom‘anyrelevantsource’,shouldbeunderscored.Thisauthorityembracesmorethanmerelythechoiceandevaluationofthesourceoftheinformationoradvicewhichitmayseek.Apanel’sauthorityincludestheauthoritytodecidenottoseeksuchinformationoradviceatall.Weconsiderthatapanelalsohastheauthoritytoacceptorrejectanyinformationoradvicewhichitmayhavesoughtandreceived,ortomakesomeotherappropriatedispositionthereof.Itisparticularlywithintheprovinceandtheauthorityofapaneltodeterminetheneedforinformationandadviceinaspecificcase,toascertaintheacceptabilityandrelevancyofinformationoradvicereceived,andtodecidewhatweighttoascribetothatinformationoradviceortoconcludethatnoweightatallshouldbegiventowhathasbeenreceived.
　　ItisalsopertinenttonotethatArticle12.1oftheDSUauthorizespanelstodepartfrom,ortoaddto,theWorkingProceduressetforthinAppendix3oftheDSU,andineffecttodeveloptheirownWorkingProcedures,afterconsultationwiththepartiestothedispute.Article12.2goesontodirectthat‘panelproceduresshouldprovidesufficientflexibilitysoastoensurehigh-qualitypanelreportswhilenotundulydelayingthepanelprocess’.
　　ThethrustofArticles12and13,takentogether,isthattheDSUaccordstoapanelestablishedbytheDSB,andengagedinadisputesettlementproceeding,ampleandextensiveauthoritytoundertakeandtocontroltheprocessbywhichitinformsitselfbothoftherelevantfactsofthedisputeandofthelegalnormsandprinciplesapplicabletosuchfacts.Thatauthority,andthebreadththereof,isindispensablynecessarytoenableapaneltodischargeitsdutyimposedbyArticle11oftheDSUto‘makeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements….’
　　AgainstthiscontextofbroadauthorityvestedinpanelsbytheDSU,andgiventheobjectandpurposeofthePanel’smandateasrevealedinArticle11,wedonotbelievethattheword‘seek’mustnecessarilyberead,asapparentlythePanelreadit,intooliteralamanner.ThatthePanel’sreadingoftheword‘seek’isunnecessarilyformalandtechnicalinnaturebecomesclearshouldan‘individualorbody’firstaskapanelforpermissiontofileastatementorabrief.Insuchanevent,apanelmaydeclinetogranttheleaverequested.If,intheexerciseofitssounddiscretioninaparticularcase,apanelconcludesinteraliathatitcoulddosowithout‘undulydelayingthepanelprocess’,itcouldgrantpermissiontofileastatementorabrief,subjecttosuchconditionsasitdeemsappropriate.Theexerciseofthepanel’sdiscretioncould,ofcourse,andperhapsshould,includeconsultationwiththepartiestothedispute.Inthiskindofsituation,forallpracticalandpertinentpurposes,thedistinctionbetween‘requested’and‘non-requested’informationvanishes.
　　Inthepresentcontext,authoritytoseekinformationisnotproperlyequatedwithaprohibitiononacceptinginformationwhichhasbeensubmittedwithouthavingbeenrequestedbyapanel.Apanelhasthediscretionaryauthorityeithertoacceptandconsiderortorejectinformationandadvicesubmittedtoit,whetherrequestedbyapanelornot.Thefactthatapanelmaymotupropriohaveinitiatedtherequestforinformationdoesnot,byitself,bindthepaneltoacceptandconsidertheinformationwhichisactuallysubmitted.Theamplitudeoftheauthorityvestedinpanelstoshapetheprocessesoffact-findingandlegalinterpretationmakesclearthatapanelwillnotbedeluged,asitwere,withnon-requestedmaterial,unlessthatpanelallowsitselftobesodeluged.”
　　(iii)SummaryandConclusions
　　Asnotedabove,pursuanttoArt.13oftheDSU,theinitiativetoseekinformationandtoselectthesourceofinformationrestswithpanels.Art.13oftheDSUenablesapaneltoseekinformationandtechnicaladviceasitdeemsappropriateinaparticularcase.Thisisagrantofdiscretionaryauthority:apanelisnotduty-boundtoseekinformationineachandeverycaseortoconsultparticularexpertsunderthisprovision.Furthermore,thisauthorityembracesmorethanmerelythechoiceandevaluationofthesourceoftheinformationoradvicewhichitmayseek.Apanel’sauthorityincludestheauthoritytodecidenottoseeksuchinformationoradviceatall.
