batable part of Korean Practices is in the territorial sea in the Strait the requirement for foreign warships or other government ships to give prior notice to the Korean authority before passing， which seems to happen only frequently in the straits. Article 4 of the Enforcement Decree in 1978， supra， rules that， “if a foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes intends to navigate through the territorial sea， it shall notify the following particulars to the Minister of Foreign Affairs not later than three（3） days （excluding public holidays） prior to its passage in accordance with the latter part of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the law， except in cases where the area of the waters through which the aforementioned ship navigates forms a strait used for international navigation in which no high seas route exists： （1） Name， type and official number of the ship； （2） Purpose of the passage； and （3） Passage route and schedule”。 This provision emphasized the exception where there is no any alternative high seas route. In fact， in this issue， the innocent passage， the transit passage， and the high seas route are overlapped in combination， theoretically.

　　Besides Korea Strait， there being only other significant strait on the international law is the Cheju Strait off the Korean southern coast， which is approximately half as wide as the Korea Strait Western Channel. If the Korean current straight baselines were combined with the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea of the Cheju Island， the Cheju Strait would be closed and becomes a territorial strait. In the 1960s and 1970s during the negotiation between Korea and Japan， Korea refused the suggestion by USA and Japan that Korea had better reserve a high sea corridor through the Cheju Strait. Albeit， geographically concurring， an alternate high sea route lies south of Cheju Island. So， Korea can apply both innocent passage and prior notice requirement to the foreign governmental ships passing， which is the same as the situation in Korea Strait. So there is no such kind of strait fulfilling the exception along the Korean coast and the prior notice is an absolute system.

　　The problem is how to justify this requirement on public international law. The only one ground is the 1956 International Law Commission‘s Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea prepared for the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva， provided： The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage subject to the observance of the provisions of Articles 17 and 18. But it was not adopted for lack of majority. The 1982 Convention did not explicitly make any reference to the prior notice to or prior authorization from the costal state on passage， either， because NATO and Warsaw blocs deny it. And this can demonstrate the reason why Korea give such seemingly exaggerated convenience in its maritime claim in Korea Strait to the Super Power Soviet Union， which is one of the only two countries with coastal lines in Warsaw blocs and the fundamental representative of the blocs’ opinion in any international affair. Although the era period has passed， the military balance and security requirement in the Far East has not fundamentally changed， resulting in the stability of this kind of claim.

　　Turning back to the prior notice， even Article 25 of the 1982 Convention is not persuasive or at least not capable of such inference， although the right of transit passage statutorily cannot be barred. The Korean scholars try to justify this requirement in two ways. One is to distinguish the prior notice from the prior authorization regime. But they seem lack of demonstrability besides the denial expression.（1） And this is not the vital argumentation. The key point is on the grounds of Korean security， “as the 1953 Armistice Agreement that the United Nations forces concluded with both North Korea and the People‘s Republic of China （PRC） does not formally terminate the state of war in the Korean peninsula”（2）。 Logically， it’s understandable for Korea to adopt such a requirement. In my opinion， the Korean War has ended fifty years before， even without any testimony of international law， but still， the practical fact that some countries do not require prior notice or authorization does not mean that a state would not be entitled to require such notification or authorization if it deemed it necessary to this requirement as precautionary measures. It should be considered as part of maritime international law. That‘s why Professor Brownlie said， it’s clear that a significant number， and perhaps a majority， of states require prior authorization （or prior notice——author） for the passage of warships， and as a consequence， dogmatic assertions of a right of passage have an aspect of advocacy.（3） I agree with him.

　　Other Practices

　　Furthermore， there are contending interests——fishing， shipping， exploration， security， and freedoms of navigation——in use of the Korea Strait between the various countries that most use the Strait （the Koreas， Japan， Russia， China， and the United States）。 These interests tend to interfere with each other. One method for reconciling some of the conflicts between shipping and other interests is with a maritime traffic control （MTC） scheme. There has currently no very active MTC scheme in the Strait until 1997. MTC schemes include active Vessel Traffic Service （VTS） systems and passive Traffic Separation Systems （TSS）。 A VTS system does not seem appropriate for the Korea Strait at this time because of its cost and complexity. However， a TSS would be appropriate. A TSS could possibly alleviate potential conflicts of interest in the Strait. It could increase transparency even while regional navies grow； it could dampen the possibility

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