nly the sensed states emphasized sovereignty in remote sensing activities， but also the sensor states highlighted it on verification issue. Data is treasure， and before ideally contributed to and shared by the world， must be proprietary by some subjects， whether there is any agreement or not. To resolve such communicative problem， in 1978， a proposal to create an International Satellite Control Agency was tabled by France during the first session of the Disarmament Conference of the United Nations held in New York. This proposal again came up for debate at the Second Disarmament Conference in 1982. The main motivation behind the proposal was inspired by military considerations.（24）

　　“Among the most important tasks to be entrusted to the Agency under the French proposal would be the acquisition， processing and dissemination of data and /or information. ‘Data’ in this context would include rough images and electromagnetic signals obtained by the Agency‘s satellites， or put at its disposal by satellite-operating States. ’Information‘ would include the analysed results of the data as well as all other information on arms systems， geographical conditions， military installations etc.， which would be useful to the Agency in accomplishing its duties. Such auxiliary information would become available either from freely accessible sources or be supplied by individual member States.”（25） Regretfully， such proposal did not seek for supportive comments from U.S. or USSR at that time， and was nullified with regards to excessive expenditure involved.（26） Albeit； in the UN Principles， such directive spirit was incorporated in Principle VIII， “The United Nations and the relevant agencies within the United Nations system shall promote international cooperation， including technical assistance and coordination in the area of remote sensing”。 However， without realistic attraction to technically developed countries， how come it seems much chance of this strategy realized in the foreseeable future？ So， such problems are staying a host of discussion in the scholarly literatures.

　　Finally， turning backwards to Principle IV， the declaration of sensed state‘s legitimate rights on sovereignty， deemed as not incentive for controversy as aforementioned， had strictly interpreted as only referring to the conduct of remote sensing activities but not including the detrimental results caused by dissemination of data， especially to the non-participant states. While the U.S. accepted international responsibility for the outer space activities of its governmental or non-governmental entities， it could never accept the extension of such responsibility to terrestrial activities， as championed by the Soviet-led socialist countries， except in accordance with generally recognized principle of international law. （27） Reaching compromises in correspondence with such attitudes， the Principles states logically circular recommendations in Principle XIV（28） ， and a non-envisaged dispute settlement procedure in Principle XV（29） . In sum， the enforcement of international liability is also controversial but beyond this article.

　　「注释」

　　1 See， Prof. Dr. I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor： An Introduction to Space Law， p. 68， Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers， Deventer-Boston， 1993

　　2 Principle I， part of paragraph （a）， “The term ‘remote sensing’ means the sensing of the Earth‘s surface from space by making use of the properties of electromagnetic waves emitted， reflected or diffracted by the sensed objects” and （b） – （d）。

　　3 Part of Principle II， “Remote Sensing activities shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries， irrespective of their degree of economic， social or scientific and technological development，…”

　　4 Principle III， “Remote sensing activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law， including the Charter of the United Nations， the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space， including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies， and the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union.”

　　5 Part of Principle IV， “Remote sensing activities shall be conducted in accordance with the principles contained in article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space， including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies， which， in particular， provides that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries， irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development， and stipulates the principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space on the basis of equality”。

　　6 Part of Principle IV， “These activities shall be conducted on the basis of respect for the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own wealth and natural resources， with due regard to the rights and interests， in accordance with international law， of other States and entities under their jurisdiction. Such activities shall not be conducted in a manner detrimental to the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed State”。

　　7 See， N.M. Matte  H. DeSaussure： Legal Implications of Remote Sensing from Outer Space， eds. 1974， 1976， contributions presented at proceedings of the Symposium appeared in citation of Legal Implications， held at McGill University， Montreal， Canada， Oct. 1975

　　8 See， Stephen Gorove： Development in Space Law， Issues and Policies， p.306， Martinus Nijhoff Publishers， P.O. Box 163， 3300 AD Dordrecht， The Nethelands， Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of， 1991. Part of Principle IX， “In accordance with article IV of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 4 and article XI of the Tr

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