通常都不會是什麼好
消息。
　The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
<I>var</I>ious segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we
entered the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company
(whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary"). For
the table we have calculated our float - which we generate in large amounts
relative to our premium volume - by adding net loss reserves, loss
adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related
receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges
applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don’t panic, there won’t be a quiz.)
下表中所顯示的數字是，Berkshire自取得國家產險公司經營權，進入保險事業34年以
來所貢獻的浮存金，(其中傳統業務包含在其他主險項下)，在這張計算浮存金的表中，
(相對於收到的保費收入，我們持有的浮存金部位算是相當大的) 我們將所有的損失準
備、損失費用調整準備、再保預先收取的資金與未賺取保費加總後，再扣除應付佣金、
預付購併成本、預付稅負以及取得再保業務的相關遞延費用後，所得出浮存金的數額，
不要緊張，這不是什麼考試!

Yearend Float (in $ millions)

Year
GEICO
General Re
Other
Reinsurance
Other
Primary
Total

1967
　 　 　 20
20

1977
　 　 40
131
171

1987
　 　 701
807
1,508

1997
2,917
　 4,014
455
7,386

1998
3,125
14,909
4,305
415
22,754

1999
3,444
15,166
6,285
403
25,298

2000
3,943
15,525
7,805
598
27,871

　　　　　We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not
happy
with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to
zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the
occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering
19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion,
which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect
our float cost to fall in 2001 - perhaps substantially - in large part
because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly
be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may
experience the same improving trend.

對於2000年的浮存金成長我們感到相當欣慰，但卻對其成本不甚滿意，一直以
來，我們浮存金成本通常都維持在接近於零的低水準，有時好的時候，還能享有
可觀的承保利益，來彌補像1984年那樣糟糕的年度，當年的資金成本高達
19%，不過2000年我們的承保損失卻高達16億美金，這使得我們的浮存金成
本飆高至6%，除非再發生什麼重大的災難，否則我們預期2001年的浮存金成
本將會大幅下降，主要的原因是General RE已經逐漸開始反映調整價格，至於
GEICO雖然規模較小，但也應該會有同樣的情形。

　　　　　There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very
rare at
other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers
that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant
portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings
but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that
we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs
attached to this business.

相較於其他保險同業，Berkshire現在有兩項相當罕見但卻越來越重要的因素影
響到其浮存金的成本，第一是部份同業目前正面臨相當嚴重的承保損失，迫使我
們必須跟著分攤，而影響到我們短期的盈餘表現，但另一方面也讓我們在未來幾
年有更多的浮存金可以運用，而在保單第一年的損失發生過後，以後年度將不會
再有這方面的成本。

　　　　　When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the
pain-today,
gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our
underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this
kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We
have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the
future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because
these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you
about them as they occur.

只要保單的價格合理，我們樂於接受這類先苦後甘的結果，在1999年所有的承
保損失當中，有4億美元(約佔總損失的27.8%)是來自於這類的業務，至於2000
年則有4.82億美元(約佔總損失的34.4%)，我們無法預測以後每年能夠接到多
少這類的業務，不過只要有案件金額通常都

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