　　Also,authoritytoseekinformationisnotproperlyequatedwithaprohibitiononacceptinginformationwhichhasbeensubmittedwithouthavingbeenrequestedbyapanel.AgainstthecontextofbroadauthorityvestedinpanelsbytheDSU,andgiventheobjectandpurposeofthePanel’smandateasrevealedinArt.11oftheDSU,theword“seek”inArt.13shouldnotnecessarilybereadintooliteralamanner.Inthesituationforapaneltoconcludeinteraliathatitcoulddosowithout“undulydelayingthepanelprocess”,itcouldgrantpermissiontofileastatementorabrief,intheexerciseofitssounddiscretioninaparticularcase,subjecttosuchconditionsasitdeemsappropriate,forallpracticalandpertinentpurposes.Theonlyexpressrestrictiononapanel’srighttoseekinformationistheArt.13.1obligationforapanelto“informtheauthorities”ofaMemberbeforeseekinginformationoradvicefromanyindividualorbodywithinthejurisdictionofthatMember.
　　Nevertheless,“[thePanel]didnotconsideritappropriatetoseekanyinformationbeforereceivingatleastthefirstwrittensubmissionsofbothparties.Weconsideredthatitwasonlyonthebasisofthesefirstwrittensubmissionsthatwecouldproperlydeterminewhat,ifany,additionalinformationmightneedtobesought”.40Furthermore,“[thePanel]didnotconsideritappropriatetoexerciseourdiscretionaryauthorityunderArticle13.1tomakegeneralizedrequestsforinformation.Instead,weonlysoughtdetailedinformationofrelevantloans,funds,contributions,assistanceetc.identifiedintherecord.Whereasmoregeneralizedrequestsforinformationmaybeappropriateforbodiessuchascommissionsofenquiry,wedonotconsiderthemappropriateforapanelactingunderArticle13.1oftheDSU”.41“Innormalcircumstances,thePanelwouldnothavesoughtadditionalinformation…underArticle13.1oftheDSU”.42
　　Tosumup,Art.13oftheDSUmakes“agrantofdiscretionaryauthority”topanelsenablingthemtoseekinformationfromanyrelevantsourceastheydeemappropriateinaparticularcase.Itiswithintheboundsofpanels’discretionaryauthorityunderArts.11and13oftheDSUindecidingwhen,howandwhethertoseekinformationfromcertainsource,solongaspanelsthinkitappropriate.However,thefactthatapanelmaymotupropriohaveinitiatedtherequestforinformationdoesnot,byitself,bindthepaneltoacceptandconsidertheinformationwhichisactuallysubmitted.
　　Inaword,apanelhastheauthoritytoacceptorrejectanyinformationoradvicewhichitmayhavesoughtandreceived,whetherrequestedbyapanelornot,ortomakesomeotherappropriatedispositionthereof.Itisinthepanels’andtheparties’interestthatpanelsareinformedasmuchaspossiblebeforemakingarulinginthehighlycomplexmatter.ItisalsobeneficialfortheWTOdisputesettlementsystemmoregenerallythatpartiesareforthcominginsubmittingevidencerequestedbypanels.
　　
　　IVAdverseInferencesfromParty’sRefusaltoProvideInformationRequested
　　Panelsmayberequiredsometimestodrawadverseinferencesfromaparty’srefusaltoprovideinformationtothepanelaboutthecontestedmeasure.Thisisespeciallytruewhendirectevidenceisnotavailablebecauseitiswithheldbyapartywithsolepossessionofthatevidence.However,astobeshowninthefollowingparagraphs,justasapanelhasthediscretionaryauthoritytorequestcertaininformationortoacceptorrejectevidenceorargumentssubmittedbyparties,itisalsowithintheprovinceandtheauthorityofapaneltodeterminetheneedforsuchinferencestobemadeinaparticulardispute.
　　InCanada-CivilianAircraft(DS70),BrazilappealsandclaimsthatthePanelcommittedanerroroflawbyfailingtodrawadverseinferencesfromCanada’srefusaltosubmitinformationrequestedabouttheEDC’sfinancingoftheASAtransaction.Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyfirstlynotesthat,“[t]heparties’argumentsandcounter-argumentsonthisissueraiseanumberofquestionswithfundamentalandfar-reachingimplicationsfortheentireWTOdisputesettlementsystem.Thesequestionsrelateto:first,theauthorityofapaneltorequestapartytoadisputetosubmitinformationaboutthatdispute;second,thedutyofapartytosubmitinformationrequestedbyapanel;and,third,theauthorityofapaneltodrawadverseinferencesfromtherefusalbyapartytoproviderequestedinformation”.43ThentheAppellateBodydealswiththesequestionsinthatsequence.
