外唯一的一種股份，B級普通股則擁有A級普通股三十分之一的權利。
　Overall, we had a decent year, our book-value gain having outpaced the
performance of the S&P 500. And, though this judgment is necessarily
subjective, we believe Berkshire’s gain in per-share intrinsic value
moderately exceeded its gain in book value. (Intrinsic value, as well as
other key investment and accounting terms and concepts, are explained in our
Owner’s Manual on pages 59-66. Intrinsic value is
discussed on page 64.)
總的來說，Berkshire去年的表現還算不錯，不管是每股淨值或價值的表現都超
越S&P500指數，雖然這樣的說法略顯主觀，但我們認為Berkshire每股實質
價值的成長甚至超過帳面價值的成長，(不管是投資學或是會計學，實質價值都
是相當關鍵的一個名詞，有關實質價值詳細的說明，請參閱股東手冊)。
　Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated
in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about
$8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight
businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and
employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases,
and our shares outstanding have
increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and
are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.
去年我們一口氣完成八件購併案，其中有兩件從1999年就開始談，這些案子的
金額總計高達80億美元，所有資金完全依靠自有資金支應，沒有舉債半毛錢，
其中97%是以現金支付，其餘3%則用股票，所以流通在外股份僅增加0.3個百
分點而已，這八家企業的年營業額合計高達130億美元，雇用員工58,000名，
更棒的是目前我們手上的現金依然滿滿，隨時準備再買下更大的公司。
　　　　　I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But
I will
tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such
cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to
control your excitement.
不要太著急，後面我還會再詳細跟各位報告合併案的內容，在這裡，我要向各位
報告，展望21世紀，我們將大舉進軍磚塊、地毯、隔熱品與油漆等實體的尖端
產業。
　On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as the
year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new business. I
told you last year that we would get our money’s worth from stepped-up
advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We’ll examine the reasons
later in the report.
另一方面，GEICO的保戶成長速度出現停滯的現象，取得新保單的成本越來越
高，去年我曾跟各位打包票說我們所投入大筆廣告經費保證值回票價，事實證明
我的判斷是錯誤的，在報告的後段我們還會再仔細檢討原因。
　Another negative - which has persisted for several years - is that we see
our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some
excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are
unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We’re not
alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in general
is far from exciting.
另外還有一項幾年來一直存在的負面消息，那就是目前我們的股票投資組合的價
位還是沒有太大的吸引力，我們確實擁有一些本質不錯的股票，但這些公司的股
價大多已合理反應其價值，所以在未來很難再有爆發性的投資報酬，這絕非單一
現象，目前整體股市的長期前景並不像一般人想的那麼樂觀。
　Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger,
Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than when
we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is the
indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a
considerably lower rate - percentage-wise - than is the case at almost all
other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the
future.
最後還有一項每年都會發生的壞消息，那就是查理曼格-Berkshire的副董事長兼主要合
夥人以及我本人，相較於去年又都老了一歲，所幸比起其他美國大企業來說，我們的主
要經理人老化的速度可以說要慢得多(年度/年齡)，而且這種差異以後還會越來越大。
　Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire’s per-share value
at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P
500. As the table on the faci

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