族他們的公司絕不會與其他珠寶公司合併時，我們可是絕對說到
做到。
　How much better it is for the "painter" of a business Rembrandt to
personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or
uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great
experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their
business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.
就像是林布蘭畫作一樣珍貴的公司，與其讓信託人或不肖的子孫把它拍賣掉，還不如由
畫家本身選擇其最後的歸宿，這幾年來我們與有這樣認知的人士有過非常多愉快的經
驗，並讓這些感覺一直延續到這些企業上，至於拍賣這玩意兒，就留給別人去用吧。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance產物意外險的經營
　Our main business - though we have others of great importance - is
insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you
understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are:
(1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3)
most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
我們最主要的本業就是保險，當然其他事業也相當重要，想要了解Berkshire，你就必
須知道如何去評估一家保險公司，其中主要的關鍵因素有(1)這個行業所能產生的浮存
金數量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是這些因素長期的展望。
　To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance
operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are
paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time,
the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with
it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover
the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an
"underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has
value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon
if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先浮存金是一項我們持有但卻不屬於我們的資金，在保險公司的營運中，浮存金產生
的原因在於保險公司在真正支付損失理賠之前，一般會先向保戶收取保費，在這期間保
險公司會將資金運用在其他投資之上，當然這樣的好處也必須要付出代價，通常保險業
者收取的保費並不足以因應最後支付出去的相關損失與費用，於是保險公司便會發生承
保損失，這就是浮存金的成本，而當一家公司取得浮存金成本，就長期而言低於從其它
管道取得資金的成本時，它就有存在的價值，否則一旦保險事業取得浮存金的成本若遠
高於貨幣市場利率時，它就像是一顆極酸的檸檬。
　A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated,
insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and
that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true
cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can
be huge. The consequences of these iscalculations flow directly into
earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in
reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept
what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that
big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and
balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
有一點必須特別注意的是，因為損失成本必須仰賴估算，所以保險業者對於承保結算的
成績有相當大伸縮的空間，連帶使得投資人很難正確地衡量一家保險公司真正的浮存金
成本，估計錯誤，通常是無心，但有時卻是故意，與真實的結果往往會有很大的差距，
而這種結果直接影響到公司的損益表上，有經驗的行家通常可以經由公司的準備提列情
形發現重大的錯誤，但對於一般投資大眾來說，除了被迫接受財務報表的數字之外，別
無他法，而我個人常常被這些經過各大會計師事務所背書的財務報告所嚇到，許多保險
公司的損益表與資產負債表上佈滿了許多地雷。
At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our
reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing
symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always
are unpleasant.
在Berkshire我們對於損失準備提列盡量採取保守且一貫的做法，但我們仍不免會犯
錯，不過我還是要警告大家，保險業本來就會發生很多意外，而且

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