　　(i)TheAuthorityofaPaneltoRequestInformationfromaPartytotheDispute
　　Withregardtothisissue,certainparagraphsabovehavetouchedonitindetail,andheretheauthormeanstostresssomepointsinpertinentbyreferringtotherulingmadebytheAppellateBodyinCanada-CivilianAircraft(DS70):44
　　“InArgentina-MeasuresAffectingImportsofFootwear,Textiles,ApparelandOtherItems,weruledthatArticle13oftheDSUmade‘agrantofdiscretionaryauthority’topanelsenablingthemtoseekinformationfromanyrelevantsource.InEuropeanCommunities-Hormones,weobservedthatArticle13oftheDSU‘enable[s]panelstoseekinformationandadviceastheydeemappropriateinaparticularcase’.And,inUnitedStates-Shrimp,weunderscored‘thecomprehensivenature’oftheauthorityofapaneltoseekinformationandtechnicaladvicefrom‘anyindividualorbody’itmayconsiderappropriate,orfrom‘anyrelevantsource’.There,westatedthat:
　　[…]
　　ItisclearfromthelanguageofArticle13thatthediscretionaryauthorityofapanelmaybeexercisedtorequestandobtaininformation,notjust‘fromanyindividualorbody’withinthejurisdictionofaMemberoftheWTO,butalsofromanyMember,includingafortioriaMemberwhoisapartytoadisputebeforeapanel.ThisismadecrystalclearbythethirdsentenceofArticle13.1,whichstates:‘AMembershouldrespondpromptlyandfullytoanyrequestbyapanelforsuchinformationasthepanelconsidersnecessaryandappropriate.’Itisequallyimportanttostressthatthisdiscretionaryauthoritytoseekandobtaininformationisnotmadeconditionalbythis,oranyotherprovision,oftheDSUupontheotherpartytothedisputehavingpreviouslyestablished,onaprimafaciebasis,suchotherparty’sclaimordefence.Indeed,Article13.1imposesnoconditionsontheexerciseofthisdiscretionaryauthority.CanadaarguesthatthePanelinthiscasehadnoauthoritytorequestthesubmissionofinformationrelatingtotheEDC’sfinancingoftheASAtransactionbecauseBrazilhadnotpreviouslyestablishedaprimafaciecasethatthefinancialcontributionofferedbysuchfinancingconferreda‘benefit’onASAandthereforesatisfiedthatotherprerequisiteofaprohibitedexportsubsidy.Thisargumentis,quitesimply,bereftofanytextualorlogicalbasis.ThereisnothingineithertheDSUortheSCMAgreementtosustainit.NorcananysupportforthisargumentbederivedfromaconsiderationofthenatureofthefunctionsandresponsibilitiesentrustedtopanelsintheWTOdisputesettlementsystem-aconsiderationwhichweessaybelow.”
　　(ii)TheDutyofaMembertoComplywiththeRequestofaPaneltoProvideInformation
　　AnimportantpartofBrazil’sappealwithrespecttotheissueofadverseinferencesisBrazil’scontentionthatCanadawasunderadutytocomplywiththePanel’srequesttoprovideinformationrelatingtotheEDC’sfinancingoftheASAtransaction.Canadadeniesthatitwaslegallyburdenedwithsuchaduty.Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesinpertinentpartas:45
　　“WenotethatArticle13.1oftheDSUprovidesthat‘[a]Membershouldrespondpromptlyandfullytoanyrequestbyapanelforsuchinformationasthepanelconsidersnecessaryandappropriate.’Althoughtheword‘should’isoftenusedcolloquiallytoimplyanexhortation,ortostateapreference,itisnotalwaysusedinthoseways.Itcanalsobeused‘toexpressaduty[or]obligation’.Theword‘should’has,forinstance,previouslybeeninterpretedbyusasexpressinga‘duty’ofpanelsinthecontextofArticle11oftheDSU.Similarly,weareoftheviewthattheword‘should’inthethirdsentenceofArticle13.1is,inthecontextofthewholeofArticle13,usedinanormative,ratherthanamerelyexhortative,sense.Membersare,inotherwords,underadutyandanobligationto‘respondpromptlyandfully’torequestsmadebypanelsforinformationunderArticle13.1oftheDSU.
