首 页       用户登录  |  用户注册
设为首页
加入收藏
联系我们
按字母检索 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
按声母检索 A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T W X Y Z 数字 符号
您的位置: 5VAR论文频道论文中心法律论文商法
   The SOE reform in China      ★★★ 【字体: 】  
The SOE reform in China
收集整理:佚名    来源:本站整理  时间:2009-02-04 16:25:02   点击数:[]    

e medium and small SOEs contracted out or leased to private, the non-state economy began to obtain the equity right and chance as state-owned sector.
3) When the whole economic environments are taken into account, then we can find that there were no condition to reduce the some public burdens of SOE, because before the establishment of a consummate legal system and the social security system, SOE must act as the natural insurance for the citizens. The private economic sector pursues only profit, thus it is not tend to take the responsibility of accommodation more labor forces. In the case that the economic situation turns worse or the reform was not successful or fail, the SOEs can still keep the society from collapse even through inefficient operation.
Based upon above reasons, China took a gradually reform strategy, in which the SOEs played an important role to maintain a safe social and economic reform in such a big country. However, if there were not further reform, the problem of the SOEs will lead to discontent conversely.

4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
At earlier time, in order to meet the development of the reform, some economist held the view called “depoliticization”, it means reducing the influence from the authority step by step, therefore to prevent it from making manageable decisions for SOEs directly as well as to cut down the interference from the Party. Such kind of plan suggested three steps, separation of enterprises from the government, establishment of mechanisms for selecting managers and release from the social responsibilities.
As we have observed, the reform followed partly this kind of theory. Unfortunately, such suggestion focuses only on management of SOEs, hence it is not the end solution. Keeping with this way, then there are rare possibilities to carry out further reform by SOEs themselves automatically and the SOEs performance will not turn better dramatically. Because government does not want to voluntarily give up their right in the SOEs. Even the government officer has still benefit from the enterprises; they can not only usually become tribute from the enterprises, but also write off some personal expense in the enterprise. Even if the enterprise falls in bad situation, they benefit from helping the enterprise to apply state allocation or from obtaining a piece of the property through the disposal of the enterprises properties.
At another side, SOE prefer to stand under the cover of the government too, so that they can continue enjoying the benefit of de fecto soft budget constraint (7) . And at least, the manager will not be laid off. Besides, so long as the enterprise is state owned, managers are still in bureaucratic hierarchy, they are lacking of inner incentive to take commercial risks like a professional manager. Although the corporate governance are adopted, they are not owner of the asset eventually, so it is better for them to maintain the current position as a cadre, enjoying the respect and welfare as a officer, but not a businessman. Therefore, the normal manager in SOEs is still conservative in contrast with those in private sector.
Based on above points, if the enterprise is as state owned, the defects can’t be dispelled, then the way left is to change its basic character, it means the change of property ownership. Actually, when Chinese government began to establish a modern enterprise system, the transformation of ownership was implied. Nevertheless, privatization is still a sensitive topic in China, however the transformation of ownership and offering equal treatment to private owned enterprise, protecting legitimacy of private property has already become a common social understanding in China. Most Chinese economists accept now, that the transformation of ownership must to be involved to eliminate the defects of the SOE further. There are many suggestion in according to the transition, for example, sale as a whole or MBO (management buyout) are suggested to solve the medium and small state-owned enterprise issue, because it is viewed can guarantee the value of the enterprise’s assets better; concerning the large-scale enterprises, it is proposed through listing in stock market or reorganizing to mix-share corporate sand to conquer all sorts of weakness of the country as a single stockholder, and through permitting the privately owned capital get involved progressively to implement the transition course gradually. The analyzing of these suggestions is out rage of this essay, but the goal of these suggestions is alike. In fact, a lot of local enterprises have already been reformed in such direction. Chinese State Council determined to reduce the state-run share of the state-run listed companies in 2002, is also reviewed as the behavior that the state-run capital withdraws from SOEs progressively too.
Certainly, there are lots of different opinions. Many people worry that it will lead to the running off of state-run assets during the transition process. For instance, in some cases, the whole enterprise asset will be sold to former manager for free or for very high discount. Though there is clear discount method stipulate, some manager layer and government officer can also conspire in order to defraud larger portion of state assets. Such kind of act leads to losses of the state-run assets naturally, furthermore, it is also a fair problem, and it is apt to cause the sharpening of social dissatisfaction.
The key problem here is, whether a proper method exists to prevent state-run assets from losing at present, when a transition is necessary for further SOE reform? I think one must realize, in China, the corruption can exist under any reform method. Even under the reform carried out through securitisation, the result can be also unjust, the example in Russia was very clear. Furthermo

上一页  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  下一页


Tags:


文章转载请注明来源于:5VAR论文频道 http://paper.5var.com。本站内容整理自互联网,如有问题或合作请Email至:support@5var.com
或联系QQ37750965
提供人:佚名
  • 上一篇文章:谈机动车辆保险合同增加免责条款的法律效力

  • 下一篇文章:管理层收购若干法律问题探析
  • 返回上一页】【打 印】【关闭窗口
    中查找“The SOE reform in China”更多相关内容 5VAR论文频道
    中查找“The SOE reform in China”更多相关内容 5VAR论文频道
    最新热点 最新推荐 相关新闻
  • ››BOT特许协议争端法律解决商法适用之...
  • ››员工住院出险是否构成保险责任
  • ››OTCBB-美国融资上市的新通道
  • ››无争议的股东身份为何须经法院确认...
  • ››公司法与劳动法竞业禁止原则之比较...
  • ››论分公司的当事人能力
  • ››试论公司监事制度
  • ››境内企业到境外上市的法律与实践
  • ››论国际商事仲裁及法院的职能在国际...
  • ››略论汽车品牌销售授权经营合同
  • ››The worlds population初中英语教案...
  • ››The new students初中英语教案
  • ››The Palace Museum(第五册)-教学...
  • ››The trick-教学教案
  • ››The merchant of Venice-教学教案...
  • ››The USA-教学教案
  • ››The trick
  • ››The summer holidays-教学教案
  • ››The summer holidays
  • ››The worlds population-教学教案
  •   文章-网友评论:(评论内容只代表网友观点,与本站立场无关!)
    关于本站 - 网站帮助 - 广告合作 - 下载声明 - 网站地图
    Copyright © 2006-2033 5Var.Com. All Rights Reserved .