amin公司生產油漆已有117年的歷史，並擁有數千家的獨立經銷商，這也是他們最
珍貴的資產，記得下次買油漆時指名該公司的產品。
Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about
$1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades -
too multifaceted to be chronicled here - was shaped by its long history as a
manufacturer of asbestosproducts. The much-publicized health problems that
affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy
in 1982.
最後在十二月底，我們同意以18億美元買下Johns Manville公司(簡稱JM)，這家公司過
去幾十年來創造了令人難以置信的傳奇-族煩不及備載，其中又以生產石綿產品最為著
名，當時因為石綿引發許多人致癌的健康問題而導致該公司在1982年宣佈申請破產。

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the
major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which
sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the
business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though,
the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.
之後破產法庭為受害人成立了一筆信託基金，其中最主要的資產就是JM的多數股權，而
這筆信託基金為了要分散其資產配置，於是在去年六月同意將該公司賣給一位融資購併
業者，只是後來由於該業者無法順利取得融資而使得交易告吹。
Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following
Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an
all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees
voted tentatively to
accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.
之後到了12月8號星期五交易正式宣佈取消，隔週，查理跟我打電話給Bob Felise-該信
託基金的董事會主席，提出全部現金不必等候融資的條件，隔天信託基金臨時表決接受
我們的提案，並於一個星期後正式簽訂契約。
JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation
and also has major positions in roofing systems and a <I>var</I>iety of
engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business
has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced
his retirement plans a year ago,
but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick
around.
JM是全美商業用與工業用隔熱材料的領導品牌，同時在屋頂裝設與其他工業產品也佔有
相當大的市場，該公司的年營業額超過20億美金，同時也享有不錯的獲利水準，(當然
該公司還是有景氣循環)，該公司總裁Jerry Henry本來已宣佈一年後計畫要退休，但在
這裡我很高興向各位報告，查理跟我已經成功說服他繼續留下來。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
　Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition
activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw
near-term lowdowns in their businesses - and, in fact, we purchased several
companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks
they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given
that we expect all of our businesses to
now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of
investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the
bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other
people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur
sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete
with us.
去年購併案之所以會蜂擁而現，主要有兩個原因，首先，許多經理人跟老闆都預視到自
己公司的產業即將走下坡，事實上在我們這次買下來的公司當中，確實就有好幾家今年
的盈餘將會較1999年或2000年減少，不過對於這點我們並不介意，因為每個產業都會有
景氣循環，(只有在券商做的投資簡報中，盈餘才會無止盡地成長)，我們不在乎這短期
的波折，真正重要的是長期的結果，當然有些人會比較看重短期的成敗，而這反而能增
加賣方出售的意願或降低其他潛在買家的競爭意願。
　A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds
dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond
purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of
ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were
felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, "finan

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