　　IfMembersthatwererequestedbyapaneltoprovideinformationhadnolegaldutyto‘respond’byprovidingsuchinformation,thatpanel’sundoubtedlegal‘righttoseek’informationunderthefirstsentenceofArticle13.1wouldberenderedmeaningless.AMemberpartytoadisputecould,atwill,thwartthepanel’sfact-findingpowersandtakecontrolitselfoftheinformation-gatheringprocessthatArticles12and13oftheDSUplaceinthehandsofthepanel.AMembercould,inotherwords,preventapanelfromcarryingoutitstaskoffindingthefactsconstitutingthedisputebeforeitand,inevitably,fromgoingforwardwiththelegalcharacterizationofthosefacts.Article12.7oftheDSUprovides,inrelevantpart,that‘…thereportofapanelshallsetoutthefindingsoffact,theapplicabilityofrelevantprovisionsandthebasicrationalebehindanyfindingsandrecommendationsthatitmakes’.Ifapanelispreventedfromascertainingtherealorrelevantfactsofadispute,itwillnotbeinapositiontodeterminetheapplicabilityofthepertinenttreatyprovisionstothosefacts,and,therefore,itwillbeunabletomakeanyprincipledfindingsandrecommendationstotheDSB.
　　Thechainofpotentialconsequencesdoesnotstopthere.ToholdthataMemberpartytoadisputeisnotlegallyboundtocomplywithapanel’srequestforinformationrelatingtothatdispute,is,ineffect,todeclarethatMemberlegallyfreetoprecludeapanelfromcarryingoutitsmandateandresponsibilityundertheDSU.SotorulewouldbetoreducetoanillusionandavanitythefundamentalrightofMemberstohavedisputesarisingbetweenthemresolvedthroughthesystemandproceedingsforwhichtheybargainedinconcludingtheDSU.Weareboundtorejectaninterpretationthatpromisessuchconsequences.
　　WebelievealsothatthedutyofaMemberpartytoadisputetocomplywitharequestfromthepaneltoprovideinformationunderArticle13.1oftheDSUisbutonespecificmanifestationofthebroaderdutiesofMembersunderArticle3.10oftheDSUnottoconsiderthe‘useofthedisputesettlementprocedures…ascontentiousacts’,and,whenadisputedoesarise,to‘engageintheseproceduresingoodfaithinanefforttoresolvethedispute’.
　　[…]
　　Canada’sfirstjustificationrestsontheassumptionthataMember’sdutytorespondpromptlyandfullytoaPanel’srequestforinformationarisesonlyaftertheopposingpartytothedisputehasestablishedaprimafaciecasethatitscomplaintordefenceismeritorious.Aprimafaciecase,itiswelltoremember,isacasewhich,intheabsenceofeffectiverefutationbythedefendingparty(thatis,inthepresentappeal,theMemberrequestedtoprovidetheinformation),requiresapanel,asamatteroflaw,toruleinfavourofthecomplainingpartypresentingtheprimafaciecase.Thereis,asnotedearlier,nothingineithertheDSUortheSCMAgreementtosupportCanada’sassumption.Tothecontrary,apanelisvestedwithampleandextensivediscretionaryauthoritytodeterminewhenitneedsinformationtoresolveadisputeandwhatinformationitneeds.ApanelmayneedsuchinformationbeforeorafteracomplainingorarespondingMemberhasestablisheditscomplaintordefenceonaprimafaciebasis.Apanelmay,infact,needtheinformationsoughtinordertoevaluateevidencealreadybeforeitinthecourseofdeterminingwhethertheclaimingortherespondingMember,asthecasemaybe,hasestablishedaprimafaciecaseordefence.Furthermore,arefusaltoprovideinformationrequestedonthebasisthataprimafaciecasehasnotbeenmadeimpliesthattheMemberconcernedbelievesthatitisabletojudgeforitselfwhethertheotherpartyhasmadeaprimafaciecase.However,noMemberisfreetodetermineforitselfwhetheraprimafaciecaseordefencehasbeenestablishedbytheotherparty.ThatcompetenceisnecessarilyvestedinthepanelundertheDSU,andnotintheMembersthatarepartiestothedispute.Wearenot,therefore,persuadedbythefirstjustificationCanadagaveforitsrefusaltoprovidetheinformationrequestedbythePanel.”
　　(iii)TheDrawingofAdverseInferencesfromtheRefusalofaPartytoProvideInformationRequestedbythePanel
　　Asnotedabove,theAppellateBodyhaveconcludedthatapanelhasbroadlegalauthoritytorequestinformationfromaMemberthatisapartytoadispute,andthatapartysorequestedhasalegaldutytoprovidesuchinformation.Thequestionremains:ifthatMemberrefusestoprovidethatinformation,doesthepanelhavetheauthoritytodrawadverseinferencesfromthatrefusal?Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesthat:46
　　“WeapproachthisquestionbynotingoncemorethatthemandateofapanelundertheDSUrequiresittodeterminethefactsofthedisputewithwhichitisseised,andtoevaluateorcharacterizethosefactsintermsoftheirconsistencyorinconsistencywithaparticularprovisionoftheSCMAgreementoranothercoveredagreement.TheDSUdoesnotpurporttostateinwhatdetailedcircumstancesinferences,adverseorotherwise,maybedrawnbypanelsfrominfinitelyvaryingcombinationsoffacts.Yet,inallcases,incarryingouttheirmandateandseekingtoachievethe‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’requiredbyArticle11oftheDSU,panelsroutinelydrawinferencesfromthefactsplacedontherecord.Theinferencesdrawnmaybeinferencesoffact:thatis,fromfactAandfactB,itisreasonabletoinfertheexistenceoffactC.Ortheinferencesderivedmaybeinferencesoflaw:forexample,theensembleoffactsfoundtoexistwarrantsthecharacterizationofa‘subsidy’ora‘subsidycontingent…infact…uponexportperformance’.Thefactsmust,ofcourse,rationallysupporttheinferencesmade,butinferencesmaybedrawnwhetherornotthefactsalreadyontherecorddeservethequalificationofaprimafaciecase.Thedrawingofinferencesis,inotherwords,aninherentandunavoidableaspectofapanel’sbasictaskoffindingandcharacterizingthefactsmakingupadispute.Incontrast,theburdenofproofisaproceduralconceptwhichspeakstothefairandorderlymanagementanddispositionofadispute.Theburdenofproofisdistinctfrom,andisnottobeconfusedwith,thedrawingofinferencesfromfacts.
　　[…]
　　However,ordinarilythepanelshouldnotrequestadditionalinformationtocompletetherecordwheretheinformationwouldsupportaparticularparty’spositionandtheabsenceofthatinformationintherecordistheresultofunreasonablenon-cooperationbythatpartyintheinformation-gatheringprocess.
　　[…]
　　ThereisnologicalreasonwhytheMembersoftheWTOwould,inconceivingandconcludingtheSCMAgreement,havegrantedpanelstheauthoritytodrawinferencesincasesinvolvingactionablesubsidiesthatmaybeillegaliftheyhavecertaintradeeffects,butnotincasesthatinvolveprohibitedexportsubsidiesforwhichtheadverseeffectsarepresumed.Tothecontrary,theappropriateinferenceisthattheauthoritytodrawadverseinferencesfromaMember’srefusaltoprovideinformationbelongsafortiorialsotopanelsexaminingclaimsofprohibitedexportsubsidies.Indeed,thatauthorityseemstousanordinaryaspectofthetaskofallpanelstodeterminetherelevantfactsofanydisputeinvolvinganycoveredagreement:aviewsupportedbythegeneralpracticeandusageofinternationaltribunals.
　　[…]
　　Clearly,inourview,thePanelhadthelegalauthorityandthediscretiontodrawinferencesfromthefactsbeforeit-includingthefactthatCanadahadrefusedtoprovideinformationsoughtbythePanel.…”
　　Also,thisisconfirmedbytheAppellateBodyinUS-WheatGluten(DS166)byrulingthat:47
　　“WebeginbynotingourstrongagreementwiththePanelthata‘serioussystemicissue’israisedbythequestionoftheprocedureswhichshouldgoverntheprotectionofinformationrequestedbyapanelunderArticle13.1oftheDSUandwhichisallegedbyaMembertobe‘confidential’.Webelievethattheseissuesneedtobeaddressed.
　　Next,werecallthatwestated,inouroriginalreportinCanada-Aircraft,thatMembersoftheWTO‘are…underadutyandanobligationto“respondpromptlyandfully”torequestsmadebypanelsforinformationunderArticle13.1oftheDSU’.Inthiscase,despitethefactthatthePanelproposedtoexerciseitsauthority,underArticle12.1oftheDSU,todetermineitsownproceduresbyadoptingtwodifferentproceduresfortheprotectionofbusinessconfidentialinformation,theUnitedStatesdeclinedtomakeavailabletothePanel,andrepresentativesoftheEuropeanCommunities,certaininformationrequestedbythePanelunderArticle13.1oftheDSU.AstheAppellateBodysaidinCanada-Aircraft,therefusalbyaMembertoprovideinformationrequestedofitunderminesseriouslytheabilityofapaneltomakeanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsandthematter,asrequiredbyArticle11oftheDSU.SucharefusalalsounderminestheabilityofotherMembersoftheWTOtoseekthe‘prompt’and‘satisfactory’resolutionofdisputesundertheprocedures‘forwhichtheybargainedinconcludingtheDSU’.Inthisspecificcase,thePanelacknowledgedthathavingaccesstoalloftheinformationrequestedfromtheUnitedStates‘wouldhavefacilitated[an]objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.We,therefore,deploretheconductoftheUnitedStates.
　　However,wenotethattheroleoftheAppellateBody,onthisissue,islimitedtodeterminingwhetherthePanelhaserredunderArticle11oftheDSU.Inthatrespect,werecallthat,inCanada-Aircraft,theAppellateBodyobservedthat:
　　…Thedrawingofinferencesis,inotherwords,aninherentandunavoidableaspectofapanel’sbasictaskoffindingandcharacterizingthefactsmakingupadispute.
　　[…]
　　Clearly,inourview,thePanelhadthelegalauthorityandthediscretiontodrawinferencesfromthefactsbeforeit-includingthefactthatCanadahadrefusedtoprovideinformationsoughtbythePanel.
　　We,therefore,characterizedthedrawingofinferencesasa‘discretionary’taskfallingwithinapanel’sdutiesunderArticle11oftheDSU.InCanada-Aircraft,whichinvolvedasimilarfactualsituation,thepaneldidnotdrawanyinferences‘adverse’toCanada’sposition.Onappeal,weheldthattherewasnobasistofindthatthepanelhadimproperlyexerciseditsdiscretionsince‘thefullensembleofthefactsontherecord’supportedthepanel’sconclusion.
　　Initsappeal,theEuropeanCommunitiesplacesconsiderableemphasisonthefailureofthePaneltodraw‘adverse’inferencesfromtherefusaloftheUnitedStatestoprovideinformationrequestedbythePanel.AsweemphasizedinCanada-Aircraft,underArticle11oftheDSU,apanelmustdrawinferencesonthebasisofallofthefactsofrecordrelevanttotheparticulardeterminationtobemade.WhereapartyrefusestoprovideinformationrequestedbyapanelunderArticle13.1oftheDSU,thatrefusalwillbeoneoftherelevantfactsofrecord,andindeedanimportantfact,tobetakenintoaccountindeterminingtheappropriateinferencetobedrawn.However,ifapanelweretoignoreordisregardotherrelevantfacts,itwouldfailtomakean‘objectiveassessment’underArticle11oftheDSU.Inthiscase,asthePanelobserved,therewereotherfactsofrecordthatthePanelwasrequiredtoincludeinits‘objectiveassessment’.Accordingly,werejecttheEuropeanCommunities’argumentstotheextentthattheysuggestthatthePanelerredinnotdrawingadverseinferencessimplyfromtherefusaloftheUnitedStatestoprovidecertaininformationrequestedfromitbythePanelunderArticle13.1oftheDSU.
　　InreviewingtheinferencesthePaneldrewfromthefactsofrecord,ourtaskonappealisnottoredoafreshthePanel’sassessmentofthosefacts,anddecideforourselveswhatinferenceswewoulddrawfromthem.Rather,wemustdeterminewhetherthePanelimproperlyexerciseditsdiscretion,underArticle11,byfailingtodrawcertaininferencesfromthefactsbeforeit.Inaskingustoconductsuchareview,anappellantmustindicateclearlythemannerinwhichapanelhasimproperlyexerciseditsdiscretion.Takingintoaccountthefullensembleofthefacts,theappellantshould,atleast:identifythefactsontherecordfromwhichthePanelshouldhavedrawninferences;indicatethefactualorlegalinferencesthatthepanelshouldhavedrawnfromthosefacts;and,finally,explainwhythefailureofthepaneltoexerciseitsdiscretionbydrawingtheseinferencesamountstoanerroroflawunderArticle11oftheDSU.”
　　
　　VConcludingRemarks
　　Rulesofevidenceareacrucialissuewithrespecttoreachingconclusionoflawandfact.WithregardtothisissueundertheWTOjurisprudence,“pursuanttoArticles12and13oftheDSUandinordertoconductanobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthematterpursuanttoArticle11DSU…,weasapanelhavebroadlegalauthoritytocontroltheprocessbywhichweinformourselvesoftherelevantfactsofthedisputeandthelegalprinciplesapplicabletosuchfacts.WeasapanelhavethemandateandthedutytomanagethePanelproceedingsandtheabilitytoposequestionstothepartiesinordertoclarifyanddistilthelegalargumentsthatareassertedbythepartiesinsupportoftheirclaims.…Inparticular,weareawarethat,inourquestionsposedtotheparties,wemustnot‘oversteptheboundsoflegitimatemanagementorguidanceoftheproceedings…intheinterestofefficiencyanddispatch’.However,thefactthatitisforthepartyassertingtheaffirmativeofaparticularclaimordefencetodischargetheburdenofproofdoesnotmeanthatapanelisfrozenintoinactivity.Webelievethatjustastheextensivediscretionaryauthorityofapaneltorequestinformationfromanysource(includingaMemberthatisapartytothedispute)isnotconditionaluponapartyhavingestablished,onaprimafaciebasis,aclaimordefence,soalsoapanel’sextensiveauthoritytoputquestionstothepartiesinordertoinformitselfoftherelevantfactsofthedisputeandthelegalconsiderationsapplicabletosuchfactsisnotconditionalinanywayuponapartyhavingestablished,onaprimafaciebasis,aclaimordefence.WeviewthisauthorityasessentialinordertocarryoutourmandateandresponsibilityundertheDSU”.48
　　Itisparticularlywithintheprovinceandtheauthorityofapaneltodeterminetheneedforinformationandadviceinaspecificcase,toascertaintheacceptabilityandrelevancyofsuchinformationorotherevidenceorargumentsreceived,andtodecidewhatweighttoascribetothemortoconcludethatnoweightatallshouldbegiventowhathasbeenreceived.AsageneralrulewellestablishedinthepracticeunderWTOdisputesettlementsystem,panelshavewidelatitudeinadmittingevidence,argumentsordefencesmadebypartiestoaparticularcase,orseekinginformationfromanyrelevantsourcesastheydeemappropriate。However,panels’exerciseofsuchbroaddiscretiondoesnotprejudgeinanywaytheissueofwhetherpanelswillusetheinformation,norwhethertheinformationisrelevanttothematterathand.Thereisasignificantandsubstantivedifferencebetweenquestionsconcerningtheadmissibilityofevidenceortheseekingofinformation,andtheweighttobeaccordedevidenceorinformationinmakingdecisions.
　　Inshort,Arts.12and13oftheDSUaccordtoapanelampleandextensiveauthoritytoundertakeandtocontrolitsprocess.Thatauthority,andthebreadththereof,isindispensablynecessarytoenableapaneltodischargeitsdutyimposedbyArt.11oftheDSUto“makeanobjectiveassessment”.However,apanelmustalsobecarefultoobservedueprocess,whichentailsprovidingthepartiesadequateopportunitytorespondtotheevidencesubmitted.Wewishtoemphasizethatthediscretionthatpanelsenjoyinthemannertheydeemappropriatedoesnot,ofcourse,detractfromtheirobligation,underArt.11oftheDSU,toconduct“anobjectiveassessment”ofthematterbeforethem.
　　However,asstatedbytheAppellateBodyinUS-Shrimp(DS58),it“maybewelltostressattheoutsetthataccesstothedisputesettlementprocessoftheWTOislimitedtoMembersoftheWTO.Thisaccessisnotavailable,undertheWTOAgreementandthecoveredagreementsastheycurrentlyexist,toindividualsorinternationalorganizations,whethergovernmentalornon-governmental.OnlyMembersmaybecomepartiestoadisputeofwhichapanelmaybeseized,andonlyMembers‘havingasubstantialinterestinamatterbeforeapanel’maybecomethirdpartiesintheproceedingsbeforethatpanel.Thus,undertheDSU,onlyMemberswhoarepartiestoadispute,orwhohavenotifiedtheirinterestinbecomingthirdpartiesinsuchadisputetotheDSB,havealegalrighttomakesubmissionsto,andhavealegalrighttohavethosesubmissionsconsideredby,apanel.Correlatively,apanelisobligedinlawtoacceptandgivedueconsiderationonlytosubmissionsmadebythepartiesandthethirdpartiesinapanelproceeding.Thesearebasiclegalpropositions…”49
　　
　　
　　
　　【NOTE】:
　　1    See,WT/DS160/R/6.15.
　　2    See,WT/DS33/AB/R/Ⅳ.
　　3    See,WT/DS155/R/11.11.
　　4    See,WT/DS192/R/7.22.
　　5    See,WT/DS189/R/6.6.
　　6    See,WT/DS160/R/6.12-6.14.
　　7    See,WT/DS44/R/10.29.
　　8    See,WT/DS33/AB/R/Ⅳ.
　　9    See,WT/DS33/AB/R/Ⅳ.
　　10    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/104.
　　11    See,WT/DS44/R/10.32.
　　12    See,WT/DS34/R/9.57.
　　13    See,e.g.,WT/DS22/R/287orWT/DS75/R;WT/DS84/R/10.19.
　　14    See,WT/DS126/R/9.32-9.33.
　　15    See,WT/DS75/R;WT/DS84/R/10.23.
　　16    See,See,WT/DS132/R/7.41.
　　17    See,WT/DS141/R/6.33.
　　18    See,WT/DS141/R/6.34.
　　19    See,Kazazi,Mojtaba,BurdenofProofandRelatedIssues-AStudyofEvidenceBeforeInternationalTribunals,Malanczuk,Peter,ed.,KluwerLawInternational,TheHague,pp.180,184.
　　20    See,WT/DS75/R;WT/DS84/R/10.23.
　　21    See,WT/DS141/R,note22.
　　22    See,WT/DS202/R/7.14.
　　23    See,WT/DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R/117.
　　24    See,WT/DS177/AB/R;WT/DS178/AB/R/112-115.
　　25    See,WT/DS56/AB/R/79.
　　26    See,WT/DS27/AB/R/142.
　　27    See,WT/DS27/AB/R/141.
　　28    See,WT/DS122/R/7.43.
　　29    See,WT/DS26/ARB/156.
　　30    See,WT/DS18/AB/R/272.
　　31    See,WT/DS56/AB/R/79.
　　32    See,WT/DS70/R/9.71-9.74;9.77.
　　33    See,WT/DS56/AB/R/80.
　　34    See,WT/DS56/R/6.55.
　　35    Article13oftheDSUreadsundertheheadingof“RighttoSeekInformation”:
　　“1.Eachpanelshallhavetherighttoseekinformationandtechnicaladvicefromanyindividualorbodywhichitdeemsappropriate.However,beforeapanelseekssuchinformationoradvicefromanyindividualorbodywithinthejurisdictionofaMemberitshallinformtheauthoritiesofthatMember.AMembershouldrespondpromptlyandfullytoanyrequestbyapanelforsuchinformationasthepanelconsidersnecessaryandappropriate.Confidentialinformationwhichisprovidedshallnotberevealedwithoutformalauthorizationfromtheindividual,body,orauthoritiesoftheMemberprovidingtheinformation.
　　2.Panelsmayseekinformationfromanyrelevantsourceandmayconsultexpertstoobtaintheiropiniononcertainaspectsofthematter.Withrespecttoafactualissueconcerningascientificorothertechnicalmatterraisedbyapartytoadispute,apanelmayrequestanadvisoryreportinwritingfromanexpertreviewgroup.RulesfortheestablishmentofsuchagroupanditsproceduresaresetforthinAppendix4.”
　　36    See,WT/DS76/AB/R/84.
　　37    See,WT/DS70/R/9.89.
　　38    See,WT/DS70/AB/R/192.
　　39    See,WT/DS58/AB/R/104-108.
　　40    See,WT/DS70/R/9.50.
　　41    See,WT/DS70/R/9.53.
　　42    See,WT/DS70/R/9.94.
　　43    See,WT/DS70/AB/R/182.
　　44    See,WT/DS70/AB/R/184-185.
　　45    See,WT/DS70/AB/R/187-192.
　　46    See,WT/DS70/AB/R/198-206.
　　47    See,WT/DS166/AB/R/170-176.
　　48    See,WT/DS122/R/7.50.
　　49    See,WT/DS58/AB/R/101.
　　
　　


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